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PREFACE
... je vous dis qu'il faut regarder tous les hommes comme nos
freres. Quoi! mon frere Ie Turc? mon frere Ie Chinois? Ie Juif? Ie
Siamois? Qui, sans doute ...
I tell you that we should regard all men as our brothers. What!
My brother the Turk? My brother the Chinese? The Jew? The
Siamese? Yes, definitely ...
VOLTAIRE, Traite sur la tolerance (1763)
This book addresses aspects of the representation of China and its
identity, 'Chineseness,' over the past hundred years or so. Much of
the book analyses the Orientalizing and crude racist ideologies that
have formed the foundations of the way white people, particularly in
Britain, have both popularly and 'scientifically' imagined China. But
the book also discusses how Chinese producers of culture in China,
and in exile, have imagined China, sometimes challenging and some-
times reproducing nationalist narratives of Chineseness. Thus the
book considers, on the one hand, elite literary representations such
as the Chinese contemporary writer Duoduo's story 'Going
Home', and, on the other, popular cultural texts including contem-
porary Chinese television 'soap' serials and MTV clips. British pop-
ular cultural forms which have focussed on Chinese and China, such
as the songs of George Formby and the pantomime Aladdin, also
come within the purview of this book. Last, the increasing number
of relevant texts to be found on the Internet are also used and
critiqued. That stereotypical racist views of Chinese people remain
endemic in British society is beyond question; the chapter on British
cultural representations of the Chinese, Chapter Two, proves as
much I believe. What is perhaps more surprising is the fact that racist
references, often intended to be humorous, have been current at the
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highest levels of social discourse. In a recent report on the British
Labour government's role in industrial arbitration in the 1970s we
read that the chief spokesman of the then Secretary of State for
Unemployment, Barbara Castle, would emerge from late night nego-
tiations to announce signs of successful conciliation with the words:
'Gentlemen, the Chinese electrician is at work,' which translated as
'there's a chink of light.'l
While the author has no intention of denying the material, his-
torical reality of China over the past two centuries, indeed one
ambition of the book is to facilitate seeing that reality more clearly,
what is emphasized in this book is the power of the social imagi-
nary in determining the way those in 'the West' and in China,
whether white, 'Chinese', or 'hybrid', imagine and conceptualise
China. There has been no single way of imagining China, for while
there have been dominant ways of representing China, there have
also been minority and contestatory ways of doing so. Thus, the
pluralism in the title of the book: Chinas Unlimited.
The hybrid mentioned in the preceding paragraph, is intended in
the sense of individuals and communities who have found them-
selves in mixed and in-between situations in the wake of the history
of the colonialism and modernity of the past two centuries. Much
of the book discusses these historical realities in terms of lived
experience and the difficulty of representing that experience. The
hybrid also refers to the socio-cultural practices and ways of being
and expressing that have developed as a result of, and in response
to these new conditions of modernity that individuals and com-
munities have been obliged to accept. The notion of such hybridity
has often been critiqued as a postmodern exculpation of colonial
responsibility, and as a means of slipping into a collective amnesia
that is history-free. I do not disagree with such criticisms of this
postmodern re-invented hybridity. But there are cultural and human
conditions that can and do only correspond to the state of hybridity,
of mixity, of intermingling, of in-betweenness, of liminality, of exist-
ing at the junctions of constantly evolving and rapidly converging
global histories. It is this hybrid reality that is so abhorrent to the
advocates of purity, authenticity, and nationhood.
I was recently made to reflect on the imbrication of hybridity
with postmodernism, which I have never understood as more than
a reality to be lived and negotiated, by arguments advanced by
Ziauddin Sardar who represents postmodernism as but a more
subtle agent of Western cultural imperialism continuing the expan-
sion and the imposition of dominative relations of colonialism and
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modernity. The invention of postmodernism for Sardar constitutes
a process in which Other cultures 'are simply being taken from one
domain of oppression into another.'2
Sardar's condemnation of the cynicism of postmodernism and
his arguments for 'non-western cultural resistance to post-
modernism' are compelling, but the appeal to tradition as the
instrument of transformation of non-western societies into cultures
of resistance' raises certain concerns for me.3 While Sardar is at
pains to distance his conception of 'authentic' tradition from
'traditionalism', whence I would ask is this authenticity to be
resurrected or reinvented, what would it imply in concrete terms,
and would such a reinvention even be desirable? While Sardar sees
the representation of tradition in pre-modern Islamic and Chinese
painting as a 'dynamic force ready to confront the problems of
modernity and the nihilism of postmodernism', can we forget the
economic and technological modes to which pre-modern Chinese
painting corresponded? While I should not oppose the recuperation
of pre-modern painting and other form of cultural productions
from the grip of the Orientalists and sinologists, I am however con-
cerned at the prospect of privileging a supposedly cultural authen-
ticity in the name of respecting 'traditional physical, intellectual
and spiritual environments'.
Where after all is this authentic to be found, or rather how is it
to be (re)invented in societies such as Hong Kong, in diasporic
communities, and indeed in China itself? When and what
'Chineseness' would constitute 'tradition'? Over the past century or
more China has been subjected to forces and ideologies of colo-
nialism, capitalism, and nationalism? As a result China has been
splintered into various fragments. Most strikingly after 1949, the
People's Republic of China developed in a very different way to
nationalist China on Taiwan where a Chinese nationalist govern-
ment and its supporters imposed its rule on a local community that
had already diverged culturally and socially over the preceding cen-
tury. Similarly communities have developed in South-East Asia well
beyond the institutional influence of 'China proper'. But perhaps
the sharpest historical divergences are to be found in the twentieth-
century development of Hong Kong from British colonial outpost
to major bastion of capitalism, at once modern yet still colonised.
The story of the making of the imaginaries of Hong Kong while
unique, also alludes to many of the social and cultural questions
generated by the paths of uneven development onto which the
colonized world has been forced. For instance, how modernity is to
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be married to tradition is a question that has been posed a multi-
tude of times in many once 'traditional' societies. But what is this
'tradition'? Is it static, was it shared by all classes and levels of soci-
ety, and what was the place of woman in such societies? Who, in
other words, defined the 'tradition'?
On this point, the recent history of Hong Kong is instructive. Its
traditions were clearly invented, or their invention nurtured, by the
post-1950s late colonialism of a British authority representing the
interests of post-World War Two neo-colonialism in Asia. That
authority was anxious to construct an alternative Chineseness that
separated Hong Kong from both mainland Communist and Taiwan
nationalist appeals to the patriotic anti-colonialist imaginary. But
in negotiation with that official and imposed alternative Chinese
identity, or Hongkongness, other colonised-produced identities
have been constructed and imagined. None of the resultant cultural
spaces and practices can be described as 'pure' or 'authentic',
rather they represent groups and classes that are found in all
modernized industrial societies. That is not to say that the various
levels and enclaves of Hong Kong society have not developed pecu-
liarities or that there are not traces of pre-modern Chinese social
imaginaries, but the concerns of the majority of Hong Kong people
today - the working class who are intended to imagine themselves
as middle-class - are those of any industrial society subject to the
inevitable (as the financial events of the last few months of 1997
have clearly demonstrated) crises of capitalism. Worries about the
implications for Hong Kong's autonomy or rather its multiple and
multilevelled identities were real, but the major events of 1997 for
most Hong Kong people are seen in the economic reality that was
the prolonged Crash of 1997-1998. For the first time in their lives,
the youth of Hong Kong were awakened to the uncertain and
fluctuating nature of capitalist economic success, and concerns
over unemployment and economic survival in a market-driven yet
heavily state-regulated, non-welfare state economy are now domi-
nant over concerns with local identity. Local identity or identities
can no longer be used simply to mediate the neuroses of postmod-
ern alienation, but must now engage in the de-alienation that will
imply challenging both the historical oppressions of colonialism
and of the dominant economic system.
While concurring with the opinion that there exists a desperate
need to encourage the de-alienation of (post)modernity and to
combat the almost viral nature of ideological legacy of colonialism,
I also want to emphasise the importance of recognizing historical
IX
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realities that have produced 'non-authentic', hybrid lived realities.
Over the past one hundred and fifty years not only social and cul-
tural forces in Hong Kong, but in China as a whole have been
obliged to negotiate the realties of colonialism, semi-colonialism
and neo-colonialism. New forms and practices have evolved or
have been actively developed, new identities have been invented or
imposed. Emancipatory change, I believe, will not necessarily imply
a 'cleansing' of the non-authentic, but a redeployment and
detournement of hybridized and local practices with the aim of
imagining that new future.
To be overly concerned with impossible ambitions of reversing
already existing reifications, and of undoing hybridizations that
result from historical colonialism, will not help us assume the chal-
lenges of contemporary reality. Recently I was privileged to visit the
film set of Away With Words (Sam Tiao Yan) by Chris Doyle,
frequent cinematographic collaborator of Hong Kong director,
Wong Kar-wai. Set in Hong Kong, it tells the story of three young
marginalized characters, Asano (Tadanobu Asano) an autistic
Japanese recently arrived in Hong Kong who speaks nothing but
Japanese, a gay Englishman, Kevin (Kevin Sherlock), and a Chinese
woman Susie (Mavis Xu). The three overcome all their differences
to become a powerful trio linked by close camaraderie. While
doubtless more pressing social problems might have been found in
the public housing estates of Hong Kong, I think the storyline of
this film can stand as an allegory for the kinds of alliances that are
possible and fruitful in the lived reality of post-colonial late capi-
talism. As Braudel wrote 'civilizations create connections, that is to
say, an arrangement between thousands of actually disparate
cultural possessions, at first glance foreign to one another - from
those that emanate from religion and intellect to the objects and
tools of daily life.'4 It is with those seemingly 'disparate cultural
possessions', as well as with the already merged, 'impure' hybrid,
that the processes of state and market oppressions that now go by
the name of 'globalization' can be challenged.
x
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1CHINESE REVERIES,
ENGLISH RAILINGS
Reimagining Twentieth-Century
Histories
But reverie does not tell stories. Or, at least, there are reveries so
deep, reveries which help us to descend so deeply into ourselves
that they relieve us of our history. They liberate us from our name.
They deliver us, these solitudes of the present, to our first solitudes.
Those first solitudes, those solitudes of childhood, leave, in certain
souls, indelible marks. For them the whole of life is receptive to
poetic reverie, to a reverie that knows the price of solitude ...
... The task before us calls for a poetico-analysis which help us
reconstitute in ourselves the being of emancipatory solitudes.
Poetico-analyses will return to us all the privileges of the imagi-
nation. Memory is a field of psychological ruins, a jumble of
recollections. Our whole childhood has to be re-imagined, and in
re-imagining it we have the possibility of rediscovering it in the
very life of our dreams of solitary childhood.
Gaston Bachelard!
The sense of 'Chinese reveries' in the title of this chapter is doubt-
less quite clear: Chinese dreams, dreams about China. Yet, reveries
are something more than this. They are also daydreams, musings,
wishful thinking. As to the second part of the title, 'railings' con-
stitute one of the concrete central images of the story I discuss here.
In the story an old alligator is kept behind railings in a zoo in a
small and ancient English seaside town. But the railings may also
be read as a metaphor for the incarcerating impulse of English
colonialism, and of Western cultural dominance in general. In other
words, the railings stand as a trope for the attempt to restrain and
to impose closure on narratives large and small. In this story, as we
shall see, there are several efforts to interrupt the storytelling of the
protagonist, but such efforts are rebuffed as stories are told and
retold and divergent versions are recounted.
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At another level, the story constructs a space within which to rep-
resent the confused and scattered detritus of political and cultural
dreams and nightmares of modernity, and the beginnings of an
attempt to re-imagine, by what Bachelard has called 'reveries of will'
(les reveries de la volante), the narratives that have recounted
twentieth-century history in China and elsewhere.2 In the story I
address here the space where this re-imagining happens lies within
the railings. 'Railings' establish enclosures, but still leave spaces
between the bars for the wilful to squeeze through. And then 'railing'
etymologically can also signify abusive scolding; the Latin from
which rail is presumed to derive indicated the act of braying or neigh-
ing. In this story such railing is done by the English who must stand
metonymically for the West and the Whiteman. But there is also the
railing about the English by the Other, by the non-English, and this
railing invokes other senses of the word; in early French and English
the word referred to 'mocking or joking.' All of these senses seem
appropriate to my reading of the railings in the story entitled 'Going
Home.' It is a text written a decade ago by the Chinese poet, essayist,
fiction writer and playwright Duoduo.3 Duoduo by sheer coin-
cidence left China for a reading tour of England and Holland on the
morning of June 4th 1989, after the night of the Tiananmen
massacre he had witnessed. Having recounted his experience to the
British media, he was unable to return to China and found himself in
involuntary exile. The story 'Going Home' was written a year or so
after the author's arrival in Europe, around the time he turned forty.
It is a story about being Chinese in England, about the concurrence
of Chineseness and of Englishness (neologisms that cannot be uttered
without evoking multiple questions and contradictions) and such
stories have always interested me.
But before presenting my reading of Duoduo's Chinese text, I beg
the reader's indulgence while I set it aside for an instant so as to
preface Duoduo's story with a story about another Chinese man, and
about myself, the author of this book. I am obliged to make this diver-
sion so as to explain where my own interest in Chinese comes from,
and why I perceive my career as an intersection, a historical conjunc-
tion of small and large histories of the last hundred years or so.
I am often asked, as are many white-looking people who are
engaged in Asian studies, how and why I became interested in
Chinese studies. As a schoolboy I was an innocent yet keen reader
of modern French and Spanish poetry, of Latin American novels,
and so I would often tell people that I took pleasure in learning lan-
guages, and having learned French and Spanish wanted to try
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something more challenging. I had also read some Chinese poetry
in translation and wanted to be able to do so in the original.
Neither reason, however, was the principal one.
The fact is that my grandfather was a Chinese who emigrated to
Britain, and settled in Liverpool. I tell his story, and analyse the dif-
ficulty of narrating it, in the final chapter of this book. However,
there are a few details that are immediately necessary to the dis-
cussion that follows on how we read and write texts.
As a child I lived in my grandfather's house. He and my grand-
mother looked after me while my mother worked. He often took
me to Chinatown. My grandfather died when I was seven or eight.
After his death, I realized that no-one was really very familiar with
who he had been, or what he had done. He was educated. He inter-
preted for Chinese seamen in trouble with the authorities in the English
courts. He negotiated disputes in Chinatown. He visited people. He
gambled. But he was a sober man, perhaps one would even say dour.
The lack of family knowledge about him made me inquisitive. I
was interested in what his life was about, what ideas and ideologies
ran through his head, what constituted the imaginary of this old
Chinese man who had washed up on Merseyside. But all that were
left behind were traces of his speech, his turns of phrase, an occa-
sional negative comment about the dislodged anti-communist
Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek, some newspaper cuttings of the
Long March. But that was not quite all that remained.
After he died I inherited a notebook, or rather I took possession
of it. It was small and black with a red spine. On the front was the
word 'Cash' in florid gold script. Inside there some twenty or so
pages of writing, Chinese writing. This was the only writing by my
grandfather that survived him. As a boy I first used the unfilled
pages as an album for bubble gum cards featuring allied news
photographs of the Second World War. They were like baseball
cards but with pictures of soldiers and amphibious landing craft
rather than ball players. The cards had captions such as:
'HIT AND RUN: NORWAY-DECEMBER 27, 1941',
'FOX ON THE RUN: LIBYA-DECEMBER 14, 1942',
'THE NOOSE TIGHTENS: TUNISIA-APRIL 23, 1943',
'TOKYO EXPRESS: SAIPAN-MAY 19, 1945'.
A white heroic mythology pasted into an old Chinaman's note-
book.
Later I used some of the pages for ornithological notes. They are
written in a childish ungainly hand, two or three words to a page:
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dark red head
and moustache
green back
yellow rump
stiff pointed
tail
large hand-
some bird
high pitch
laughing call
long strong
bill
Only later did the Chinese words, the characters in the notebook
seem important or interesting.
The subsequent course of my adult life could be explained as the
pursuit of a grail, the attempt to decode a history, to 'decipher' a
few years of an old man's life observed at first hand only from the
perspective of a three-foot high child who had not known what
questions to ask. But more precisely, and perhaps subconsciously, I
had been aiming to engage in a more literal decoding at a textual
level: a decoding of writing, the written Chinese characters of the
little black cash book that excluded me from the power of reading,
and from what I perceived then as the power of knowing.
Over the subsequent decades, that desire to read the written
Chinese word was subsequently fulfilled, but also multiply dis-
placed into the decoding of other Chinese texts; the necessity to
know was diverted into other Chinese contexts and transtexts.
During the first four years or so of my sinological training I was
content to acquire the power to read poems written in classical
Chinese. Yet, after I had actually lived and studied in China I
quickly realized that what interested me were the texts, contexts
and transtexts of China's modernity, a modernity that was a pro-
duct of Western colonialism. I understood also that the academic
training I had received with its emphasis on the 'tradition' and its
suspicion of the modern was a means of continuing or submitting
to a practice of Western colonial masking of the China the West
had produced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That is
not to say studying China's past is of no interest, but at that point
in time, and from my own position it was not. Sinology's neglect
of the temporarily and spatially near, the modern, and the close-
to-home (Britain's occupation of Hong Kong, and the presence
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and cultural practices of Chinese people in Britain was of no
concern to British sinology whatsoever) except as an object of the
state-sponsored social scientific gaze, seemed to me part of that
process, and so I devoted my time to the study of modern Chinese
literary culture, and then to the contemporary. It was only then
that I understood that the 'nativist' interrogators of colonial
power and history themselves, the Chinese intellectuals, had
engaged in their own project of invention and masking, a project
of writing a univocal literature of China in celebration of official
history, especially in its metanarrative of progress and modernity,
a project equal in its effect to the monologic construction of
official Chinese dynastic discourses and of the official canon that
sustained them.
The cultural and intellectual history of twentieth-century China
can be read as a linear history which parallels the history of
China's efforts to compensate for the effects of the technological
and economic uneven development so brutally foregrounded by
Western and Japanese, but in particular British, imperialist aggres-
sion in 'opening up' China. This would be a linear, nationalist,
grand narrative, or metanarrative, extending over a hundred and
fifty years and interrupted with regularity by internal struggles
and wars.
We can also find in that same period of China's intellectual and
political history, the attempt to break out of feudal modes of
thought and their cultural reproduction, and simultaneops
attempts to mediate and assimilate a model of modernity imposed
from outside. This would be less of a linear model and more a con-
ceptualization of this period of time as a long moment, a longue
duree; a useful French historiographical concept popular since the
Second World War. Within such a framework, concerns about the
condition of modern China's culture and the wider questions relat-
ing to modernity converge as the problems of postcolonialism in
general.
More specific and shorter moments can also be isolated. In terms
of major political, social and cultural crises and turning points,
there would be perhaps 20 to 30 such moments since the mid-nine-
teenth century, and 10 to 15 such moments over the forty years
separating 1949, the year of the establishment of the People's
Republic of China and 1989 the year of its ultimate ideological
unmasking in the debacle at Tiananmen Square.
With the idea of the long duree, comes the notion of stable his-
tory. But in the history of modernity such stability has become
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increasingly rare. The histories of the twentieth century are
complex and stability cannot be understood in the same way; espe-
cially for the semi-colonized, semi-modernized society that has
been China. In the field of cultural production such historical
conditions have produced cultural histories of instability. Western
modern literary endeavours produced novels which were negotia-
tions and textual representations of the longues durees of history,
of the moments when bourgeois national cultures produced the
necessary conditions for the writing of such novels, for the repro-
duction of class and national identities. They were also moments
during which national vernacular languages were available to the
literary producer. China did not share such conditions and it
should not be surprising that from the mid-19th to the mid-20th
century Chinese writers produced few novels, but rather a plethora
of short fiction. It was not until the 1930s and 1940s that writers
negotiated the representation of the turmoil that was everyday life
in the form of longer fiction. The novel by Qian Zhongshu entitled
Weicheng or Besieged City stands out; the story of a young student
returned after five years overseas with only a fake diploma to his
name and his gradual journey to ruin, it is something like a modern
Chinese rake's progress, a tale of disenchantment with new social
and cultural conditions.
At the level of language, the same invention and consolidation
of language that had been proceeding in France for two hundred
years and in Italy and other new nation-states for a much shorter
time, was suddenly also demanded in China. At this level China's
intellectuals, its writers, were engaged in the basic labour of con-
structing a new national language. By this wilful action of textual
production they sought the realization of a reinvented China,
China reinvented as modern nation-state. But new language, new
means of verbal representation was needed even by those who
questioned the new nationalism and statism of modern China,
who contested the closed linear strategy constituted by the mim-
icry of the model of modernity presented by the Western powers
and Japan.
Poetry had need of new language, new forms, new modes to
overcome the now tortured formalistic legacy of inappropriately
anachronistic modes of writing at the end of the 19th century. It
was not until the mid 1940s that a new language with which to
engage modernity became fully and powerfully available. And then
the tutelage of the bureaucratic state and the rhythmic certainty of
socio-cultural instabilities diverted and warped the new language,
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so that after Mao, from the mid 1970s onwards, the process of
language creation, reinvention, renovation began again, as it did in
Germany after the·defeat of Nazism.
In the early part of this century new language was seen as neces-
sary not only to cultural but also to social renovation, and those
who were interested in the new language were not only the enlight-
ened literati but the politicians. If China were to be rebuilt as a new
nation-state on the model of Europe and America and Japan, then
like these nation-states China required a national vernacular
language, and language, literature and culture were destined to be
instruments of nationalization. In that sense even the cultural mod-
ernists and the feminists, critics of the metanarrative of this French
Jacobin and Soviet Russian inspired, centralizing modernization,
were trapped within the nationalizing and totalizing discourse.
While on mainland China the May Fourth Movement, that was
mounted in reaction to the imperialist and racist treatment of their
ally China by the great powers at the Versailles Peace Conference
of 1919, spearheaded a cultural and linguistic revolution and
promoted multiple practical steps to make the new nationalizing
literature and language instruments of state reform, revolution, and
reinvention, on Formosa, Taiwan, then a Japanese colony, the
popularization of a new and vernacular Chinese written language
was based not as on the mainland on northern Chinese, but on the
local Minnan language. Where necessary, characters were invented
to facilitate this language-making process, just as today characters
are created or improvised in written Hong Kong Cantonese on" a
daily basis. The reality, a reality viewed with suspicion and fear by
centralist ideologues, is that there is no linguistic impediment to the
development of a dozen different written vernacular Chinese
regional languages. But while initiatives tending to linguistic diver-
sification have been taken on Taiwan, and in part in Hong Kong,
the dominant trend amongst intellectuals has been to accept with-
out question the centralization and standardization of language.
This twentieth-century preoccupation with language may indeed be
seen as part of the complex longue duree whose contours are so
hard to discern, for the concern with language is imbricated with
what C.T. Hsia rightly called in his discussion of the modern
Chinese writer, the 'obsession with China'. This dominant attach-
ment to the nation can itself be seen as a form of stability, if not of
intellectual stasis, for the modern intellectual who, from the mid-
19th century onwards, is persistently preoccupied with the nation,
with the people-as-nation, with the intellectual's relationship to it,
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and how to represent it. How to represent the nation in the mimetic
sense, but also how to be its representative.
In a sense the key to the opening up of this closed discursive
dilemma, the interruption of the obsessive narrative of national
salvation and sacrifice for the nation, for the people as authentic
national essence (as they were during the Mao years in an almost
Heideggerian conflation of nation, people and race) is contingent
upon the acceptance and incorporation of instabilities, the insecuri-
ties, the temporariness of the present moment. It is that capacity to
negotiate and represent that quality of being that has been gradually
learned by some of those attempting to represent the kind of space
and time that is constituted by China, Chinas, Chineseness, by
modernity and increasingly (to borrow Marc Auge's terminology)
by the supermodernity (surmodernite) of the non-place that is
increasingly the locus of Chineseness: The Chinese producer of cul-
ture working at the margins within Chinese national territory, in the
wilderness of exile, or beyond the bounds of accepted Chineseness,
writing in English in Europe or America or Hong Kong.4
The experience of exile, of banishment, like the experience of in-
betweenness, at any rate of exclusion, the acceptance and aestheti-
cization of insecurity is what Maurice Blanchot pointed to in his
description of the poetic realities of the elite orphic poet of
European modernity :
... to speak poetically and to disappear belong to the profundity
of the same movement, that those who sing must enter into it
totally and, ultimately, perish, for they speak only when the early
approach of death, accelerated separation, the farewell given
ahead of time erase the false certitude of being, dispel protective
securities, and deliver them to a boundless insecurity.s
But those Chinese writers and thinkers who have understood the
futility of the discourse-bound mentality of saving the nation,
reinventing the nation, developing the nation, of negotiating
modernity, of squaring the circle are few, as indeed are their coun-
terparts the products of other modern and modernizing societies.
So much needs to be forgotten in the striving for cultural moder-
nity, just as so much must be forgotten in assuming the mantle of
post-modern post-culture. So much history, so many histories, so
much geography, so many geographies, so much archaeology of
many one-time disciplines.
Those who do not participate in the process of forgetting, those
who have never invested in narratives of a single singular linearity,
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but who live and produce along and between multiple and inter-
secting axes are content to have these lines projected elsewhere, but
not to sever them altogether. Indeed, these interweaved lines cannot
be severed, they can only dawdle in near-stationary spirals. So they,
you, we have to wait.
The character Lee in Duoduo's story Going Home is a Chinese
who has gone to live in a village on the north-east coast of England.
At the beginning of this story we find him waiting for the arrival of
another Chinese. He seems to have waited forty years. This is not
a simple national allegory, nor is it a globalizing postmodernist
narrative, but rather an oneiric representation of the lived reality of
late modernity, and not simply of China:
Many years have passed, and whether I have spoken or not
spoken with the townsfolk has become equally unimportant; they
have aged with me amidst our unchanging relations, and the chil-
dren of the youngsters who used to call me Lee still call me Lee
today. Sometimes, when they come to visit their parents buried
beneath the earth, I stand with them for a while ...
Like this country cemetery and this church, my arrival and stay
have long lost their rationale; or, that rationale has long lost its
flavour. I tend to the flowers and foliage throughout the year, and
as long as it is not raining, I go to the fields to watch the sky. If
it is raining, I stay in; but if there is a storm, then I must go out.
In the storm, I sit on the bench of the church across from the
town square holding a red umbrella. At those times, behind the
shop windows, the people speak: look, that Chinese is waiting
again.
What they say is perfectly correct; I am waiting.
I am waiting for the arrival of another Chinese. I think he
must be a young man, perhaps with a backpack, perhaps with-
out. Emerging from the long-distance bus depot, he will pass a
second-hand bookstore and walk straight into the square; he
will see me in the rain and approach me, and listen to the tale I
tell him. If he is willing to listen, then I shall be able to depart
from this world; or, as the Chinese say, I shall be able to go
home ....
The apparent serenity of Iremond, of this rural traditional England
provides a space for dream, for an imagining of a China unknown
to and by modernity. In the Other's metropolis the Chinese exile
imagines all too easily the Chinese metropolis, Beijing, Peking, the
Northern capital, which constitutes not yesterday's China, but the
China of just yesterday, China on the eve of the exile's departure,
9
CHINESE REVERIES, ENGLISH RAILINGS
China in chaos, the China of butchery, the China the exile has fled
and not without guilt:
I was already a middle-aged man in London, yet every day I
walked to and from school carrying my book bag and waving
my arms, as if there were a youth in my heart pointing out this,
and that. The cluster of red smokestacks near Paddington
station, and the grey buildings around King's Cross, brought
sudden memories back to me of a coal yard outside Beijing's
Xizhimen; sometimes the wash basin used by the butchers in Ox
Alley just before the slaughter would clearly appear in the sky at
dusk in Hyde Park; a corner store on Jinshi Street would some-
times flash across the doors of the bank on Piccadilly Circus;
and I even saw, from a narrow alley near London's Euston rail-
way station, a stampede of white horses in Beijing's
Guang'anmenwai! The past in London rumbled into the distance
with the Underground.
But London is not simply a matrix for the easy imagining of unde-
sired memories, the Other's metropolis is also strewn with the
searching, questioning faces of other Chinese refugees. It was
always hard to leave China, the exit from China often required
resort to compromise, to venal practices, to nepotism, and all
other Chinese who were out knew that. Just occasionally depar-
ture was a function of aleatory circumstance as in the instance of
Duoduo himself. Right after Tiananmen it was almost impossible
to leave, and the associated discomfort of having left was there-
fore multiplied. To be out of China meant having avoided a
collective suffering, having fled a battle, being no longer there to
mourn and tend the national cemetery. Still on the subway the
narrator recounts:
I once rode in those segmented steel coffins, and when I met a
Chinese, on occasion, we would turn away from each other at
first, and then do a double take, consciously or unconsciously,
with a significance in our gazes: how the fuck did you get over
here? Well, didn't you fucking get here too?
And that is why I left London and came to Iremond.
It was when I was still a student in London; I went out for a stroll
and made my way to Iremond. When I left the bus station and
walked into the town square, the tourist season when the stores
would be selling plastic beach gear had not yet arrived. The little
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rows of houses seemed to have grown out of a dream, and the
rolled up newspapers in front of each door had not yet been
picked up; it was just like today, with no one around, only
well-fed horses in the distance that seemed half-buried due to
undulating of the slopes. As I found my way to the sea wall, the
beach was full of people; the whole town was probably right
there. Each of their hearts followed its own movements, and their
silence seemed to explain itself, as if a single prearranged gesture
would cause them to plunge into the sea all at once. I did not
know what they were waiting for; I knew only that they had a
reason to be waiting, whereas I had none.
The perceived Englishness, an almost cliched, quaint, purposeful
Englishness constructed in this story serves to foreground the
absence of China, the absence of Chinese meaning, the futility of
Chinese waiting. The lack of Chineseness is accentuated by the
Chinese character's consciousness of being Other to his English
hosts. This is accomplished not without some irony as when we
read of the reaction of the woman who runs the local antique store
every time she sees Lee approach:
Old Maria wore spectacles, and whenever she spotted me coming
she pretended to be reading: from left to right, then right to left,
and finally from top to bottom. That was from a time in her
youth in a London pub when she saw three men in a row, read-
ing: the first had been an Englishman, the second a Jew, and the
third a Chinese.
Indulgence of English humour is not excessive, however. Quite the
contrary, as we read later in the story that 'you might laugh at an
English joke if you didn't understand it, but you wouldn't once
you did.' A reflection that betrays not merely an attachment to the
notion of national characteristics, and thus of the integrity of
peoples and the identity of nations, but which also points to the
supposedly instinctive reaction of the intruding Other when
ignorant of the host's language and culture: embarrassed and
compensatory laughter.
Chineseness, made present by a sense of Chinese absence is
represented not simply by being elsewhere, being in England, and
by English reactions to the Chinese presence, but also by the traces
of Chineseness, by the appearances of Chineseness, by Chinese
presences that fail to translate into Chinese valences for the narra-
tor. The sense of Chineseness that is sought by the exile is not a
sense of cultural Chineseness, of greater Chineseness that might be
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found elsewhere than China. The only satisfactory Chineseness is
that framed by a national sense of Chinese space, a geographically
specific China:
Iremond never had another Chinese besides me, and naturally it
had no Chinese bookstore either. There was only a large plaque
across the road from Maria's antique shop bearing four large
Chinese characters that translated as: 'Phoenix Restaurant.' I was
quite happy the first time I entered the restaurant, and I asked in
Chinese: 'Do you serve Cantonese or Szechwan?' The owner
waved his hands at me. I then asked: 'Is this a Chinese restau-
rant?' The owner waved his hands again. I understood what he
meant: don't ask. And so I sat for a moment, ordering neither
food nor tea, but paying a tip for the sale purpose of looking at
a painting on the wall. 'Was this painted by a Chinese?' I asked.
The owner waved his hands; 'Was this not painted by a Chinese?'
I asked. The owner waved his hands again. 'Let's just speak
English,' I said. Still he waved his hands, and he never stopped
for the decades to follow. I still came to see the painting as I grew
old, but the owner was no longer there; but the painting will still
be there when I no longer exist.
It was an oil painting: a towering Chinese palace amidst
verdant hills, an arch nearby, a pagoda in the distance, and
nothing else; that is, no human figures. The weather is calm
and bright, and everything is in bloom; there is no sun, but its
light fills the canvas; nothing but a magnificent structure with no
signs of age or time, leaving the rise and fall of the dynasties
imperceptible. I could never grow tired of looking at it. It was
god-sent, that honesty and warmth of a continental topography,
which no perpetually sea-gazing people could ever possess.
I thus always felt, upon leaving the Phoenix Restaurant, a
sense of leaving a clinic, cured of all maladies of the heart. The
light in the painting is extremely gentle, like a music, like Chinese
speech. The last time I heard Chinese spoken was on the
Underground in London:
'Well, let's just go back, then; why don't we go back?'
'Who says we're not going back? Can we? I'd go back if I were
Ma Yo-yo.'
'It's Yo-yo Ma.'
'Whatever the hell he's called, he gets 3000 pounds just for
taking a piss!'
The muteness represented here, the lack of power to enunciate,
could be read as a criticism of the 'inauthenticity' of the diasporic
Chinese, of their 'rootlessness', but perhaps there is a less superficial
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reading here of the modern Chinese subject's incapacity to inter-
rogate itself, China's inability to imagine itself otherwise than as an
entity mimicking the West, the nation-state narratives of
modernity, and the invention and redeployment of Tradition. Not
just the non-communication of China after 1989, of China after
Mao, after 1949, but even further back, China after colonialism,
China after the white man. Powerless to speak, only able to be
spoken in the global diction of banality. The Chinese restaurant
owner cannot speak, will not speak. This Chinese space, this space
that calls itself Chinese and yet is located in an English village, the
global village. This Chinese space is empty of meaning, of the
capacity to communicate, except for a visual representation, a
spatial and temporal window, the Western-medium painting of a
Chinese landscape. A representation of a physicality and terri-
toriality of China, somewhere, some time. Not a reality, an
unreality, a dreamed painting.
When Lee points to the inability of island peoples to conceptual-
ize on a grand scale, the significance of the painting is constituted
by its historicity, and its lengthy history as a component of the men-
tality of the Chinese elite. As Lacoste notes in Paysages Politiques
[Political Landscapes] while 'Western' painting incorporates the
landscape relatively late, Chinese and Japanese painters had done
so for centuries.6 And yet contradiction remains, because the
Chinese space has been represented in a Western space, on a
Western canvas in oils.
In the painting in the Chinese restaurant, the Chinese-space-that-
is-not-Chinese, rather than the constructed ideological importance
of the Chinese continental vision, the significance in fact lies in the
anxiety it represents, in the quest for identity, for essence in an
English village, in the globalized world. 'Was this painted by a
Chinese.' 'Was this not painted by a Chinese.' It is not at the level of
national characteristics, nor 'ethnic' consciousness, that the differ-
ence is constructed, but upon a historical practice, itself mimicked
as Lacoste tells us by the European painter. Thus while in the
narrator's imaginary it provides the catalyst for reverie, it represents
at another and real and historical level a practice recuperated by the
Other. Its Chineseness then constituted only by piercing through our
forgetfulness, our lack of memory, our ignorance of history. The
painting is evoked to represent China's difference but as an oil paint-
ing, a distinctively Western mode simultaneously affirms the global
transcendence of practices which until the age of essentializing
ideologies of modernity were everyday transcultural currency.
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At another level, the China represented in this painting is not the
China of the Great Wall, not the China of national signs that been
sifted into the contemporary collective imaginary. No, this is a
different order of mythic China. It is not the 'authentic' China sought
by that group of post-Mao cultural producers known as the 'roots
seekers' who in the wake of the ideological disillusionment produced
by the Cultural Revolution, attempted to invent an alternative
empowerment to Maoism but with the same end, the maintenance of
Chinese centralism and Chinese essentialism. No, the China dreamt
here, via the Western medium, Western negotiation in oils of Chinese
space, whether or not authored by a Chinese, is an imagining of an
alternative vision of human life perceived as having run counter to the
pragmatism and instrumentalism of Confucian centralist bureaucratic
feudalism and subsequently bureaucratic modernising centralism.
It is a cliche to talk of an unchanging China, a cliche dismantled
by one sort of history, buttressed by others. Even if ultimately the
idea of a longue dude stable history of China is impossible to sus-
tain, contemporary oppositionism reads the history of cultural and
intellectual opposition and divergence as indeed a continuous
thread unravelling back through narratives of heterodox unreality
opposed to dominant, orthodox, realist and pragmatic literary
modes, all the way back to Daoist aesthetics, and textually displayed
within the metaphoric modes of narrative and poetry. Chinese mod-
ernist critics of modernity throughout the twentieth century have
been among those, as 1 have sought to demonstrate in previous
books, who have been attracted to what they perceive as a discourse
of resistance to monologic ideological dominance, a discourse
recuperable to, and deployable in, their own critique of modernity.?
'I never dream in England' declares the narrator Lee. But to pro-
duce no dreams is to produce no poetry and this narrative seems
like a web of poetically dreamed moments. Perhaps then these are
dreams dreamt in China, now mapped onto an experience called
England, or Iremond, the experience of not-China, of the long
imagined not-China. This is the story of dreams being forced
through the mesh of Englishness, unChineseness, which instructs
that the imagined Chineseness and unChineseness coincide only
partially with experience and that these categories leach the one
into the other with the temporal and physical distancing from the
space of former dreaming.
'The imagination', writes Bachelard, 'is not ... the faculty to
form images of reality; it is the faculty to form images that go
beyond reality, which sing reality.' He continues:
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The imagination invents more than things and tragedies, it
invents new life, new spirit; it opens eyes which have new types
of vision. The imagination will see if it has visions. It will have
visions if it is educated through reveries before being educated by
experiences, if experience follows as affirmation of its reveries.8
Duoduo's narrative is a poetic narrative in that it is a cluster of
visions, narrated in a series of vertical progressions and regressions,
a series of poetic instants in which the reader can ascend and
descend. It is a poetic narrative in that it is a succession of visions
which are the result of imagining through reveries before being
educated by the experience of lived realities. Here exile, a distanc-
ing from the place of reverie, supplements reverie, but it not only
supplies confirmation, it also interjects a deception, a contortion of
the imagination's reveries. This narrative, then, is at one level the
telling of that process of mapping of experience onto reverie. An
imagination and language that has merely dreamed the critical dis-
tance, the gap, provided by Western modernism as critique of
modernity, as what William's called modernity's Other, with which
to write China, in particular the China of the ideological disillu-
sionment of the post-Cultural Revolution, Dengist consumer capi-
talist moment. Duoduo like many others of his generation was
attracted by the resistance to the banality of modern programmed
existence that they read in the modernist reveries of the West's
poets, in Baudelaire and in Lorca, in Dylan Thomas, in David
Gascoyne, and more sonorously in the poetry of Marina Tsvetaeva;
and Sylvia Plath. But the heroically constructed imagination now
has to accommodate the material reality, the lived experience of
Western reality and Western ideology. The trope of the confusion
and doubleness of the young-becoming-old and the old-becoming-
young Chinese constitutes a representation of the knowledge that
is the experience of exile. It is the narrator's exile, the author's also,
but China's too, as reverie surrenders to the experience of a reality
of modernity that demonstrates that this alienation is not only the
author's, not just the narrator's or China's but is a generalized
alienation of a globalized modernity. In the light of 1989 the imag-
ining of living otherwise is not transferred from China to England,
it is deferred. That experience of the West's modernity has replaced
the innocent anticipation that were 1989's collective dreams of
emancipation with the anxiety of having to reimagine, to dream
again. It is not anxiety alone, however, but once again mourning
before life and thus the tropes of death and cemeteries. In this story
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and in Duoduo's poetry and the poetry of some of his contempo-
raries, tropes of death, of spaces of the dead occur repeatedly, since
as Bachelard writes in a phrase that presages Raoul Vaneigem's
distinction that discerns that which is life and that which is the
numbing substitute for life that is mere survival, 'If dream is a
reminiscence, it is the reminiscence of a state preceding life, of a
state of dead life, a kind of mourning before happiness. '9 Thus the
struggle to achieve a life, Life, rather than survival, rather than
death in life, before the finality of Death itself. Thus the refusal 'to
go gentle into that good night' , thus the poet's railing resistance to
Death's dominion.10
If dream is a reminiscence, 'a kind of mourning before happi-
ness,' then that imperative to mourn before happiness, post 1989,
is not confined to Chinese dreamers.
Here again, I intend dreaming in Bachelard's sense which
includes 'dreams of definite action', which he calls 'reveries of will'.
In Duoduo's story reverie incessantly intrudes into, is mapped onto
the function of reality, or as Bachelard puts it more elegantly 'the
oneiric forces ceaselessly flow into conscious life.'ll
There is no history without memory, but when both official his-
tory and collective memory have been strategically detourne,
diverted off course, warped, then perhaps the only recourse is the
kind of poetic function, the function of unreality that Helene
Cixous finds in the poetry of Marina Tsvetaeva operating as a sub-
stitute for the telling of history.
If the cemetery is the site of mourning before happiness, the zoo
is the site of storytelling, of wilful dreaming, where oppressions are
overturned:
'Here for the alligators?'
The zookeeper seemed to have worked something out: 'An old
Chinese man has been coming every day for 40 years.'
'40 years? It must be 70 years now.'
'Chinese people like looking at the alligators. That's interest-
ing.'
'The Chinese have had alligators for a long time; they've seen
enough of them. But the English haven't, so it's their turn now.'
The zookeeper shrugged. 'Well then, I hope you enjoy your
visit.'
A story written in 1990, the author's fortieth year of his life. A
story written in 1990 forty years after the 'birth' of New China. Is
!remond the locus of reflection on either of these temporal
16
CHINESE REVERIES, ENGLISH RAILINGS
anniversaries territorialized as milestones? Are both anniversaries
perhaps conflated, are both the national and the authorial body
coexistent in the Chinese who spends forty years in Iremond, and
does Iremond then lend itself to a multiple reading both as
England and China. Forty years of life, forty years of China, forty
years of life all lived in China. Or in England. London as Beijing,
Iremond as place of exile, as England, but also as China. And why
the hesitation between forty years and seventy years if the larger
number doesn't echo the origins of the intellectual's engagement
with the modern Chinese state in 1919 when another manifesta-
tion of popular unrest took place at Tiananmen, a political event
redeployed by a sophisticated populace in 1989 with slogans
demanding the resurrection of the twin demands of 1919 Science
and Democracy.
If the confusion between forty years and seventy years in 'Going
Home' can be read as an allusion to the landmarks of official
Chinese history, then it should also be read as alluding to the con-
ception of history as repetitive because manipulable, what Debray
has termed 'programmable and recapitulable political history' that
is dominant in 'societies of commemoration'. Here we see the con-
flation of forty years and seventy years, the convergence of two
landmark moments in Chinese history, the association of the nar-
rator who is perhaps, sometimes forty, and the author who is forty,
with the 70 year old May Fourth intellectual revolution tradition
which re-produced and nurtured the discourse of modernity and.
progress whose logic surely terminated in Tiananmen Square. Yet,
that logic is still dominant amongst intellectuals and cultural pro-
ducers, the putative saviours of China.
Here the two long moments of seventy and forty years, one a
moment of intellectual and political history, the other life-span of a
generation (that of the Cultural Revolution Red Guard), of a social
class (urban middle class), of an individual writer are not only
mapped the one over the other but are also enmeshed, imbricated.
The conjuncture of forty years and seventy years is not a failure of
memory, but an indecision over which history, which meta-
narrative to privilege, an interrogatory imprecision about when
technically to date the beginning of these ironically stable repeti-
tions of closed, routine historical events, for even violence and
chaos can take on the aura of habit.
China, then, is the zoo, the zookeeper the colonial figurehead,
the white man, the custodian. The alligator is China, Chinaman,
Orientalist discourse, the old Chinese man waiting.
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... Little Seven, and Little Eight, are nicknames reserved for a
cluster of alligators; they're always kept on the bottom by the
larger ones. As for the one in solitary confinement, I call it 'Third
Uncle.'
Every time he sees me sitting there cross-legged, the zookeeper
tactfully steps aside, or else he goes to the gate and smokes a cig-
arette. But today he insists on watching over me: 'May I bother
you for a minute? It's just a bit of personal curiosity.'
'No, I don't mind.'
'Haven't you noticed any change?' he asked, pointing to Third
Uncle.
A shudder runs through me whenever I meet someone who
doesn't know how to tell jokes trying to tell one.
'What I mean is, have you never felt that it's dead, or that it's
a fake?' I didn't answer. 'Never? Well, I did. I had never seen it
change over the past 40 odd years, and no one ever paid any
attention to it except for a young girl. She stuck her head over the
railing, and unfortunately I wasn't by her side; her scarf was too
long, and there it dangled -luckily it wasn't knotted.' He paused
and waited for me to ask what happened next.
'And then?'
'There wasn't any and then.' The zookeeper put his hands in
his pockets. 'The girl is still typing today in that BBC building
that the Japanese purchased; as for the scarf, I think that it's still
in the alligator's stomach. Actually that girl was Japanese.' He
stepped aside rather self-contentedly.
As with the dumb Chinese restaurateur and the painting of China
on the restaurant wall, again, muteness is the response when the
spectre of mimicry appears, when the Chinese is forced to confront
the reality of globality, the absence of authenticity, of Chineseness.
Here the inability to speak in response, to situate the Self outside
of the logic of the late twentieth-century, is compensated for by
near hysterical but wordless reaction. The zookeeper continues his
storytelling:
The English have a holiday, St. Valentine's, which one year hap-
pened to fall on the same day as Chinese New Year's Day. That
old Chinese man had made a kind of Chinese hotdog, with thick
rice noodles on the outside and a Chinese sausage on the inside,
which he carried in a basket as he walked through the streets
yelling: 'It's a Chinese holiday today; please help yourself to a
Chinese hotdog.' Most of the townsfolk politely declined, but
there was one young lady who said to him: 'So St. Valentine's
Day is a great Chinese holiday?' Suddenly the old man changed;
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he froze for a moment, and then did something quite incredible:
taking a wild bite out of a hotdog, he squeezed the sausage out
of the noodle as he laughed lewdly and crazily at the young lady.
And that wasn't the end of it - he wept out loud all that night at
the cemetery, which really gave everyone around there the chills.
He denied everything afterwards - he said that it was only ghosts
who'd been howling, and that squeezing the hotdog was some-
thing he'd learned from English schoolboys, and was certainly
not some Chinese tradition.'
The explosion of a gesture of obscenity, like the ejaculation of mis-
siles when trapped in a political discourse whose very agents even
find it distasteful, and the shock of realization leads the Chinese to
howl wordlessly all night, and subsequently deny history, deny
experience, deny meaning, displacing meaning onto the English
schoolboys, onto the other, the foreigner, the colonizer who
invented the discourse the Self is now trapped within, so that the
act is read as mimicry, its valences thus shifted. Innocence, no
blame, no responsibility. Continuity.
But let's recall that the narrator of this story within the story is
the English zookeeper, the Chinese with the Chinese hotdog bun is,
in the zookeeper's story, none other than Lee, the narrator of the
story within which the zookeeper has challenged the Chinese, and
indeed buried him, in the belly of the alligator:
'That's rather serious,' 1 sighed.
'There's more serious yet,' said the zookeeper as he pushed his
face closer to mine. 'That old Chinese man has been coming every
day for 40 odd years to see the alligator, watching it grow old like
himself. One day, just like on any other day, 1 was smoking out-
side the gate, and when 1 came back the old man had disap-
peared. He didn't leave from the front gate: that I'm sure of.'
'What you mean is that the alligator ate him.'
'I didn't say that. 1 only said that he disappeared.'
'You're lying.'
'For 900 years no one in this town has ever lied.'
The zookeeper's face seemed a little younger now.
'You don't have to believe me, but it's no lie,' the zookeeper con-
tinued quite seriously. 'Anyhow, the old man disappeared, and in
any case that's why after that 1 never saw this alligator shit again.'
And as he finished talking he turned around so that 1 couldn't
see if he was laughing; 1 sensed that he was laughing so hard that
even the remaining change in his pocket was jingling. 'Excuse
me,' he said, leaving me with this story about an old Chinese
man.
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So our 40 some years of silence had allowed him to construct
such a little story.
Silence, forty years of history with no communication, forty years in
which myths of the Other can be constructed, as a mimic man, an
inauthentic product of hybridity, forty years in which the Other can
be spoken but does not speak, in which he can be constructed as the
weak and arriviste colonized incapable of enunciating 'truth',
capable only of manipulating lies, against which there are the 900
years during which the zookeeper and his forbears have never lied.
But then the zookeeper is not just local authority, he is all
authority, he is also Chinese authority who has authored and here
still attempts to author the Chinese into a narrative of disappear-
ance, consumed by the alligator, a constipated China (the alligator
who doesn't shit). But here in this narrative the reified Chinese
refuses the narrative, reclaims the story, becomes the author, erases
the dry, encrusted Orientalizing and bureaucratic constructions of
China:
This wouldn't do - you couldn't just bury me like that, it won't
do. And then I heard a sound over and over again, and it put
me in a frenzy. This won't do, this just won't do. Struggling, I
stood up and slipped in through the railing. I needed to retell
this story.
I walked the length of Third Uncle from head to tail several
times, I walked the life of this damned old man anew several
times, until it was walked to a dust as white as cocaine. Better to
say stomped than walked - it was long since dried out, but had I
not walked it once, it would still be an alligator, with an old
Chinese man and a Japanese scarf in its stomach ....
It was gone now - only I remained within the railing. And the
old Chinese man was gone as well, leaving just me in the story
about him, only this story hadn't ended.
Unreality, wilful reverie, oneiric forces refusing dominant realities.
One of Bachelard's tenets of what he terms a 'sort of Copernican
revolution of the imagination' is the placing of 'fright before the
monster'. The monster at the end of the twentieth century is well
entrenched. If only we could erase it with the same act of imagina-
tion with which Lee stamps out of existence the old crocodile.
When the zookeeper showed up again, half of his face dropped,
numb and frozen in place.
'Good God.'
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'Good God, the old Chinese man has come back to life.'
'You know,' said the zookeeper, displaying excellent self-
control, 'you know that that was only a joke.'
'It would do as a story, but not as a joke.' I stepped back.
'Then let me tell this story again for you: one day you saw an old
Chinese man enter the zoo. In the time it took for you to smoke
a cigarette, the old alligator had disappeared, and there remained
only the old Chinese man behind the railing. That day was
today.' I raised my leg and flicked the cuff of my trousers, which
was covered with the remains of Third Uncle's body.
'That's it , sir.' The zookeeper's few remaining hairs seemed to
lift up. 'That's enough. Let me remind you not to take advantage
of April Fool's day - it's no time to be fooling around.'
'Let me remind you that today is Easter.'
'Yesterday was Easter. It's April 1st today - it just so happens
that April Fool's follows Easter this year. So don't play dumb, you
well understand that anything goes today. Nevertheless, this is
too much - it can't be allowed. From a legal point of view, it's
animal cruelty, it's the destruction of public property, or perhaps
just money, money!' The zookeeper's two little fists seemed ready
to beat his little stomach now. 'Wait here, please don't go any-
where.' His leather shoes slid across the ground, all the way to
the offices.
Money, the fundamental imperative of English society beneath the
civilizing, colonizing, cultural superiority, of narrating the Other
into Otherness, beneath all of these constructs, the material reality
of money and property.
I waited, of course. I waited within this story as if I were waiting
in a cemetery.
From birth this cemetery has enriched me; it has given me even
a bit more than I would have had. And for this I must thank the
light that is unique to England, as if it could turn time back 300
years.
The cemetery, the place of contemplation of death, which has
allowed life to be grasped, history to be overturned, by reimagin-
ing it with wilful reverie. The cemetery where stories end. But the
story does not end there. The function of reality, a reality, forces
another renarration of the story:
Only as the police sirens hastened, shaking even the windows, did
I suddenly realize: I can't let them see that the railings around the
alligators are now only railings in a joke.
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So, this story must be told once again.
I crept out of Third Uncle's confines and climbed over another
set of rails, and I saw that pile, that younger pile, with Little
Seven and Eight among them, their gaping jaws pointing to the
sky like so many pairs of scissors. I sighed; a man's greatest mis-
take is to have so little time left. Just before I trudged up and
finally managed to squeeze my buttocks through the railing, I
heard a grinding of teeth.
It was the sound of my mother chewing a guava on her very
last breath - her greatest wish before dying was to taste the fresh
guavas that had just arrived at the markets. I'd always had a wish
of my own, which was to bring her out and bury her in this ceme-
tery, so that I could watch over her and scrub her gravestone
every day. And if someone passed by, I would be able to say look,
I'm watching over my mother. I'd thought so many times of
discussing it with the church: it won't take up space, it's not a
coffin, it's only a little box ...
In my last glimpse I saw the English police officer's insignia; it
was just like the one upon China Air's pilots' caps. No one
stopped me, just so as to let the story conclude.
Here the narrative is brusquely elevated through several levels onto
an autobiographical plane, as the narrator tells the story of the
death of his mother, like the death of the author's mother in the
spring of 1990 while the author lived in Holland. I was in Beijing
that spring, just for a few days to make a BBC radio programme on
culture in China one year after Tiananmen. Duoduo had asked me
to buy Western heart medication for his mother. I did. I tried to call
to arrange a rendezvous to deliver the medicine. Each time the
phone was either answered and put down or left to ring. I mailed
the drugs. It was only much later I knew, he knew. He wasn't told
for months. That day I rang she was already dead, dead that day
or the day before. So in the last glimpse of the English police offi-
cer's insignia the story does not conclude but is deferred as it spills
over into other stories, into autobiographies, into, for instance, the
author's and into mine.
Some twenty or more years after my grandfather's death, after
years of subjecting my mind to the frequently unpleasant discipline,
order, and routine that learning that language demands, I took out
the notebook which I had kept safely. The Chinese consisted of
poems that read like riddles. They seemed to be in the ci or sung
lyric form of pre-modern poetry. But they were no known lyrics.
There are enormous encyclopaedic tomes to assist the sinologist in
locating lines of poetry, but none of these appeared there. Perhaps
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then they were popular Cantonese lyrics, copied from a newspaper
maybe, or perhaps even his own words.
Blanchot writes of the relationship between power and impossi-
bility involved in the act of reading, 'between the power tied to the
moment of reading and the impossibility tied to the moment of writ-
ing'.12 But merely for me to reach the moment, or rather space, 'a
space held open by the reader' as Blanchot puts it, had demanded
an investment of time and labour during which I had engaged
numerous other texts; the reading of this notebook in any case had
never constituted a conscious aim. The impossibility of the writing
had for me been occulted by the impossibility of the reading. Again
Blanchot paraphrasing Rene Char, points to the gap, or the ecart
between the one who commences or forms the work and its
completion. The work has to be separated or distanced from the one
who commences, and indeed is only accomplished in this separa-
tion, in this distancing, a 'separation which takes exactly the shape
of reading (and where the reading takes shape).>l3
I must confess that, once I could read Chinese, I returned to that
cash book only in a desultory and gingerly manner. I looked at the
odd line, but have never yet invested the necessary time and labour
in the text to decode it. I have imagined from the odd phrase read-
ings that could be established. There are tantalizing references to
brothers and boats and comings and goings, and days spent in
travel, but all in verse form. I decided not to proceed, not simply
because I didn't wish to be disappointed by what might eventually.
be as banal as bubble gum cards or the observations of birds copied
from a children's encyclopaedia, but because it would seem to
represent the end of a progression from what Blanchot terms the
vide, the void, or emptiness, in which reading is born and out of
which it progresses 'to the moment when the distance from the
work with regard to itself changes sign, and no longer indicates its
incompletion, but its accomplishment, no longer signifies that it is
not yet done, but that it never had to be done.'14
In a sense my reading of other Chinese texts has been enabled by
and taken place in that 'ecart' or gap. In the gap between that
initial impossibility not of writing but of reading and the deferred
accomplishment of reading, the reading of that little black book,
much reading of numerous other texts has taken place, and much
more I hope is yet to take place.
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2ADDICTED, DEMENTED, AND
TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS
The White Invention and
Representation of the 'Chinaman'
In this chapter my concern is with white, mainly British, represen-
tations of 'Chinese characteristics'. I first discuss the representation
of the Chinese as an opiomaniac, and the ways in which the
'Oriental habit' of opium consumption was constructed and
nuanced by the English. Of particular interest to me are the con-
tradictions that emerged between the ideological project of the
purification and construction of the English national body in the
British colonial metropolis (a task requiring the suppression of a
widespread British opiate consumption), and the conflicting eco-
nomic interests of the British imperial state in its 'Chinese colonies'
(an interest demanding a different gloss on the taking of opium).
Later in this chapter, I go on to discuss the colonial representation
of the peculiarities of the Chinese mind, and specifically of mad-
ness. This discussion relates in the main to official government
reports (in the instance of Hong Kong), and newspaper reportage
in the case of representations of the Chinese in England. In the final
part of the chapter I analyse the representation of the Chinese in
modern British popular entertainment media, in song and in the
pantomime. In particular, I examine the persistence of a racist and
orientalizing discourse in popular culture. In the 1940s the affable
singer and entertainer George Formby popularized in lyrics the
figure of Mr. Wu, a Chinese laundryman. The Chinese as laundry-
man, also figures large in the British pantomime version of
Aladdin; dating back to the nineteenth-century but still being
staged in the late twentieth, and continuing to reproduce the white
racist panoply of perceived Chinese biological and cultural
difference.
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The British imperial addiction: ideology, economics
and the consumption of opium
We find that your country is sixty or seventy thousand Ii [three
Ii make one mile] from China. Yet there are barbarian ships that
strive to come here for trade for the purpose of making a great
profit. The wealth of China is used to profit the barbarians. That
is to say, the great profit made by barbarians is all taken from
the rightful share of China. By what right do they then in return
use the poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people? Even
though the barbarians may not necessarily intend to do us harm,
yet in coveting profit to an extreme, they have no regard for
injuring others. Let us ask, where is your conscience? I have
heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly forbidden by
your country; that is because the harm caused by opium is
clearly understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your
own country, then even less should you let it be passed on to the
harm of other countries - how much less to China!
Letter from Lin Zexu to Queen Victoria, 1839.
The use of opium by British and other foreign imperialist authori-
ties as a means of oppression and coercion, the resulting Opium
Wars and as a consequence the British colonization of Hong Kong
have all been embedded in the Chinese national imaginary for a
century and half. It is rather the representation by the British
authorities of opium and its consumption in Hong Kong, as com-
pared to its representation in the metropolis, which is the focus of.
my current inquiry. I come to the story of opium via my interest in
representations of race in nineteenth and twentieth century texts;
the representation of opium consumption being just one part of
that larger meta-representation. And yet I find that I am compelled
to address the interest in a larger context. Indeed, the story of
opium is vast, and here I focus on the representation in the
Victorian and early twentieth-century periods of the Chinese as
consumer of opium.
What is perhaps unexpected is the bifurcation of representation
of opium use in England on the one hand and on the other in the
colonies, especially the port of Hong Kong obtained by the British
as a result of the nineteenth-century Opium Wars fought over
Britain's right to freely trade in opium in China. The effects of
opiate substances on health, for instance, were represented differ-
ently depending on whether the Chinese concerned were to be found
in Britain's Chinese colonies (Malay Straits, Singapore, Hong Kong)
or in the colonial metropolis - in London and in Liverpool.
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The issue I concentrate on here is of opium consumption and its
function in the British imperial order. While in Britain from the
early to mid-nineteenth century onwards opium consumption
became taboo and constructed as an alien, indeed Oriental custom
unworthy of Victorian citizens, in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong,
an official British imperial government campaign of denial of the
ill-effects of opium on the Chinese was waged for a century against
English abolitionists, who were by and large constituted by the
same class that had fought for the abolition of slavery. Colonial
medical health officers were at the forefront of those campaigns to
maintain the consumption of opium and thus the financing of the
British empire's administration east of Suez.
Thus, the same discourse of racial physical and mental difference
could be used in England to negatively construct the Chinese so as
to promote strategies of segregation or exclusion (as had occurred
in the USA in the second half of the nineteenth century), and in the
Colonies to justify and maintain practices that were forbidden to
citizens of Britain but which were economically lucrative to the
state machine in the Colonies. For while it had become imperative
to the modern British nation-state to construct a healthy national
body, the sickness of the non-white colonized body could be toler-
ated and indeed encouraged for reasons of economic necessity. This
is not to deny the importance of the ideological stance which for
much of the period under discussion was based on the precepts of
scientific racism. However, whether in Liverpool (as local govern-
ment functionary) or in Hong Kong (as colonial officer) the role of
the medical health official was to bolster the state or local author-
ities. Thus while medical officers' reports tend to be more ideolog-
ically moderate than other official or media representations of the
Chinese, they are nevertheless complicit in reproducing myths that
sustain the idea of major innate biological difference as the cause
of patterns of social behavioural difference.
The recent history of opium, then, can be seen as an archetypal
story of modernity: a story of economics (the commodity, profit,
and revenue to finance the state apparatus that promotes and
negotiates with venture capital) and a story of ideology (the con-
struction of the Chinese as a genetic opiophile).
The British passion for opium has been well documented by
Berridge and Edwards in their book Opium and the People: Opiate
Use in Nineteenth-Century England.! The availability of the drug
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[in Britain1 in the first half of the century was 'rarely seen as a
"problem" and opium-use was not yet construed in terms of an
Orientalist discourse that would construct the drug as being
seminally Oriental. However, from the 1830s onwards bourgeois
and professional opinion began to shift and soon 'opium use was
no longer regarded as an everyday part of life for all sections of
society'.2 By the time Oscar Wilde wrote The Picture of Dorian
Gray opium had been established as a marker of difference, of the
exotic and of the transgressive.
The level of consumption of opium in Britain was extremely
high. According to Anthony S. Wohl:
Medical officers were convinced that one of the major causes of
infant mortality was the widespread practice of giving children
narcotics, especially opium, to quieten them. At one penny an
ounce laudanum was cheap enough - about the price of a pint of
beer - and its sale was totally unregulated until late in the cen-
tury. The use of opium was widespread both in town and coun-
try. In Manchester, according to one account, five out of six
working-class families used it habitually.3
But prior to these mid-nineteenth century concerns opium had been
seen as totally benign. In Coleridge's day, as Alethea Hayter has
noted, 'most doctors and patients still thought of opium not as a
dangerous addictive narcotic drug but primarily as a useful anal-
gesic and tranquilliser of which every household should have a.
supply, for minor ailments and nervous crises of all kinds, much as
aspirin is used today'.4
Hayter goes on to recount the remarkable ignorance that
shrouded the drug in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
and notes that while the substance 'was widely used and easily
available, almost nothing was known about it ... few people
realised, for example, that opium was addictive, and no one under-
stood that withdrawal symptoms were the result of discontinuation
or diminished dosages. Indeed, everything that was known about it
seemed positive and beneficial.'s Laudanum was widely dispensed
and in the form of a patent medicine it was administered to restless
babies, often inducing a permanent sleep.
'Supplies were readily available: in 1830, for instance, Britain
imported 22,000 pounds of raw opium .... By and large, opium
was taken for granted; and it was only the terrible experiences of
such articulate addicts as Coleridge and De Quincey that eventu-
ally began to bring the horrors of the drug to public attention.'6 In
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the mid to late nineteenth century, however, official attitudes
towards opium consumption changed.
It was during this moment of ideological and institutional trans-
formation relative to the consumption of opium and its effect on
British individual and national bodies, that Britain was engaged in
militarily promoting the use of opium in China. A hypocritical,
fork-tongued approach to opium was thus inevitable. At one level,
a divergence in the textual representation of opium consumption
arises from the doubleness of the concerns invested in its late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century re-representation in the
colonies themselves and in the metropolis. These concerns were, I
reiterate, both economic and ideological.
The discourse that underpinned the economic agenda was asso-
ciated with the needs of both colonial governmental apparatuses
and of capital (represented by mid-nineteenth century opportunists
such as Jardine and Matheson who would later become heads of
respectable and powerful Hong Kong-based corporations). The
ideological arguments were produced by those concerned with the
integrity of the Victorian English nation, and its (re)construction
which necessitated an Other against which to achieve that con-
struction; in textual terms we can look to Sax Rohmer's popular
fictional Fu-Manchu, and to the media (the newspapers and maga-
zines), and even to seemingly avant-garde elite producers of litera-
ture such as Oscar Wilde and his story of Dorian Gray.?
In specific terms in the mid to late nineteenth century, the
ideological necessity of constructing 'the Chinese' as the totally
different Other in Europe and the USA, an Other against which the
white could be legitimated in terms of the dominant ideology of
scientific racism, was pitted against the economic interests not only
of capital (the logic of capitalism), but also against the interests of
the imperial apparatus with which capital was imbricated.
Ideological concerns over racial purity, the integrity of the national
body and so on, led to the Chinese or 'Chinaman' being con-
structed negatively (as the Irish were, and as the English working
class had been) as the embodiment of the antithesis of Anglo-Saxon
bourgeois decency and national rectitude.
In other words the Chinaman was represented as dirty, impure,
sick, decaying, decadent, mentally different, cunning, wily, and bio-
logically and morally inferior, and ridden with vices, such as opium
smoking, that were innate. Thus, the opium den became a metaphor
for vice and evil that hid plans of conquest and invasion symbolised
in Sax Rohmer's famous, and profitable character, Dr. Fu-Manchu.
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The economic imperatives of capital however made it essential to
minimise such a construction of the Chinese. In the USA and in
British South Africa the economic argument was over cheap labour
for the rapid development of natural resources and the construction
of national infrastructures. Capitalists wanted Chinese labour; gov-
ernment and media however responded to popular fears of a 'flood'
(the most common racist and anti-immigration metaphor of the last
century or so) by successfully resisting even temporary (guest
worker) Chinese immigration. This resistance inevitably took the
form of arguments based on racist ideology. The logic of capitalism
was subsumed under the logic of the capitalist-nation-state which
while privileging the interests of capitalism had also to pursue a
strategy of nationalism that indeed clashed with the ideology of an
inclusive imperial happy family. The relatively loose institutional
domination of China by colonial powers (manifested by a territorial
presence in a network of treaty ports such as Hong Kong, Shanghai
and Tianjin, and by legal autonomy for foreigners under the concept
of extraterrioriality), as opposed to their military and economic
domination of China (ownership of railways, control of the customs
and excise) that was the precursor of a later global, post-colonialist
economic mode, meant that it was in fact comparatively easy to
represent as minimal Britain's imperial ties to China and to fore-
ground China's total and irrecuperable foreignness.
At the turn of the century, apart from a dominant ambience of
popular racism that had been bolstered by late nineteenth-century
scientific racism and which had entered the collective imaginary in'
vulgarized form, there were specific economic reasons why anti-
Chinese sentiment in particular resurfaced in Britain and its 'white'
colonies. The American campaign to exclude totally the Chinese
from emigrating to the USA had been successful and would-be
Chinese emigrants fleeing China's ruined economic condition in the
hope of survival or even enrichment elsewhere were now heading
to various other developing economies. In particular, Chinese
migrated to Australia and to South Africa where they became
targets for white labour's resentment.8 In particular, certain union
leaders and politicians attempted to make major electoral capital
out of the issue of Chinese labour in the Transvaal; an issue that
almost dominated the 1906 British general election. In Britain itself
where the Chinese population could be counted in mere hundreds,
Chinese residents became the targets of racism and came under
attack from labour union leadership. The press and middlebrow
fiction, such as Sax Roehmer's Fu-Manchu novels, both recuper-
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ated popular racism, re-representing and reinscribing it. A popular
trope was of the addicted Chinese opium-smoker; a trope that
always forgot and occulted the real history of Chinese opium
smoking and the British Empire's role in its promotion.
In 1906 the major concentration of Chinese in Britain was to be
found in the major imperial port of Liverpool. A local Liverpool
Irish former seaman turned union organiser James Sexton who was
also Labour Party parliamentary candidate and local councillor,
had been instrumental in calling for an official inquiry into the
immorality and vice of Chinese residents. A number of press
reports and investigative articles followed. An article from the
Liverpool Weekly Courier entitled simply 'Chinatown' and sub-
titled 'Opium, Gaming, Joss-Sticks' was typical of the kind of
report produced.9 These articles, even when reluctantly concluding
that the local Chinese are ultimately harmless and innocent, invoke
the whole range of Orientalist discursive language constructed and
developed over the course of the nineteenth century in regard to
Chinese people and Chineseness. For example, while 'one could not
but admire John Chinaman's restraint' one had to reflect 'with
apprehension on the volcanic personality which it conceals.' The
discourse then always constructs the Chinese as totally different,
totally Other to the white Anglo-Saxon, and as ready at any second
to shed their inscrutable exterior and commit monstrous acts of
violence. For instance, while there was only one recorded case
of violent crime committed by a Chinese in Liverpool, it was
nevertheless a 'murder conceived in Oriental passion and perpe-
trated with shocking coolness.'
Chinatown was described thus:
Suddenly out of the dusk loom strange figures moving with the
stiff-jointed shamble of the Orient, and gazing with impassive
eyes, set aslant in saffron, mask-like faces, at the incongruous
surroundings. The street is part of Liverpool's Chinatown.
In the space of a single sentence, the Chinese is associated with
darkness (the 'dusk'), with alterity and difference (the Chinese is
'strange', walks differently, 'shambles', is unknowable, or
inscrutable 'with impassive eyes' which are shaped differently
('slanted') set inscrutably again in motionless, 'mask-like faces'
which are not white, but yellow or rather 'saffron' which also
alludes the exoticism, the out of the ordinariness of the Orient.
Ultimately, they are deemed to be out of place, or 'incongruous'.
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Gambling and opium-smoking were of particular interest - as if
the 'pure' Anglo-Saxon folk, here constructed as both ethnically
and morally 'pure', had never indulged in these vices. The Courier
continues:
More sinister scenes could be surveyed in the
HAUNTS OF THE OPIUM SMOKERS
which are by no means unknown in the neighbourhood. There
on their floor mattresses recline silent figures, puffing at the
slender, tiny bowled pipes of disastrous peace; ... the air is
almost drowned in the reek of the charmed narcotic, but
squalid as it is, the scene is not without Dantesque and
Rembrandtesque suggestiveness. Then though yonder contorted
sleeper is horrible to look upon, who shall say in what realms
of delight he wanders ... It is not good, however, to linger in this
dismal den of dreams.
And with that alliterative flourish the writer takes his leave of
what is evidently a small, pathetic, local instantiation of the imag-
ined and imaginary exotic Oriental opium den that has fascinated
writer and filmmaker alike for over a century. In 1894, in the very
infancy of the cinematic industry, America produced a film
entitled Chinese Opium Den; in 1898 the American Mutoscope
Company produced a two-part film entitled A Chinese Opium
Joint; in 1908 French director Georges Melies directed Le reve'
d'un fumeur d'opium, released in the USA as The Dream of an
Opium Fiend; 1912 saw The Opium Smugglers starring Myrtle
Stedman appear; in 1919 the German director Robert Dinesen
made a film called simply Opium. All these films reproduced and
reinforced white Western myths about Chinatowns, and made
possible the kinds of groundless and exaggerated claims made by
the anti-Chinese campaigners active in turn-of-the-century
England. Throughout the twentieth century such films would
continue to be made. In 1962, Thomas De Quincey's book
Confessions of an Opium Eater was turned into a film starring
Vincent Price as De Quincey. Released first under its original
literary title in the USA, it was reissued as Souls for Sale;
in Britain it was released as Evils of Chinatown. Depicting
Chinese women sold into San Francisco Chinatown slavery,
lewd old Chinese men bidding at auction for nubile girls, Tong
(Chinese mafia) wars, and the centrepiece of the opium den,
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the film reproduces all the standard white imaginary of
Chinatown.
Opium consumption was undoubtedly a practice that existed
amongst a minority of the Chinese community in Britain, although
not as widely as in Chinese populated British colonies of Asia and
consumption was confined to transient members of the community
such as seamen. Compared to the average British consumption of
opium in the nineteenth century, the use of opium in Chinatowns
would have been almost nugatory. Nevertheless, its reporting was
part of an obligatory representation of Chineseness just as that of
the gambling den was. We read in the subsequent paragraph that:
At [the Chinese card game of] fan-tan ..., the Chinaman spends
much of his time ashore; and this and opium smoking constitute
the most marked of his failings. He is a born gambler ...
In this sentence we see that not only were all Chinese constructed
as congenital gamblers and opium-smokers, but that all Chinese
were considered to be seafarers. In fact, a number of Chinese who
resided temporarily in Liverpool were seamen, but many had
boarded ship simply as a means of escape, and many were long-
standing residents who had forsaken the sea. Some, like my own
grandfather had never been seamen and the ship had simply been
the means of transport to the heart of Britain's empire.
In a sense however, while the opium smoker might be seen as he
who had abandoned hope, the gambler was the eternal optimist
who lacking a part in any collective hope 'invested' (like the millions
of lottery players in Britain today) in a hope of individual liberation.
Apart from the 1906 elections and the furore over the putative
threat posed by Chinese labourers to white English would-be
emigrants to South Africa, the other more immediate concern in
Liverpool was the recent Immigration Board decision to allow 31
legal Chinese immigrants to proceed from the Port of London to
Liverpool to take up work that Chinese laundry owners had
arranged for them in advance. In the same issue of the Liverpool
Weekly Courier and on the same page as the above report we read
of the anger of the English laundrymen's representative, a
Mr. Arthur J. Tudor, who had organized a petition of three
thousand names to exclude the thirty-one Chinese. He declared
that: 'We who are engaged in the laundry business ... are being
literally driven out of it by the crowds of Chinamen who are
coming to the city.'
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At that moment in the twentieth century, it should be noted, the
Head Constable reported to the Liverpool City Council inquiry
which followed this series of anti-Chinese complaints, that only
356 Chinese people resided in the city, 'of whom about 224 were
resident and 132 transient.'lO And indeed, the numbers involved
were always inconsequential. But this did not prevent that most
common of racist tropes the 'flood' and the 'tide' being repeatedly
applied to the small numbers of Chinese settling in Britain.
Mr. Tudor furthermore invoked the moral decadence of Chinese
immigrants, which he and the newspaper refer to as the 'Yellow
Peril.' Another aspect of the Yellow Peril, the newspaper contin-
ues, 'was that of morality. The code of morals amongst the
Chinese, he [Tudor] pointed out was having a serious effect upon
the English people amongst whom they came to live in Liverpool.'
Referring to the streets known as Chinatown, Pitt Street and
Frederick Street, Tudor claimed that they 'were now almost
infested with Chinese.' In the same column Mr. Tudor vowed that
'if the authorities would not help the people of Liverpool to resist
the incursion of Chinese into the city the people must help them-
selves.' Asked what he meant by that remark, the following reply
was given: 'I mean that we shall force them to leave our city; we
shall drive them out, and if a riot results, the Home Secretary must
not hold us responsible.'
Of interest here is the use of the word 'infested', a trope which
proceeds from the association of Chinese with forms of undesirable
animal life such as rats, in other words a denial of the humanity of
the Chinese. And as with any such vermin, Tudor wishes to 'drive
them out.'
The official Liverpool Council inquiry, in fact, unveiled little
that corresponded to the popular representations of the Chinese.
The enquiry found that the opium habit prevailed only among
seamen 'as distinguished from resident Chinamen' and that 'a
large number of the resident Chinamen are not in the habit of
using the drug.' 'A statement to the effect that the Chinese were in
the habit of giving sweets impregnated with opium to children is
not confirmed by the evidence.' That even such a charge should
have been made, given the wholesale nineteenth-century English
custom of doping infants, is indicative of the collective amnesia
that marked the stigmatisation of the Chinese as the instigators of
opium consumption.
Yet, when small quantities of opium were discovered in the
possession of the rare Chinese consumers the Chineseness of the
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practice was always emphasised. One instance, the case of Law
Sing, a Liverpool laundryman, was represented by the print media
as an example of the dishonesty typifying the Chinese. Here the
eating and leisure habits of the Chinaman are not only treated as a
curiosity, but also as giving rise to hilarity. Raided under a warrant
to search for illicit gaming activities, Law Sing claims the wrapping
papers found by the police contained Chinese opiate-based medi-
cine for indigestion caused by the consumption of pork. At the trial
Chief Inspector Howard of the Liverpool Police was questioned by
advocate Mr. Noel B. Goldie about the peculiar alimentary habits
of 'the Chinaman':
Did he tell you he had to consult a distinguished Liverpool doctor
because he had pork for supper and followed it with pork for
breakfast?
No sir.
You agree that if even a Chinaman had pork for supper and
pork for breakfast in all probability he would want some
medicine?
Not a Chinaman (laughter).
While in Liverpool, the local newspaper could now mock Chinese
opium consumption, a formerly widespread British practice now
erased from the collective memory, opium use was hardly open to
such censorious comment in that other British imperial port, Hong
Kong. And indeed, British imperial officials there persisted in
defending a very different interpretation of the practice of opium
consumption.
In Britain's so-called Chinese colonies (Hong Kong and
Singapore principally), the concerns were different. There was no
need for government to pander to ideological concerns, and there
was no white labour to appease. Moreover, in addition to the direct
interests of capital, which the colonial structure was clearly meant
to serve, the imperial apparatus itself was financially dependent on
the opium trade. Indeed, the total monopoly maintained by the
imperial authorities over the drug industry and its distribution was
the financial foundation of the imperial state apparatus. In Hong
Kong, while to this day the erroneous impression of laissez faire
economy still dominates, government has paid its way, and thus
facilitated the advance of capital, via indirect taxation and mon-
opolies on specific goods. In the nineteenth century the major
monopoly and source of colonial revenue derived from the opium
license; a license to import and distribute was sold to a Chinese
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agent known as the Opium Farmer for a limited number of years,
usually a period of three years at a time. My interest here is not so
much with the enormous profits generated by the opium trade for
the British capitalists who invested in and managed the opium
trade, but rather with the direct financial support of the British
colonial apparatus furnished by opium taxation. However, on
several levels the concerns of the traders and the government are
inseparable. First, because the very reasons for the establishment of
Hong Kong as a British colony and the Opium Wars that enabled
its colonization, were directly the protection and promotion of the
trade in opium. Secondly, because those who directly profited from
India, the Straits colonies, and Hong Kong (traders such as Jardine,
Matheson and others) were also directly involved in the legislative
and executive branches of colonial government; Jardine Mathesons
and the Swire brothers enjoyed special representation in the Hong
Kong government. 11
In other words, opium smoking, introduced and spread into
China by the British in order to generate profits to cover the pur-
chase of tea (and later that too was grown in British India), was a
major source of revenue for the maintenance of the colonial appa-
ratus and thus of the colonial apparatus's own position and power
within the empire.
The importance of opium as state
apparatus-financing revenue
'[T]he opium trade was vital to the solvency of the East India
Company - which is to say the solvency of the Indian
Government.'12 Although nominally indigenous princes still had
executive power, in fact, real regnant power was increasingly in the
hands of the Company, or rather with 'the agents of a limited com-
pany trading out of offices in Leadenhall Street. To help finance its
governing activities, the Company had in 1773 acquired a monop-
oly of opium cultivation in Bengal. By 1832, the proceeds of this
amounted to one eighteenth of the Indian revenue, and would later
in the century rise to one seventh.'13
The larger picture is also addressed by Trocki in his book on
opium and the Chinese-populated colony of Singapore: 'the British
agency houses in Singapore were the pioneers of British colonial
capitalism. The British came as merchants of opium, and in a very
real sense we can best understand the British Empire east of Suez
as of 1800 as essentially a drug cartel.'14
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Trocki points to the almost pathological dependence of the
east of Suez empire on opium revenues and profits, and to the
consequent 'incredibly determined efforts by the Colonial Office,
British officials in Malaya, and the British economic community in
the colonies to oppose anything that might decrease the opium
revenue or otherwise shift the tax burden. Any argument that the
imperial system did not rely on opium and was not, in the patho-
genic sense, systemically dependent on the drug is simply not in
accordance with the facts. This was true not only of Malaya, but
also of all India and virtually every place under British control east
of Suez.'15
Amongst the Malayan Chinese community the extent of opium
use was enormous. Singapore opium traders and government
lacking the economically strategic position in the opium trade
with China that was occupied by Hong Kong developed a market
for the drug among Chinese labourers imported to Malaya. Even
after the global depression of 1929, when opium revenues
plunged 'it was estimated that there were over three hundred
thousand opium addicts in British Malaya out of a total adult
population of three million.' A Singapore Chinese Anti-Opium
Society pamphleteer Chen So Lan, estimated one in four Chinese
was an addict. 16
In Hong Kong the importance of opium revenue was paramount.
Even at the height of abolitionist sentiment, colonial officials
staunchly defended opium use, and for good financial reasons. In
1909 in his 'Memorandum regarding the restriction of opium in
Hongkong and China', the Governor, Lugard (a foreign office
Africanist exiled to Hong Kong for his particularly violent approach
to colonial government, a man once accused even by Winston
Churchill of being a 'butcher'), stated that 'the farm is a lucrative
business and its acquisition therefore is the object of keen competi-
tion and the Government derives from the sale of the Monopoly a
sum equal to nearly a fourth of its entire Revenue.'1?
In one sense, the anti-abolitionist apologists for opium were right
in their claim that 'forcing' the Chinese to use opium was no
different from the idea that you could force any society to import
any commodity. And indeed, in economic terms, opium is no
different from any other commodity that a society does not need;
the history of capitalist modernity is stuffed full of such com-
modities. However, once dependence is established opium becomes
the perfect commodity. As an addictive commodity, opium was the
optimum good.
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The economic effects, however extend beyond profits and state-
apparatus financing revenues. In a comment that could apply
universally to drug use in British Asia and in China, Trocki points
out that nothing 'destroyed peasant self-sufficiency faster than the
need for silver to feed a habit. Nothing kept a labourer working for
a substandard wage more effectively than dependence on a drug.'18
Thus the economic effects of opium went beyond considerations of
revenue and profit that was derived directly from the drug and
affected wage-levels and worker demands, and peasant economies.
Both in England and in the colonies the habit of opium smoking
was reinvented as an essentially Chinese habit, and Britain's part in
its promotion and imposition, through the Opium Wars and their
aftermath, was minimised or forgotten. This is not to say that the
medical profession in England and various clergymen were not
vociferous long before the first opium war even, in their denuncia-
tion of the opium trade, but their opinion was never dominant and
their campaign to suppress opium consumption unsuccessful until
the economic returns of the opium trade themselves declined.
However, in the colonies the economic and bureaucratic impera-
tives of maintaining opium-smoking were always paramount. And
thus while in England a negative representation of the opium
smoking Chinaman was predominant, in Hong Kong officials,
governors, chief medical officers and the opium traders themselves
were vigorously engaged in the demystification and naturalization
of the practice of opium.
It is interesting that in this discourse that maintains the innocu-·
ity of opium-smoking a comparison with alcohol is always made.
Opium is benign, has beneficial effects; it calms, it sedates.
Alcohol, on the other hand, excites and incites aggression and
subversion. For Atkinson, the superintendent of the Civil
Hospital, alcohol 'was much the greater evil in its results on those
who take it to excess' .19 Ignoring the fairly recent historical real-
ity of the massive promotion and distribution in China of Indian
opium by the British, while reproducing late nineteenth-century
scientific racist thinking, Atkinson supports the likelihood of a
racial and biological Chinese difference when he suggests that
'there is in the Chinese an hereditary toleration, if not a craving,
for opium'. Yet, in the next sentence, in order to explain the
difference between Chinese and European habits, Atkinson shifts
to a an argument based not so much on race, but rather on
economic class, the fact that the Chinese constitute the labouring
classes, and are thus more exposed to the environment. Here it
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emerges that the Chinese need for opium is due to the weather: 'It
is not necessary for Europeans to take opium to withstand the ill
effects of the climate, as for one reason we are not so much
exposed to the climate as the Chinese from our manner of living,
occupations etcetera and alcohol in moderation fulfils the same
purpose.' None of this tortuous logic explains why the Chinese
may not take alcohol in moderation, and why they must seek
their relief in opium.
As Trocki records 'international pressures to end the opium trade
had been growing since the 1880s. In 1893, the Society for the
Suppression of the Opium Trade had prevailed on the House of
Commons to organize a royal commission to study the opium trade
and, along with it, the farming system.'20 However, it would be
another twenty years before anti-opium forces would start to
prevail.
In October 1893 the 'Royal Commission on Opium' solicited
answers to a questionnaire (Questions regarding opium consump-
tion and opium revenue in the Colonies and Dependencies of
Singapore, Penang and Hongkong). In Hong Kong both the
Colonial Surgeon and the Superintendent of the Civil Hospital
responded to the questionnaire.21 The survey consisted of seven-
teen questions prefaced by the request that 'gentlemen who kindly
undertake to deal with these questions should answer as many as
they can.' The two medical officers answered fifteen of the ques-
tions. Neither 'gentleman' responded to the sixteenth question: 'Is
there among the Asiatic race in your Colony a feeling of hostility
against England for allowing opium to be exported from India? If
so, how does that feeling display itself.' However, the Colonial
Surgeon Ayres was particularly virulent in denying the deleterious
effects of opium smoking. Commenting on what many European
employers took to be the after-effects of opium smoking, Ayres
insisted; 'These are the effects among the Chinese of a night in a
brothel and over-copulation, but neither the servant nor his friends,
the other servants, will tell the cause.'
It was only in 1943, by which time Japanese forces in any case
occupied much of British colonial territory in East and Southeast
Asia, that the British government, conforming to international
political and economic developments, prohibited opium-smoking.
The stereotype image of the opium-smoking Chinaman is not so
easily eliminated, however, and the representation persists and con-
tinues to be reproduced to this day in the 'western' imaginary of
China and Chineseness.
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Chinese mind and Chinese language:
infantile decrepitude
Closely related to the physical characteristics of the Chinese
constructed and reproduced in the representation of opium
consumption was the supposed biologically determined mental
condition of the Chinese. As in the discourse on opium consump-
tion which reveals bifurcated and almost incommensurate interpre-
tations of Chinese opium practices in Britain on the one hand and
in the colonies 'East of Suez' on the other, the discourse on mental
health also seems to be contradictory. The Chinese being repre-
sented both as wily, scheming and capable of the most intricate
machinations, and as degenerate, unbalanced, demented and
mentally deficient. There are, for instance, numerous examples in
popular discursive texts, most famously Sax Rohmer's Fu-Manchu
novels, of the 'apparent' serenity and calm of the Chinese under
which is concealed a wild, uncontrollable, deranged and passionate
nature.
The stage of development of the Chinese mind in scientific racist
discourse is also an important element of the overall representation
of the Chinese mental state. In 1926, the French 'man of science'
Dr. A. Legendre writing in the popular weekly newspaper
Illustration repeated many of the discursive elements commonly
reproduced in Europe to represent the mental capacities of the
Chinese:
To what then should this deficiency in the Chinese brain be
attributed? Without doubt to the catastrophic reaction of this
mass of negroids and mitis - the Yellow - forming the majority
of the population and whose blood, by dint of a widely practiced
polygamy, impregnated the elite, originally of white race,22
Legendre is attached to widely current late nineteenth-century sci-
entific racist theories that were deeply invested in a hierarchisation
of races and which accounted for racial degeneracy in terms of the
'impregnation' by the non-white of pure national bodies. Thus,
Chinese or 'yellow' civilization can be discounted, and Chinese
intelligence with it:
There is, and there has never been, a yellow civilization, no more
than there has been a negro civilization. The white race alone,
constituted of Aryans and Semites, has been, in the history of
peoples, a ferment of intelligence and activity .... The Yellow is
only a metis of conquering whites and negroids.23
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Thus, in a discursive turn that seems to presage late twentieth-
century relativist positions on human rights in Asia, Legendre
claims it is 'destabilizing' to introduce the biologically, mentally
immature, infantile Chinese to notions of autonomy and
democracy:
... the teaching of certain democratic doctrines [in China is]
detestable to, detrimental for peoples still closer to childhood than
maturity. Our political and social concepts, in undiluted doses,
destabilizes the Asiatic who has not yet achieved the biological age
when their assimilation could be real and productive.24
And finally, 'the Chinese' is represented as mentally incapable of
organizing an economy: 'This incapacity of the Chinese to organize
in the economic field is surely a characteristic of a biological
nature. It reveals a retarded evolution due to organic and racial
deficiency.'25 The idea that 'the Chinese' is congenitally incapable
of running an economy was a notion that underpinned colonialist
justificatory discourse for the white colonial presence in Asia and
Africa. But this notion has reverberations to this day, and doubtless
has constituted the sub-text of the West's late twentieth-century
discourse of the Asian 'economic miracle', for people incapable of
advanced economic organization, capitalist development can only
be understood as miraculous.
Legendre, like many other Europeans and Americans in
twentieth-century writing on Chineseness, relied on the narrative of
biological and mental difference established by an American mis-
sionary named Arthur H. Smith whose monograph Chinese
Characteristics would become a standard work of reference for
those seeking to reproduced the discourse of Chinese difference.26
As I have noted previously, the Chinese language has always
been easily capable of reification as an indicator of total difference,
of the hidden and the impenetrable. The Chinese language was rep-
resented as a mysterious writing system as yet undeciphered, a code
which only Western scientific enquiry could break. American
philologist, Stephen Pearl Andrews, wrote a book in the mid-nine-
teenth century entitled Discoveries In China: On The Symbolism
Of The Primitive Character Of The Chinese System Of Writing.
The New York newspaper, The Daily Tribune, credited Andrews
with the 'solution of the mystery of Chinese writing.'27 Reified, the
Chinese language is represented as concealed, and thus discover-
able, solvable like a Chinese puzzle:
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The composition of the characters offers a sort of a puzzle and a
charm equal to a game or a child's riddle book, so that the work
[by Andrews] cannot fail to attract many readers as an object of
amusement ... 28
As we shall see in the discussion of pantomime below, the Chinese
language still is a reified source of amusement, and the idea of the
Chinese language as odd, quirky, and infantile has entered into
the Western cultural imaginary. For the Times correspondent
Cooke, writing in the mid nineteenth century the 'Chinese language
is the most intricate, cumbrous, and unwieldy vehicle of thought
that ever obtained among any people.'29
For Holcombe, at the end of the nineteenth century, it was the
nature of Chinese that excluded the outsider:
A barrier far more serious than the Great Wall to any intimate
acquaintance with the Chinese is found in their language. It is
the oldest spoken language now existent on the earth, has been
the mother tongue of a far larger number of human beings than
any other either in the past or present, and, so far as can be deter-
mined, has undergone no serious changes either in his construc-
tion or written form since it came into existence.30
While seeming to be impressed by the monumental qualities of the
language ('the Great Wall', 'oldest spoken language', 'the mother
tongue of an enormous number of human beings'), the writer rein-
scribes the idea of the language as conservative and unchanging..
The historical reality is far more complex. There is first the dis-
tinction between the elite literary language, wenyan (classical or
pre-modern Chinese) and the vernacular language. Wenyan,
although a 'dead' language, had like Latin undergone multiple styl-
istic and other changes over its millennia-long history. As for the
vernacular, it was, like any other language, in a constant state of
evolution in both its written and spoken forms. The numerous
dialects which existed and exist in Chinese also go unmentioned by
this author.
Holcombe goes on to reproduce another shibboleth concerning
the non-existence of scientific thought and the incapacity of the
language to express scientific ideas:
While the Chinese tongue discloses various line of thought, deli-
cate turns of speech and, so to speak, accurate shades of idea
unknown in England, there are many subjects in which the lan-
guage is totally devoid of words, many ideas for which there are
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no forms of expression, simply because those ideas have never
entered a Chinese head. In the whole range of scientific language,
for example, and the simpler terms and phrases used in our text-
books in common schools, no equivalent expressions are found
in Chinese, because the sciences and even the simpler studies are
unknown to them.3!
The 'western sciences' were, in fact, not unknown to China, and
China has its own extremely long scientific history, witness the
enormous investment of time and labour necessary to the produc-
tion of the Cambridge scientist Joseph Needham's encyclopedic
multi-volume work, Science and Civilization in China. Chinese
science may not have always posed the same questions in the same
ways as European had, but science and technology did not go
neglected by the 'Chinese head'.
It was Arthur Smith writing in 1890 who represented as tightly
imbricated the mental capacities of the Chinese with the character-
istics of the Chinese language. Smith claimed that the Chinese lan-
guage was essentially responsible for rendering the Chinese stupid:
We are not about to complain that the Chinese language cannot
be made to convey human thought, nor that there are wide
ranges of human thought which it is difficult or impossible to
render intelligible in the Chinese language (though this appears to
be a truth), but only to insist that such language, so constructed,
invites to 'intellectual turbidity', as the incandescent heats of
summer gently woo to afternoon repose.32
The Chinese, Smith claims, have enormous difficulty in under-
standing a linguistic message, a difficulty attributed to a lack of
intellectual capacity:
He does not understand, because he does not expect to understand,
and it takes him an appreciable time to get such intellectual forces
as he has, into a position to be used at all. His mind is like a rusty
old smooth-bore cannon mounted on an old decrepit carriage.33
Notice here how the habitual Orientalist charge of decadence and
senility of the Chinese mind is reproduced in the allusion to a
'decrepit old carriage'. But not only can the Chinese not grasp
enlightened, modern, Western speech, neither can the Chinese talk
sense: 'Nothing is more common in conversation with an educated
Chinese, than to experience extreme difficulty in ascertaining what
he is talking about.'34
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Smith was enormously influential upon writers in Europe, and
numerous were those who popularized and disseminated his ideas
on Chineseness. In a book entitled Chine et Chinois d'aujourd'hui,
Ie nouveau peril jaune [China and Chinese today: the new yellow
peril] (1926) d'Auxion de Ruffe reproduces Smith's discourse on
the Chinese language and what he termed 'intellectual torpor'.35 At
the beginning of the book is reproduced a photograph with the fol-
lowing legend: 'Xenophobic Chinese student type: His coat bears
inscriptions such as 'Give Back the Concessions! Down With the
English' etc. All the signs of mental deficiency can be noticed on
this physiognomy'.
Such a description was in keeping with the anthropological mode
of categorizing 'types' that was in vogue until World War Two. The
English edition of d'Auxion de Ruffe's work appeared in 1928 with
the title Is China Mad?36
Among the more celebrated disciples of the Reverend Smith was
Paul Claude! who writes that the Chinese language is the 'main
source of that 'intellectual torpor' to which the Reverend Smith
devotes several very amusing and very correct pages'.3?
Claude! also discerns a connection between Chinese syntax and
that other 'Chinese characteristic' foregrounded by Orientalists
and scientific racists, a trait that has entered into the Western pop-
ular imaginary, that of 'mercantilism', the universally Chinese
desire for material profit. For Claude! the love of profit 'is the
strongest sentiment in the Chinese heart', the Chinese is instinc-
tively 'above all a "profit-seeker" [gagneur], a trader [marchand],:
One can see an index of this mercantile instinct in the way ques-
tions are formed in the Chinese language in which the question
consists of an affirmative followed immediately by a negative:
You have - you haven't - you are - you aren't -like a trader who
offers the various objects on his inventory, leaving the buyer to
choose.38
The Chinese then was marked as different in terms of intelligence
and the capacity to use language logically.
While Claude! concludes that the Chinese language betrays the
mercantile propensities of the Chinese character, others writing
without the slightest modicum of linguistic analytical prowess, fre-
quently discerned in the language an instantiation of the infantile
nature of the Chinese mind. Writing in the second decade of the
twentieth century Johnston describes the language thus:
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When a baby begins to talk, he can only say little words - 'ta'
for 'thank you'; 'mo' for 'more'. He sometimes says the same
sound twice to make a word, as 'ma-ma', 'pa-pa', 'ta-ta'. The
Chinese language is all of short words of one syllable, and they,
too, often repeat the same sound. Learned men say that this
simple language is like the primitive talk of a baby race.39
The implication here is that the Chinese 'as a race' have not grown
up. They have remained at the stage of an infant. Linguistically they
resemble toddlers, and their mind must inevitably be incapable of
adaptation to adult thought processes. In a paragraph that repro-
duces two scientific racist charges, the innate childishness of the
Chinese coupled with the Chinese society's decrepitude, Johnston
goes on to attribute the motive for this perceived lack of linguistic
development to China's distance from the rest of the world:
Does it seem strange that so old a people as the Chinese should
have a baby language? Baby learns as he grows older to use
longer words and more words by hearing all the people round use
them. China was too much alone to hear the languages of other
nations, and so it kept on using its first language, while other
nations have forgotten or altered theirs.4o
Once again China's distance from Europe and China's 'isolation'
underline China's immense 'difference'. In the next section, I shall
discuss how this discourse of 'difference' was, and still is, repre-
sented and exploited in other forms of media and in popularly con-
sumed entertainment.
Oh, Mr. Wu, What Shall I Do?:
'Chinese fourths', Western triads, and the laundryman
in the British popular cultural imaginary
While the Chinese in China may have been constructed as the
'instinctual' profit-seeking trader, in Europe and the United States
the Chinese was always the 'laundryman' who frequently indulged
in the 'Chinese' vices of opium-smoking, illicit sexual intercourse,
and gambling. But the major trope found in the comic discourses
of both the mid twentieth-century novelty song and the 'tradition'
of British pantomime, was of the Chinaman not as an distant agent
of evil, but rather the Chinaman who ran the laundry on Britain's
main streets, the lowly laundryman marked by minor vices, the
Chinaman who was the butt of the music-hall joke.
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There is a certain irony in the celebration of the Chinese as a
cleaner of laundry. The Chinaman, after all, has been long discur-
sively configured as 'dirty'. Indeed, the notion that the Chinese, the
'Oriental', and more generally the non-anglo-saxon, is 'naturally'
unclean has been ingrained in the white popular imaginary, and
many a Chinese immigrant child over the past 100 years has had to
endure the playground chant:
Chinese
Japanese
Dirty knees
The allusion to dirt in this ditty is not aleatory. The construction of
the Other, the poor, the manual worker, the immigrant, and within
those categories and as a discreet category, 'woman' as dirty, unhy-
gienic, infected, is well documented.41 However, such contradic-
tions are common to discourses of race and class. The immigrant,
the colonized, the worker is lazy but still produces the wealth, he is
dirty but still produces cleanliness.
The figure of the Chinese laundryman became fixed in the
American and European imaginaries from the late nineteenth
century onwards. But even after the passing of the laundry with the
advent of the washing machine, the trope of the Chinese laundry-
man has remained a feature of popular cultural representation,
and thus also a seemingly unerasable figure in the white popular
imaginary.
As mentioned previously, in England at the beginning of the
twentieth century the issue of Chinese laundries displacing
'English' laundries was a source of major debate within the British
labour movement and was integrated into the 1906 election cam-
paign issue of the use of Chinese labour in the British Transvaal,
South Africa. The laundry was an easy and visible target both dur-
ing the election campaign of 1906 and, in the economic depression
that followed the First World War, during the race riots of 1919.
The laundry like the restaurant and take-away outlets in con-
temporary European and American society put the Chinese physi-
cally in the midst of the white community, and away from the
relative protection of Chinatowns. As the most immediate locus of
Chinese presence the laundry often attracted racist attacks.
Similarly the laundry business was the object in 1906 of a white
laundry owners' boycott in protest at the arrival of a couple of
dozen Chinese workers destined for British laundries. What was,
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in fact, in question was the cheaper and more efficient service
offered by Chinese laundries prepared to accept narrower margins
of profit.
In the cartoon accompanying the Liverpool Weekly Courier's
report on the boycott, a pigtailed 'Chinaman', stands idly on the
doorstep of the 'Go Bang' laundry.42 The caption reads 'Go Bang
(boycotted): Dese Liverpool folk have grown velly dirty all of a
quick!' The name of the laundry accords with English perceptions
of the supposed monosyllabic aural quality of the Chinese lan-
guage, and provides (as in many a music-hall joke) the basis for
punning. Here, for instance, 'Go bang' can be glossed as 'go bust',
go bankrupt.43 A sign in the window of the laundry reads: ONLY
MOONLIGHT SOAP USED HERE,' alluding both to the allegedly
illegally employed workers used in Chinese laundries, and to
'Sunlight' soap, a popular brand of soap made by Lever Brothers at
nearby Port Sunlight.
As we saw in the instance of Law Sing, the 'Chinaman' with the
'propensity for pork', laundries were also suspected of being
'fronts' or 'covers' for illicit activities, as establishments that
masked the Chinese vices and habits of indulgence in gambling,
opium and sexual intercourse with white women.
George Formby, also known by the sobriquets 'the Emperor of
Lancashire' and 'Mr. Ukulele', a northern English popular singer
and ukulele player of working class origins who for decades from
the 1920s to the 1950s was the most popular English entertainer in
British social life, both satirised and popularised the Chinese
laundryman. Formby's Chinaman was called Mr. Wu and became
celebrated in the song 'Chinese Laundry Blues.' Mr. Wu entered
the popular cultural imaginary of twentieth-century Britain as the
comic stereotype of the Chinaman.44 Formby, who had secured a
contract with the Decca recording company in June 1932, recorded
'Chinese Laundry Blues' with Jack Hylton and his band.45
Just as the Chinese language is represented in popular cultural
discourse as a marker of extensive difference and separation, simi-
larly Chinese music is distinguished as being totally alien to the
Western musical tradition. Thus, in Formby's 'Chinese' songs,
apart from the narrative recounted by the lyrics, the Chineseness of
Mr. Wu and his milieu is indicated by a standard musical trope, the
use of 'Chinese fourths'. 'Chinese fourths' refer to the arrangement
of notes representing what was understood by late nineteenth-
century 'Western' musicians to be the typical traits and sound of
Chinese music.
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To the Western-trained musical ear Chinese music lacked what
was then understood as the basis of Western music musical
harmony, the triad. 'Chinese fourths' constitute a non-triadic
sound, and thus Chinese Otherness may be represented by a lack
or absence of Western tonal, triadic, harmony. Chineseness is thus
once more represented by a negativity.
The first song narrative in which Mr. Wu appears, 'Chinese laun-
dry Blues' reproduces several metaphors already common to the
representation of the Chinese in Britain. Formby's songs were
always marked by a coy allusion to titillating images such as ladies'
undergarments, and the Chinaman's reputation for womanizing,
for having an unusually voracious sexual appetite, was easily recu-
perable to Formby's use of slightly risque innuendo. For instance
the lines 'Now Mr. Wu he's got a naughty eye that flickersIYou
ought to see it wobble when he's ironing ladies' blouses', where the
expected rhyming word is 'knickers'. Even more outre are the lines
'Now Mr. Wu he's got a laundry kind of trickylHe starched me
shirt and collars but he never touched me waistcoat', in which
'waistcoat' presumably stands for 'dicky'.
Mr Wu has become enamoured of 'a Chinese girl and his laun-
dry's all gone wrong', 'My vest is so short it won't fit my little
brother/And my new Sunday shirt has got a perforated rudder'. In
other words, the song lyrics point to white British, especially
middle-class, dependence on the Chinese laundry in the 1930s, a
moment when domestic servants had become rare, and the wash~
ing machine was not yet in people's homes. So, 'Oh Mr. Wu what
shall I do' without your laundry-cleaning services?
Subsequently Mr. Wu was emancipated from the laundry in the
song 'Mr. Wu's a Window Cleaner Now', to indulge his taste for
women in the occupation of window-cleaner. The subject matter of
the song, a window-cleaning Chinese facilitated a combination of
a series of music-hall 'gags' about Chineseness and Formby's stock-
in-trade coy jokes about ladies' underwear and semi-naked women
- the sight of which was supposed to constitute one of the
privileges of window-cleaning.
Formby had previously had a success with his chart hit 'When
I'm Cleaning Windows', and 'Mr. Wu's a Window-Cleaner Now'
was perhaps intended to replicate and recuperate the success of the
proven profitable songs which had depended on the apparently
comic qualities of window-cleaning and Chineseness. The song was
featured in Ealing Studios' first film to address directly the Second
World War, Let George Do It, directed by Marcel Varnel in 1940.
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The following bar of music
recurs throughout 'Mr. Wu's a Window Cleaner Now' and was,
and continues to be, common to many musical representations of
Chineseness in film soundtracks. It is also notable that the liberally
sprinkled 'Chinese fourths' in this song are lent a distinct percus-
sive quality; the notation marking the notes as being played
staccato. Moreover, 'Mr. Wu's a Window Cleaner Now' is musi-
cally prefaced by the sound of the banging of a 'Chinese' gong. The
foregrounding of percussion here corresponds to the impression
reproduced in the Western musical imaginary that music from 'the
East' is dominated by percussion.
As to the representation of Mr. Wu's physical appearance, the
song reproduces all the cliches pertaining to the 'typical' Chinese
physique. Mr. Wu is depicted as 'naturally', biologically, myopic
and thus with a 'hi-dee-hi and a won-long too', he 'had his eyesight
tested'. As a result of his window-cleaning, a career that allows him
to peer into women's apartments, 'his eyesight's getting better.'
However, this activity results in a deterioration in another suppos-
edly biologically determined feature since, as a result of flattening
his face against window panes better to glimpse women in their
underwear, his already flat nose 'is getting flatter'. Moreover, Mr.
Wu's sexual libido excited by his voyeurism leads him to make
excessive demands on his 'little Chinese wifey': 'Tearing her silk
stockings her husband makes her sadder/All day long he wants to
keep on running up the ladder.'
But with the coming of the Second World War the representation
of the Chinaman became more positive. After successive and par-
tially successful attempts to erase Chinatown and the Chinese from
Britain's soil, Chinese seamen suddenly became indispensable to
the allied war effort. In the First World War the Chinese labourers
had dug the trenches, now they were to man the merchant ships,
provide the menial labour on Royal Navy vessels, and thus keep
open the shipping lanes of the world.46
George Formby similarly improved the status of his fictitious
Chinese. Formby's Chinaman was even elevated beyond the level of
a lowly seaman, when Mr. Wu enlists in the Royal Air Force. Of
48
ADDICTED, DEMENTED, AND TAKEN TO THE CLEANERS
course, in the song 'Mr. Wu in the Air Force', as he forsakes the
laundry for the skies, Mr. Wu is still a figure of fun:, 'Packing his
laundry bag he said bye-byefThe RAF he went with glee/He said
"Please you takee me!'"
Again there is a reference here to the innate inability of the Chinese
to master the English language; here Mr. Wu can still only speak
Pidgin. In subsequent lines, the listener hears that: 'Our language so
confuses him he gets in a mix/When ordered on parade one day gosh
what a fix/Instead of wearing camouflage he wore cammy knicks.'
The reference to women's underwear also reminds the audience
not to forget that Mr. Wu is by nature and profession a laundry-
man more used to ironing undergarments than dropping bombs,
but in times of national emergency with that other Asian evil, the
japanese, to defeat, all skills and bodies are redeployable: 'still his
laundry training is handy perhaps/He used to stiffen collars now he
stiffening the japs.'
Air force pilots were in the habit of painting personalized
insignia on their aircraft and Mr. Wu is no exception, and yet Mr.
Wu's Chineseness has to be marked by the trappings of the laundry
with which Chineseness in England has been made synonymous:
'His coat of arms are painted rather tricky/It's two stiff collars and
a shirt that's got no elbow.'
Given the reputation of the RAF's Brylcreem boys as 'ladies'
men' Mr. Wu is for once not out of step as he 'chases women all
day long and gives 'em no rest' in indulging his sex drive. .
Mr. Wu was doubtless a lucrative invention for Formby, the
song-writers and the recording company. But the impact of Mr. Wu
has spilt over beyond the Formby years and become encrusted onto
the persistent British image of the Chinaman.
***
Neither the character nor the story of Aladdin is usually associated
with Chinese laundries these days, but rather with the Walt Disney
Technicolor mega-hit cartoon movie. There is however one popu-
lar cultural medium in which Aladdin is still a 'Chinaman', and
that is in the traditional British pantomime. Its present-day
aficionados describe its history in celebratory prose:
Pantomime was, at one point, a short piece put on after the
evening's main performance, and consisted largely of acrobatic
tricks and knock-about humour. The first known mention of
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pantomime in Glasgow was in 1751 with the presentation
of Harlequin Pantomime or the Dutchman Bitt at Burrell's Hall
near the Cathedral. Aladdin was produced at the Theatre Royal
in Queen Street in 1814, although it was described as a melo-
drama. By 1866 however the Theatre Royal, Dunlop Street billed
Aladdin as the 'gorgeous pantomime.' The poster for that show
uses Chinese figures for the letters of the title, and describes it as
'a most Magnificently Magnumptious Processional Production,
Profusely Produced and Peculiarly Pretty.'47
The story of Aladdin and his Wonderful Lamp first appears in
nineteenth-century European translations of One Thousand and
One Nights or One Thousand Tales. There had never been a thou-
sand tales, and Aladdin was one of those stories added to the
corpus to assuage the literal-mindedness of bourgeois Europe.
Aladdin is the offspring of a deceased Chinese tailor and a poor
widow. In a type of exoticist fusion, an African magician uses
Aladdin to enter a cave to retrieve a lamp. But Aladdin uses the
powers of the lamp to become wealthy and marries the Sultan's
daughter, Bedr-el-Budur, now known in the pantomime as
Balroubador.
The first pantomime performance of Aladdin took place at
London's Covent Garden in 1788, and the version that is per-
formed today was first staged at the Strand Theatre, London in
1861, when Aladdin's mother became known as Widow Twankey;
Twankey was the brand name of a Chinese green tea popular in
Britain in the nineteenth century.
Pantomime is celebrated as a very British form of entertainment,
as family entertainment. However, sadly much of the humour is
based on sexist and racist innuendo, and the reason for
pantomime's endurance has probably more to do with the
economic necessity of theatres needing to survive through what
would otherwise be the dead season of mid-winter by providing
popular non-elite entertainment; pantomimes are performed
through December and January, thus coinciding with the festive
season and school holidays.
Pantomime holds a special place in the hearts of many people
connected with the British stage. It is often a child's first experi-
ence of the theatre, and can draw in crowds who would not
normally go to see a play or show at any other time of the year.
People go to be entertained, to feel the 'magic' of live per-
formance, secure in the knowledge that it will be bright and
boisterous, with glitzy and fantastical costumes and sets, lively
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music and dancing, romance, adventure, and jokes galore. It is
reassuringly traditional with the same titles appearing throughout
the years, and yet at the same time each pantomime is different,
features television personalities, can make fun of current affairs
and unpopular politicians of the day; in short the pantomime is
traditional while deploying topical socio-cultural allusions.48
However, the populist ideology underpinning the pantomime also
operates so as to socialize children, a major part of the audience,
into the masculinist, and racist stereotypes of the popular British
imaginary.
In a sort of participatory practice of call and response, each time
the main pantomime character (leading man or woman) appears,
the children in the audience are supposed to respond to his call.
The call and response are established by the actor or actress early
in the performance.
In the Liverpool Royal Court Theatre 1997-98 pantomime ver-
sion of this tale from One Thousand and One Nights, Aladdin
works in a laundry in Peking. Aladdin's call is 'Ah-so, kids'. The
children's response: 'Ah-so, Aladdin.' The 'humour' underlying this
particular call and response is based on the homophony between
the supposed Chinese, Japanese, 'oriental' at any rate, expletive
and the English profanity 'arse hole.'
Further in the category of derogatory linguistic usage, we find
that Widow Twankey, Aladdin's mother, addresses her son as
'Oriental Oik'. Mrs. Twankey runs a combined laundry and take:
away restaurant, thus accommodating early and late twentieth
century perceptions of typical Chinese occupations. The establish-
ment is called 'Mrs Twankey's Wash n'Nosh'.
Many of the jokes are puns on the popularly imagined charac-
teristics of the Chinese language. The scenery has shop signs that
read 'Lee Kee Plumber' (leakey plumber) and 'Tet-Lee Teashop' (a
reference to a brand of tea popular in Britain, Tetley tea). One shop
is lamely labelled 'Kung-Fu'.
The police constable, P.e. Noodle, wears a uniform displaying
not Chinese writing, but Japanese hiragana script, as do the chorus
children's costumes. Japanese has evidently been mistaken by the
set and costume designers for Chinese, but in any case supplies the
requisite aura of the Oriental and indecipherable. The stage curtain
is intended to represent a Beijing street. Chinese lanterns are
painted on it, and on the lanterns are inscribed representations of
Chinese writing much of which does not correspond to any real
Chinese characters.
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The script-writers notions of the spoken Chinese language are
occasionally represented by 'stage' Chinese accents, as when
Aladdin in disguise declares 'My name is One Hung Low'. Mrs.
Wong's telephone number is mis-dialled, it is the 'Wong number'.
Mrs. Wong is described as the 'woman with more chins (Chins)
than the Peking phone directory'. There is even an innovative item
of rhyming slang: 'I'm prawn crackered' which rhymes with
'knackered' meaning 'worn out'.
At the level of visual appearance, all the adult white 'chorus
girls', the female dancers, appear in 'Chinese' tunics with no skirts
or pants, and all wear long black wigs. At a most rudimentary
level, they correspond to male fantasies of available and seductive
Chinese women. In the tradition of the Orientalist confusion in
which Aladdin was invented, later in the performance the chorus
girls appear against a backdrop of Japan's Mount Fuji wearing
Japanese kimonos, as does the Princess Balroubador who has now
become Chinese, as has the Sultan who is now the Emperor of
China.
There seems to be a tradition of pantomime's producers
indulging in the incongruous. Just as in the Royal Court 1997 pro-
duction the latest Spice Girls song (performed by a local copy-cat
children's group, the Spice Kids) is reproduced, at the beginning of
the twentieth century in Scotland the latest popular songs were fea-
tured in the contemporary production of Aladdin. The Scottish
comedian Harry Lauder played 'Roderick MacSwankey', the
young Glasgow boy apprenticed to the Wicked Magician in
Aladdin, at the Theatre Royal, Glasgow in 1905. He performed
several songs in the show, but it is recorded that the 'hit' of the
evening was his new song, 'I Love a Lassie'. Six years later he had
another success in pantomime with the song 'Roamin' in the
Gloaming'.49
It seems that it was never problematic for pantomime's produc-
ers to incorporate a Scottish 'flavour' into the scenario. A Punch
cartoon from the 1935 Almanack makes a wry comment on this
practice. It is a typical pantomime Chinese street scene, except that
one of the Chinamen is playing the bagpipes, and the caption
reads:
Librettist: But dash it, you can't introduce a Scotch song into a
Chinese street scene!
Producer: Perfectly simple dear boy. You just make Aladdin say
'Although I am only a chinaman, there are times when I yearn for
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the "Bonny Bonny Banks of Loch Lomond".' The orchestra
strikes up, and there you are!50
As to the musical accompaniment, the usual aural representations
of Chineseness, 'the Chinese fourths' are deployed. In addition, the
audience is treated to any popular song that refers to China and
Chineseness. Thus, the seemingly Slavic early 1980s hit-song
'Rasputin' is performed with the line 'brightly coloured dragons
drinking Chinese tea' emphasised. There is a rendering of George
Formby's 'Chinese Laundry Blues'; even sixty-five years after
George Formby first had a hit with 'Chinese Laundry Blues' no
mimicry of Chineseness would resonate with a British pantomime
audience without it.
Socialized into English society, the author of this present work
can never hear the name Wu without George Formby's song spring-
ing to mind; such is the power of the popular cultural imaginary.
In its ability to deploy the visual, verbal and musical in a comic
ensemble, the popular cultural imaginary force of the pantomime
rivals that of the television and the cinema. However, in its ability
to legitimize itself with the aura of community and populism it
undoubtedly surpasses the cinematic and the televisual in its 'inno-
cent' yet authoritative sway over its young spectators and auditors,
and in its ability to reinscribe myths and tropes in the social imag-
inary of the child, the pantomime remains extremely powerful.
***
I saw that performance of Aladdin towards the very end of 1997.
Earlier in the day I had noticed in Blackwell's bookshop a new
omnibus reprint of Sax Rohmer's Fu Manchu stories. On the front
and back covers appeared a citation credited to Time Out's
Christopher Fowler, declaring that the reprint had made 'his heart
sing' and hoping new generations would discover the joys of read-
ing about the evil Oriental Fu-Manchu.51
Evidently, even at the very end of the twentieth century British
popular culture persists in its crude, simplistic representation of the
Chinese. Moreover, such perceptions and cliches have become
firmly lodged in the minds of the British public. But it is not just
the popular cultural media which are responsible for the pervasive
portrayal of the Chinese in this supposedly satirical vein. Later that
same evening, after visiting the bookshop and attending the pan-
tomime, I tuned into BBC Radio 4. It was the special end of the
year edition of the news quiz programme, and there emanating
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from the airwaves of the most eminent of radio stations, I heard yet
another Chinese joke trading on the monosyllabism, the 'differ-
ence,' of Chinese names. The joke focussed on the recent 1997
Hong Kong stock exchange crash. A spoof news item claimed that
a correspondent reported never having seen chins so low on the
floor of the stock exchange, but then Chin So Low stood up, and
said it was not the first time he had fallen down.
So much for the facile comedy. Britain's quality newspapers also
paid attention to Hong Kong and the Asian economic collapse at
the end of the year. It coincided with another major news item,
avian 'flu or bird influenza which led to the slaughter of Hong
Kong's entire chicken population. I noticed that the two news
stories, the stock market collapse and the chicken 'flu, gradually
became enmeshed the one with the other. Asian stock troubles were
already being described as a sort of transmitted 'contagion,' and
then came the chicken 'flu. Suddenly contagion was spreading
everywhere. The West, it seemed, was again under threat from the
East. In addition to the menace of poisonous foodstuffs, the Asian
economic miracle had now succumbed to a deadly 'virus.' When
capitalism in Asia succeeds (despite the mythic character faults of
the Chinese, and the Oriental in general) the experts describe it as
a 'miracle', and when economies fails, as they frequently do under
capitalism, they talk in terms of fearsome, irresistible, pandemic
disease: a new 'Yellow Peril.'
In 2001, foot and mouth disease broke out in Britain and led to
an economic and environmental catastrophe. In late March,
Ministry of Agriculture officials advanced the theory that meat
from Chinese restaurants had contaminated pigswill and caused
the outbreak. The popular press immediately reacted against this
new Oriental menace. The Mirror newspaper (28 March 2001) ran
the headline 'SHEEP AND SOW SAUCE' along with a colour
photograph of a sweet and sour pork dish; the paper also printed
pictures of dried meat originating from China. The Chinese com-
munity's restaurant and takeaway trade suffered particularly from
these spectacular claims, despite the government's hasty retraction
of the 'Chinese theory'. Much more serious, however, was the re-
entrenchment of the perception of China and people and things
Chinese as an evil foreign menace.
And so, as we enter the twentieth-first century, nineteenth-
century anti-Chinese racist discourse remains common currency in
Britain's media, culture and collective imaginary.
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MOUNTAIN BY TELEVISION
Televisual Socialization of the
Contemporary Chinese Consumer
Over the past two decades consumer capitalism and market
economics have been so integrally embedded in China's socio-
economy that today Western market-analysts complain that China
has a much less interventionist economy than Hong Kong's.
Indeed, while commentators are now admitting that the represen-
tation of Hong Kong's economy as the concretization of the spirit
of free enterprise is and always has been a myth, consumerism in
China, on the other hand, is a material reality.
The advent of consumerist, spectacular capitalism to China has
left the Chinese state machine intact and even emboldened. While
Chinese citizens have been inducted into consumerism,. the
Chinese state and its ideology have learned well the lessons of
spectacular self-representation in late twentieth-century con-
sumer capitalist culture. In the two sections that follow two kinds
of televisual text are discussed: the first a Chinese soap from the
early 1990s illustrates how Chinese official cultural producers
have deployed television to introduce the Chinese spectator-
consumer to the mores and modalities of consumption and every-
day capitalism. The second text I discuss reveals the extent to
which the potentially subversive redeployment of Maoist and
nationalist iconography has now been successfully reined in to be
displaced by a sophisticated reproduction of nationalist ideology
resituated in the new consumerism of emerging middle-class
urban China.
At the conclusion of the twentieth century what has emerged in
China is a new capitalist nationalist state underpinned by a
negotiated accommodation with, and integration of, global
capitalism.
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Soap, Cola and 555: Cultural imperialism in
Chinese consumed televisual production
'Cultural imperialism,' wrote Herbert Schiller, is 'the sum of the
processes by which a society is brought into the modern world
system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured,
forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to
correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the
dominating centre of the system.'! This has long been a useful
definition, and yet cultural imperialism is not necessarily and
solely, as women and other minorities know too well, imposed
from outside the nation, it also emanates from dominant forma-
tions within the nation.
There have been a number of recent works devoted to defining
and mapping cultural imperialism,2 but here I prefer the theory of
the French cultural and political theorist Guy Debord, whose most
useful contribution to critical thinking about modernity has been
his elaboration of the theory of the 'society of the spectacle' and of
the power relations sustained by it.
Debord has described as 'concentrated' spectacular power that
ideology which is 'condensed around a dictatorial personality;' a
form of power that had 'accomplished the totalitarian counter-
revolution, fascist as well as Stalinist.'3 The other form of spectac-
ular power, the 'diffuse' was that which drove wage-earners to use
their 'freedom of choice' to purchase the array of commodities
available in post World War Two consumer societies. Debord
arrived at these theorized conclusions in 1967. Twenty years later
he discerned the emergence of a third and dominant form of
spectacular power which would ultimately replace the other forms,
a combination of the two based on 'the general victory of the form
which had showed itself stronger: the diffuse. This is the integrated
spectacle, which has since tended to impose itself globally.'4
Nowhere has that integration of the two forms of the spectacle
been more thoroughgoing than in the China of the last decade or
so. While capitalist practices have been steadily entrenched in a
society where there have never been bourgeois forms of democracy,
dictatorial practices have continued to thrive, so that market
capitalism and its supposed 'freedom of choice' are limited by the
ideological needs of the state.
For instance, in October and November of 1993, the Chinese
authorities implemented a range of censorship measures aimed at
controlling distribution of information and cultural products and
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practices. The official New China news agency, Xinhua, announced
the government's intention to close illegal dance halls, video game
parlours and other types of entertainment categorized as harmful
to 'the body and mind of the people.'5 Controls on publishing were
also reinforced and publishing houses were closed down for print-
ing 'anti-government' books. Xinhua claimed that 'some of the
profit-oriented entertainment facilities' had been used as 'gambling
dens, brothels and for showing pornographic videotapes,' and that
pornographic shots had been inserted into video games 'to corrupt
young game lovers.'6 Meanwhile, paradoxically many dance and
karaoke halls are owned by the state's own government offices or
the army.
In the last decade of the twentieth century the Chinese authori-
ties have had to attempt to extend their control over an exploding
domain of consumer products and services. In October 1993, the
government banned the use of unauthorized satellite dishes, esti-
mated to number in the millions, in an attempt to prevent reception
of direct satellite broadcasts from Hong Kong and elsewhere.
Subsequently invoking Proclamation 129 the authorities closed
down several dish manufacturers. Yet despite these measures
several months later it was estimated that 30 million of the 49
million viewers of Rupert Murdoch's Hong Kong-based Star TV
were constituted by Chinese living in the PRe.7 In order to main-
tain and expand that audience, Murdoch announced in March
1994 that Star TV would cease to carry BBC World Service televi-
sion news, a channel the Chinese authorities find odious.s In the
same month Singapore businessman Robert Chua announced an
all-Mandarin station to be beamed from a mainland and overseas
Chinese-owned satellite Apstar-1, with a 'footprint' (the area
within which a satellite signal may be received) 'stretching from
Mongolia to Indonesia and Xinjiang in western China; the channel
'planned to be acceptable to Chinese authorities.'9
As early as November 1993 the Chinese authorities recognized
the importance of controlling new forms of telecommunication by
declaring a state monopoly over mobile telephones, pagers, radio
and television stations; at the time there were just 460,000 mobile
telephone subscribers and 6 million radio pager users in mainland
China. lO Six years later there were already 60 million mobile tele-
phones in use, a figure expected to double by 2001; the pager or
'beeper' (bipiji) being already obsolete. ll In mid-2000 the Finnish
mobile telecommunications giant Nokia and Fujian Mobile
Communications Corporation launched the 'world's first fully
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standards compliant commercial GPRS network,' a technology
permitting continuous connectivity to the Internet and opening up
a range of services to mobile users via a WAP [wireless application
protocol] portal.12 Thus, the expansion of mobile telephone pos-
session will have consequences going far beyond more convenient
voice communication. While for reasons of cost, and of lack of
availability of standard telephone lines, the number of home com-
puters linked to the Internet still lags behind consumer desire for
access to the world wide web, the new WAP technology permitting
connection to the Internet over a portable telephone will result in
an ever more huge increase in Chinese Internet traffic; even with-
out WAP technology, the number of Chinese households connected
to the Internet had reached 9 million at the end of 1999, and 17
million by August 2000 with the number of Chinese internauts
doubling every six months. 13 The prediction of foreign telecom-
munications companies is that by 2004 there will be 250 million
portable telephones in China equipped with WAP technology yield-
ing an equal number of potential Internet users.l4 Evidently, the
expansion-minded Chinese state seems to have set itself the
ambitious and somewhat contradictory targets both of monitoring
'dissident' use of new technologies, and of encouraging the massive
expansion in production, consumption and distribution of new
forms of telecommunication. Regnant Chinese authority is wary of
losing control over the means of communication, and the means of
distribution of information. Official political authority always
wants to maintain the monopoly over being heard and dies with-
out it; 'a leader reduced to silence is no longer a leader ... taking
away his power of speech leaves him destitute; to tear away the
microphone is to kill him.'15
Moreover, censorship remains a much-used government tool in
the suppression of dissent and also serves to indicate its boundaries
of tolerance. A particularly sensitive topic is the 1989 Tiananmen
massacre. Recently a team of Guangdong television journalists were
stripped of their posts for having 'unintentionally' broadcast a 1.8
second video clip of the 1989 student movement. 16 Government
corruption is also a delicate area. Guangdong People's Broadcasting
Station in Guangzhou was reprimanded for permitting a caller to
criticize the government for rampant corruption in a radio call-in
programme on 27 July 2000.17 Similarly, a new television drama
mini-series filmed in 1999, and due for release in 2000, was banned
for failing to 'fully demonstrate the central leadership's determina-
tion' to eradicate corruption.18 Also in the mid-summer of 2000, the
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government took measures against the print media, more than a
dozen publication houses and publishers of periodicals were closed
down or reprimanded for alleged violation of new publishing
criteria. Contravention of the rules was constituted by publishing
material which was critical of the 'Four Cardinal Principles' of
Marxism, which contradicted essential party and state policies,
which contained pornography or military and other state secrets,
which opposed official policies on ethnic minorities, or which
otherwise threatened social stability.19
But new technology media are more difficult to censor. Not only
the Chinese government, but also the British government fears the
possibilities of untrammelled free expression offered bye-mail and
Internet communication as demonstrated by the passing into law of
the United Kingdom's 2000 Interception of Communications Act
obliging Internet service providers to facilitate government
'tapping' of their clients' Internet communications. In China, the
government's action is more visible and direct, as is illustrated by
the recent closure of a China-based dissident web site, www.xin-
wenming.net, and the announcement that 525 of Shanghai's one
thousand or so cybercafes were to be closed for encouraging the
youth of the city to play 'morally corrupting' computer games.20
However, sanctions against dissident Chinese web sites based
abroad are more difficult to implement, and measures can only be
taken against those in China who consult dissident sites. Such
measures of restriction and suppression are rarely comprehen.sive,
however, and often are followed by greater consumption of officially
disdained foreign media consumer products. As Joseph Chan has
noted, 'after each crackdown there will likely be a spurt of growth.
This may repeat until reception goes beyond policing, putting China
in a state of 'illegal openness' to foreign media.'21 The 'spillover'
phenomenon of television programmes from Hong Kong to the Pearl
River delta ensures that at least twenty million viewers in mainland
China receive terrestrial Hong Kong television programming, and
there is also access to Hong Kong television through local cable;
widespread piracy ensures that such programming is sold on to the
interior of China.22 With increasing miniaturization of satellite
reception technology, and the gradual imbrication of telecommuni-
cations with broadcasting, in order to police the reception in China
of extra-national words, sounds and images the state will need to
invent ever more ingenious means of censorship and control.
Yet, despite the fears of the Chinese State, the liberatory effects
of new globalized electronic media and computer technology are
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probably overestimated, there being 'a tremendous utopianism
about proselytes for electronic media.'23 A succinct critique of this
electronic network utopianism is provided by Sean Cubitt:
Undoubtedly, the enormous potential of such media is for a new
mode of democracy, one intimated by the networks in which
research, games and gossip are exchanged on a global scale
already. But since these media are very precisely designed with
profit maximization in mind, their design itself is a matter of con-
cern. Whatever the technology in general is capable of ... those
capacities are being framed, contained and limited by decisions
that have nothing to do with any production of the future. They
are to do with the maintenance of the status quo, or rather with
the extension of the status quo.24
The ultimate balance of the authoritarian 'concentrated' form of
power and the 'diffuse' form giving full play to commodity capi-
talism is still under negotiation, and yet a consolidation leading to
what Debord calls an 'integrated' form of the society of the specta-
cle has certainly occurred. For more than twenty-five years China's
'closed society' has been increasingly exposed to the outside world,
and communications have expanded enormously; by 2010 it is
expected that there will be more air travel to and from China than
to and from the USA in 2000.25 And yet, the state has maintained
ultimate control over the daily lives and the political expression of
its citizens, while skilfully (and this despite the debacle of 1989)
negotiating China's integration into global spectacular con-
sumerism. Debord wrote of the development of the 'diffuse' form
of spectacular power as an 'Americanization,' as 'a process which
in some respect frightened but also successfully seduced those
countries where it had been possible to maintain traditional forms
of bourgeois democracy.'26 Now in the 'integrated' society not just
economic practices but ideological practices are conflated. Not
only is commodity capitalism globalized but also ideological
attempts to control the citizen-consumer. State authorities are,
indeed, desperate to maintain ideological domination, but once
again the only ideology left available to them is nationalism, an ide-
ology they attempt to nurture and exploit by appeals to patriotic
sentimentality and its associated practices. The Chinese state
authorities, for instance, recently called for the national flag to be
raised and for the national anthem to be sung at all meetings and
popular activities. 27 Is this the new 'Americanization,' as economic
and cultural globalization gathers pace, will allegiance to the
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national flag now be demanded in all societies of the spectacle, as
a token obeisance to the vestiges of particularist cultures? Are we
not now living in a globalized world dominated by increasingly
convergent cultural practices manipulated by forms of capitalist
spectacular power which are becoming ever more similar? While
then we may still talk of media imperialism or cultural imperialism,
domestic televisual broadcast production as well as transnational
or supranational broadcasting is exploiting, and reinforcing the
same spectacular power.
In this chapter I shall discuss the role of Chinese soap opera, but
to assume that Chinese domestic production of soap operas is
somehow liberatory or resistant to transnational spectacle is to
misunderstand the global nature and economic underpinnings of its
power. Spectacular power may be wielded at a local level by state
or official authority, but it is fundamentally however a form of the
same capitalist spectacular power that deprives and suppresses the
powerless around the globe. In terms of televisual production the
only practice that does stand in potential opposition to the domi-
nant media is independent video production, such as that produced
by Asian American women video makers in the 1990s. A theoriz-
ing of that independent practice has already been undertaken by
Sean Cubitt. This other practice is popular not in terms of con-
sumption but in terms of production. Videotape and its technology
is comparatively cheap, and anyone with a hand held camera can
produce a video. Hypothetically, anyone may challenge the .way
network and satellite television unites or reunites image and sound.
We can use video as a means of critique alongside, or even in place
of, theory.
But here again in the practice of video production, as in com-
puter technology, 'opportunities are being closed down as rapidly
as they are being opened.'28 Rather than women making videos,
women are reinscribed as the objects of desire that help to sell
consumer products.
In the Chinese televisual catchment area of Hong Kong, Taiwan
and mainland China, woman is portrayed, as in general in the
masculinist discourse of MTV, soap opera, television advertising,
and the recently popularized supermodel television fashion show, as
the seductive, and seducible objectified commodity. Whether on the
catwalk, in the TV studio singing the praises of the latest SONY
product, or falling for a macho mate, the camera lens is probingly
thrust in her face and at her body. In late twentieth century Chinese
television the figure of woman as object of male desire is reproduced
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again and again. Interleaved into the constantly repeated shots of
woman-as-object, are the model MTV and TV beer commercial
men: masculine, street-wise, male-bonding, and cool.
Helping to make China cool is that classic vanguard commodity
of American and global consumer capitalism, COCA COLA. Coca-
Cola is post-modern, Coke is cool, Coke is zany: cartoon colours,
cartoon Coke. Be cool, make China, a funky, masculinist, capitalist
paradise, and BUY A COKE.
Chinese Soap
The terrestrially broadcast soap A Native of Beijing in New York
(Beijingren zai Niuyue) is also sponsored by Coca Cola. Thus,
besuited professional white men are portrayed sitting around
sipping diet Coke, and chain smoking 555s, a brand of American
cigarette which is particularly popular in China.29
Soft drinks and cigarettes, in the narrative of Western con-
sumerism, have traditionally been the bottom rung of the ladder to
consumer paradise to which the subjects of China's regnant author-
ity are now meant to aspire. The domestic television soap opera
Beijingren zai Niuyue (A Native ofBeijing in New York), a twenty-
one part television series, aired on Chinese television in the autumn
and winter of 1993 is a Dallas-type of soap opera and the sort of
ideological text to which Chinese viewers can relate their own com-
mon sense ideas, or popular ideology. This ideology is something of
a melange of pre-Maoist 'traditional Asian values', of which
Singaporean and Hong Kong politicians would approve, and rem-
nants of post-1949 official Communism and nationalist ideology.
A major element of that populist ideology is an emphasis on the
family unit.
In some ways Feng Xiaogang's Beijingren, resembles the Latin
American variant of soap opera, the telenovela which is limited to
a 'specific number of episodes', as is A Native of Beijing in New
York, 'in contrast to the never-ending openness of the narrative in
Anglo-American soaps' such as the longrunning British soaps
Coronation Street, East Enders and Brookside.3D In the mid-1980s,
the Latin American telenovela, dubbed into Chinese with two or
three episodes often aired back to back, was extremely popular
with Chinese television audiences and the particularities of the
form would not have escaped Chinese television producers. The
Latin American format lays a greater stress on 'class, social mobil-
ity, freedom, choice, consumption and other themes of mobility,'
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and these are indeed the very concerns represented and mediated in
Beijingren.31
One of the earliest academic commentators on soap opera, len
Ang, in her book Watching Dallas has noted how 'personal life'
provides the 'ideological problematic' of the soap opera: 'The
family is regarded as the ideal cradle for human happiness. At least
it should be.'32 It is the external world, society, in the instance of
Beijingren, which threatens the ideal. In Dallas the external world
is the world beyond Southfork ranch: 'The outside world, i.e. die
world outside the family, is presented in Dallas as a hotbed of activ-
ity threatening to the family'.33
One of the hooks which attracts the viewer is an appeal to, and
exploitation of, her or his dissatisfaction with the lack of fulfil-
ment, and the standardization of capitalist urban life, in other
words with the effects of dehumanization and alienation. Dallas
was exceedingly popular with British audiences in the 1980s,
mainly because the almost totally urban British viewing public had
little or no idea of the reality of American life as lived by the major-
ity in the USA, and was content to let the spectacle of America as
configured in the British imaginary be reinscribed. Just as the
Hollywood movies of the 1930s-1950s had successfully lulled
the spectators of Britain's cinemas through the depression and the
war, Beijingren would nourish the secret yearnings of the long
materially-deprived urban Chinese viewer. Despite the occasional
negative representation of capitalist life in New York, despite the
disintegration of his family and dreams of being a symphony cellist,
the allure of protagonist Wang Qiming's two-storey palatial mod-
ern house in the New York suburbia constituted a powerful vision
for the Shanghai or Beijing dweller who inhabited a comparatively
minute and frugal apartment.
Because personal life and families, something to which all viewers
can relate, are always in a constant state of negotiation, no charac-
ter is 'invulnerable, however, heroic, powerful or strong he or she
might be.'34 This vulnerability is intended to be tragic in a soap like
Dallas, but it also surely signifies that if there is never a permanent
winner, the spectator, therefore might not always be a loser, at least
no more so than a major figure like J.R. Ewing. The intimation that
the soap hero's survival under modernity is uncertain and precarious
renders the viewer's own permanent state of domination, alienation
and unpredictability more bearable.
JR, of course, is the classic soap opera dominator. By isolating
him as a 'bad guy', the rest of the system, of which he is only an
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extreme example, is rendered almost decent, normal, and natural.
In alienated capitalist modernity individuals are compelled to
search for satisfaction of their egoistic needs by attempting to
establish an alien power over others, and this is one of the fore-
grounded human motivations of soap.35 As in Dallas, so in
Beijingren. The major characters in both soaps are driven by the
impulse to establish power over others. Such domination is one of
the prizes of capitalism. That both Dallas and Beijingren fore-
ground those characters who are the most extreme in striving to
realize their dreams of domination is a function of the ideology that
such soaps are instrumental in reinforcing, or in the case of
Beijingren, in establishing. The ideology depends on a bourgeois
morality of sentimentalism which the viewer is called upon to
adopt, or which the viewer has already long ago internalized. Thus,
capitalism need not be so morally repugnant, the 'decent person'
can profit from capitalism and still feel moral rectitude. Of course,
the Chinese cultural producers who are mediating this visual intro-
ductory manual to capitalist life still have to negotiate the current
official and popular ideologies and the collective imaginary.
Capitalism is shown to some extent to be problematic: loose
morality, and hard-nosed individualistic self-reliance are just two
among many blemishes of capitalism that Beijingren allows.
Wang Qiming asks his white American competitor in the gar-
ment trade why his friend the buyer did not help him out when he
was going bankrupt, and Wang is made to understand that such is
not the American capitalist way: 'When you are in trouble you are
on your own.'
In a confrontation with his newly arrived, but rapidly
Americanized teen-age daughter, the one-time aspiring cellist Wang
Qiming in a fit of temper destroys the pop record collection he has
given her to demonstrate that he has no love for material posses-
sions. She has accused him of being a capitalist. But, he seems
insulted more by the inference that he has not worked hard, strug-
gled and suffered (a good old fashioned ideological tenet of the
capitalist work ethic and of heroic Maoism) to obtain his wealth.
The breaking of the record albums provides a brief moment of
ambiguity in what is otherwise an unproblematic representation of
the objects of consumer desire. And yet only a moment, for the
motives for acquisition are ideologically justified. It is the love of
family that forces the individual to give up his/her motherland and
personal ambitions (in Wang's case to be a professional cellist) to
secure the future of the next generation. Similarly, Wang Qiming,
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who has lost his wife to his American business competitor, seen his
daughter swept away by a young white high school student, and
then by the student's father, and his musical ambitions exchanged
for the proprietorship of a knitwear sweatshop, is redeemed by
secretly paying for his ex-wife's medical school education. This
prompts the glaring populist reading: If every Chinese emigrant
family could achieve the good life at no moral cost except the sac-
rifice of a Wang Qiming, maybe the American capitalist gamble
would be worth it after all.
This television series is necessarily set in New York, but Chinese
capitalism will be different, the soap seems to inform its viewers.
But, of course, it will not be different, least of all for women. The
capitalist post-modern affirmation of women as commodity object,
sits nicely with the re-encroachment of feudal attitudes towards
women; witness the literal buying and selling of women in recent
years.36
Foreign broadcast television, and in particular MTV, screams at
China and the rest of Asia, 'Capitalism is great, capitalism is fun
(especially if you're a man), capitalism is emancipatory.' 'Hi there,
Asia,' grins the VJ, as glibly as if he were saying: 'Hi, Chicago,',
'Good morning, Brooklyn'. Chinese soap shouts back: 'China,
watch out for American-style capitalism. Stay at home. Enjoy Coca
Cola with Chinese characteristics. Don't let your women get
infected by ideas of emancipation. Support traditional Chinese
family values.' MTV screeches: 'Global capitalism is great.'
Chinese soap yells back: 'Capitalism with Chinese characteristics:
capitalism tempered with Chinese patriotism will be better!'
Backbeat of the nation: Chinese MTV and the
official national imaginary
Although performed by a private individual, in other words not a
state employee, the text discussed below is an officially sanctioned
and broadcast song and video clip. While most independent popu-
lar music makers in contemporary China have been consistently
excluded from official broadcast media, Gao Feng, a young
Chinese singer and musician has been warmly received by the offi-
cial media. In 1996 he produced a hugely successful (in terms of air
time) song and four-minute video entitled 'Da Zhongguo', 'Great
China,.3? The title may also be translated as 'Greater China', a
space imagined territorially that would include Taiwan, and dis-
puted areas over which China claims sovereignty. Greater China
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may also be understood non-territorially, as the framework for a
culturally imagined space intended to appeal to overseas Chinese
communities.
What foregrounds this song in terms of importance and mean-
ing, is that it has been enthusiastically received by the national offi-
cial broadcast authorities as politically acceptable. The song has
also been broadcast on satellite TV, and commercial radio, beyond
China's borders, and in particular in Hong Kong where it has even
been covered by local Hong Kong singers.38 But before discussing
the song and, video in detail, let me first address the context of the
song in terms of the politics and music-culture of the past two
decades.
In my previous work on Chinese popular music and music tele-
vision, I wrote about non-official, or underground, musicians
whose songs and performances had redeployed or diverted
(ditQurne) ethnic or national ideologies and imaginaries.39 I dis-
cussed the Chinese rock and roll singer Cui Jian whose mockery
and defiance of the state and the party centre was represented
bodily by a people's army uniform and red kerchief both worn in
transgressive and unauthorised ways to emphasise the party's alien-
ation from the people and its original principles. But there was also
a vocal and instrumental unorthodoxy. Cui Jian redeployed the
trumpet he had learnt as a child in the People's Liberation Army
orchestra in deliberately inharmonious ways, and sang in a rau-
cous, guttural Beijing proletarian street accent, in contrast to the
mellow undisturbing voice of official and centralized standard
Chinese language singers found on state radio and television.
I also discussed a group named Panther which has now dis-
banded. Panther was a more middle-of-the-road rock group which
in its video productions aggressively and physically occupied
centralized national space, while again musically using a basic rock
and roll as a representation of non-official, non-authorised noise
against state control over the production and distribution of noise.
There was also a heavy metal band Tang Dynasty whose recu-
peration of national and ethnic space and history involved both the
televisually forceful images of Buddhist temples on the desert fringes
of the old empire, and the setting of Chinese classical poems to
heavy metal rhythms. Tang's main ploy was to foreground the mori-
bund ideology of the PRC state by squeezing it between a recuper-
ation of past Chineseness and heavy metal masculinist Otherness.
None of these groups ever used lyrics overtly to challenge the
central authorities. Rather it was the absence of direct, political
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content (either in terms of patriotic rhetoric, or the standard
official lyric references to 'socialist' successes) that was sufficient to
foreground the songs as anti-authoritarian texts. Lyrics in both pre-
modern and modern Chinese traditions have always been the target
of a close political censorial gaze, and readers are adept at reading
between lines. Similarly none of the musical and performative
practices would have appeared at all transgressive if the ideology of
the state did not privilege an official imaginary in which ethnic
authenticity and purity was somehow intended to be inherent in
'socialism with Chinese characteristics' as the current mode of
capitalist modernization in China is called.
While in Europe and America rock music and its surrounding
culture is no longer perceived as constituting a real threat to reg-
nant authority, in China it still is. For instance, in early 1996, in the
northern Chinese city of Tianjin a concert featuring self-styled
punk rocker He Yong was permitted by the authorities. However,
the usual practices and aura of a rock concert were strictly
forbidden. The police authorities allowed no dancing or even
standing-up, no exuberant behaviour of any sort. Police and
security guards employed aggressive and insistent tactics to ensure
compliance in the enforcement of their desire to suppress and con-
trol the rock concert ethos and its latent dangers for authority.4o
I should like now to discuss briefly the issues of ethnicity and
nationalism in Chinese popular music. There are numerically large
ethnic minority communities in China. The Tibetans are the .best
known outside of China, but officially there are over eighty recog-
nized non-Han Chinese minority groups. Statistically the minorities
constitute only seven per cent of the whole population. However,
the 93% supposed Han ethnic majority is not a homogenous
group, let alone a 'race', a category in any case no longer sustained
by scientific analysis. 'Han', then, is an unsatisfactory term that
refers to the dominant supposedly 'homogenous', invented and
socially constructed majority, an 'ethnicity' referred to outside of
China simply as 'Chinese'. But the ethnic can only be the national
when an ethnically 'authentic' nation has been constructed, and
this the Chinese central authorities have done as convincingly as
any modern European state. Once the Han majority becomes
represented as (almost) the whole nation, the marginalization of
other 'ethnicities' as minorities follows as a matter of course, and
minorities become, as Engels so bluntly put it, 'non-historic
peoples' whose destiny is tied to that of powerful 'ethnically
homogenous' nations.
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It was against, yet also within, this monolithic discourse of cen-
tralized nationalized modernity promoted by the Chinese state that
1980s 'underground' pop musicians produced their music and their
spectacle. For even while they challenged the authority of the state,
the discourse within which they did so was both national and
nationalist, as it was for the students at Tiananmen square in 1989.
The nationalist discourse was deployed against the central state
authorities who themselves were not only propagators of national-
ist ideology, but were also its product. Within this dominant
discourse, however, popular music culture, emergent Chinese rock
and roll in particular, positioned itself oppositionally with regard to
the central authorities. Gao Feng's song and video clip, however,
recuperated and reoriented that national space, the collective imag-
inary, the panoply of national symbols, in favour of the centralized
state, so as to privilege official ideology.
In the Tang, Panther and Cui Jian performances one could, to
varying degrees, discern a dissatisfaction with central control, a
critical stance that represented or exploited popular discontent
with economic and social realities. Cui Jian pointed to the new con-
sumerist materialism as one of his specific targets. And more than
that there was a resentment of the betrayal of the ideals of the
Revolution, and even of those of the Cultural Revolution
(1966-76) whose stated aims, if not its real results, were enthusi-
astically supported by Chinese urban youth in the 1960s.
But the oppositional music culture that so dismayed the author-
ities and that now seems to have been brought under control by the
emergence of cultural producers such as Gao Feng, has never been
a dominant musical idiom widely available to even the urban pop-
ulation of China. Musically, what followed the Cultural
Revolution, that honeymoon period in Sino-American relations of
the late 1970s and early 1980s, was an official music policy that per-
mitted only the distribution of folksy, seemingly patriotic melodies
and sentiments representing an imaginary homeliness, cosiness and
harmony of American life. Such music was consumed eagerly by
an audience that had only had access to the narrow and limited
repertoire of Cultural Revolution model operatic music and
military-style songs. For the regnant authorities, the clean, white,
ethnically unproblematic music of singers such as John Denver, and
the Carpenters, represented the acceptable face of American pop
music, an acceptable model for China's popular music, unlike the
'miscegenated', hybrid, ethnically unclear and confused music con-
stituted by rock, soul and blues. The traces of the official policy
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that favoured such musical models are to be found in the musical
and ideological simplicity of the Gao Feng song discussed here.
The rock and roll that emerged slowly and unofficially through-
out the 1980s, was firmly identified with youth and dissidence,
with what the authorities called 'bourgeois spiritual pollution',
which in the official Chinese political lexicon translates as 'Western
influence'. Rock and roll emphasised every social and cultural
reality the state was engaged in occluding. Rock music culture fore-
grounded difference, divisions, Otherness, ideological gaps, and
above all it positioned itself against official ideology and auth-
oritarian control. Meanwhile the state broadcast authorities
continued to air unsophisticated middle-of-the-road pop products
that celebrated national, and ethnic and social unity in a banal and
unfashionable style. But, Gao Feng's song was different.
At the level of the lyrics, which are very simple, and yet which
avoid the directness and over-deployment of patriotic terminology
of official song-writing, the intention is to reinscribe and reaffirm
the centralizing and totalizing construction of China as a 'natu-
rally' cohesive nation. The collective first person lives in a single,
unitary home, 'its name is China' in which there are many brothers
and sisters.41 The geographical features mentioned include the two
dragons (the Yangzi river and the Yellow River), and Mount
Everest - deftly recuperated as wholly Chinese. And no patriotic
song would be complete without mention of the Great Wall, but
citing the Tibetan Plateau indicates clearly where the ideological
stance of the song lies. While re-inscribing the Chinese state's terri-
torial claims, what is privileged here is obviously the unity of the
monolithic nation. The sub-text alludes to the current incorp-
oration of Hong Kong into the Chinese state, and the official
long-term project of recuperating Taiwan, but also to maintaining
the internal cohesion of a state challenged by minority peoples such
as the Tibetans and the Turkic peoples of the north-west border
region. In other words, as the 'return' of Hong Kong and Macao
approached and the party-state pushed for a similar arrangement
with Taiwan, there could be no question but to foreground the
integrity of the motherland and the state's staunch rejection of any
degree of Tibetan sovereignty, an eventuality seen by the leadership
as the first step towards Soviet-style disintegration. Tibet, in this
song, is solidly part of the Chinese jia.42 Neither must the
'inclement weather' of history disturb the stability of the 'great big
home' which is 'our great China'. The homeliness of the 'great
big home', the sense of cogent and willing community, that has
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survived the trials of history, and the loyalty of the Chinese
citizen/subject are all represented here. The 'inclement weather'
may allude to the specific or the general tribulations of Chinese
society over the past two hundred years: the encroachment and
exploitation of foreign imperialist powers, the establishment of the
treaty ports such as Hong Kong, the war against the Japanese, the
Civil war with the Nationalists (which led so many Chinese to flee
to Taiwan and elsewhere - remember that they too are the target of
this song), the economic disasters of the 1950s and 1960s, the divi-
sive, fratricidal Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), or more recently
the massacre in and around Tiananmen Square that ended the
political dissatisfaction and protests of 1989, described by the
authorities as 'a counter-revolutionary rebellion.'
However, more forceful yet than the lyrics, are the visual and
musical aspects of Gao Feng's product which constitute a transfor-
mation of style and presentation in their re-presentation of the
nationalist and centralizing ideology as positive and seductive.
Instead of a cynical and ironic use of national memory and space,
Gao Feng produces a music and imagery of celebration. In celebrat-
ing the national, the central, the ethnically dominant, the ethnically
integrated, in ways that parallel, or derive from, official ideology,
with musical and video techniques that previously had been the
marker of dissident and marginalized voices, Gao Feng renaturalizes
a totalizing national popular imaginary. Rather than recuperate
national and ethnic space for alternative visions of society, Gao Feng
recuperates it for the nation, or rather for a quasi-official represen-
tation of the nation that effectively aims at rallying not the People,
but a new urban middle class represented as the nation.
In terms of the music, Gao Feng's simple folk-like melody, is
accompanied by a heroic chorus. The tune can be listened to by
anyone, but the tune is designed to appeal to, and to give the
impression of accentuating and emulating, the 'local'; that is in
'Chinese' terms, the national and the central. The pentatonic verse
provides a constant reminder of the nativist, the 'authentic' with its
almost Heidegerrian conflation of national/racial/ethnic 'roots', at
the same time accommodating and recuperating the Western, the
contemporary, the commercially popular. The chorus alludes to a
sort of Western folk-rock reminiscent of John Denver. There is also
one musical phrase redolent of the revolutionary songs of the
Cultural Revolution. The verse is not only pentatonic but folk-like.
The folk element of state-sponsored popular song is nothing new
of course, neither in China nor elsewhere where state ideologies are
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dominated and formed by the project of nationalization and mod-
ernization. In China, state recuperation of folk song and folk dance
dates back even before the 1930s revolutionary era of the Yan'an
communist guerrilla base; both left and right from the early twen-
tieth-century had attempted to recuperate and deploy the academic
yet 'patriotic' study and reinvention of the many regional varieties
of Chinese folk music. In the 1930s the collection, ordering and
rewriting of Chinese folk songs became central to Chinese
Communist cultural policy and since the Communist base was sit-
uated in north-western China, folk melodies and styles of that
region not only became dominant, but thereafter assumed a certain
revolutionary aura connected temporally and spatially to the
terminus of the mythically important Long March that was
Yan'an.43
In an attempt to synthesize the supposedly typically 'Western'
with the supposedly typically national 'Chinese', in a contemporary
somewhat perverse instantiation of Mao's formulaic admonition to
'make the West serve China, and the old serve the new', the penta-
tonic verse supplies a generalized folk aura, while the folk-rock
chorus provides the musical mood of the modern and the Western.
In the effort to realize a synthesis in which the musical allusions to
'ethnic authenticity' are nonetheless not lost, the background,
deploying a typical Western 1980s production, employs drum
machines and synthesisers to evoke a convenient conflation of the
ethnic and the national which is deliberately pentatonic. A he!lvy
backbeat marking out time helps to bind together these disparate
musical (and visual) elements, and a 'world beat' is also invoked in
the production of the music in the attempt to achieve a cohesive
texture.
But with a little attention the viewer and listener may conclude
that all is not what it seems. The percussion instruments we hear
are not the drums of the drum-dancers we see, but a mere
minimalist impression of them. Visually, the folk dance alludes to
the seductive cinematic redeployment of the folk-dance and its
characteristic drumbeats in recent Chinese cinematic productions
(principally Chen Kaige's Yellow Earth), again drawing on the
recuperated local culture of the area surrounding the 1930s-1940s
Yan'an revolutionary base, but the sound is a mere an electronic
simulacrum.
While this drum dance sequence could also be read as a token
representation of the geographically peripheral, I would rather
conclude that the drum dancers of Shaanxi are in fact merely
71
RE-TAKING TIGER MOUNTAIN BY TELEVISION
representative of a long-standing historical recuperation of a local
peasant cultural practice by the state, by the centre. In other words,
they represent and symbolise the legitimacy and historical revolu-
tionary credentials of the centre, when the Communists fought first
the Japanese and then the Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang
Jieshi). These drum dancers then are not only folklorized but
nationalized. They are representative of a revolutionary tradition
that claims to embody the popular desire for a centralized, national
and cohesive construction of China. The dancers may also be seen
as representing a nostalgia for what even the disillusioned and dis-
sident perceive as an innocent national revolutionary moment; the
rock musician Cui Jian has produced cover versions of a number of
pre-1949 revolutionary songs, most strikingly the old revolution-
ary favourite Nanniwan. However, that revolutionary moment and
its musical and performative representation are simply commodi-
fied in the Gao Feng product.
While bells in various musical traditions seem almost always to
represent the calling together of the community, especially in
Western musical usage, in some societies the artefacts and the
sound stand as tropes of both unity, and authority. In the Chinese
case the bells are also visually and musically a marker of history,
authenticity and tradition; even more than the comparatively
recent Christian church bell. Bells in China also represented state
power, and thus they constitute the physical evidence not only of
cultural but also of political sophistication stretching back three
thousand years; such markers of civilization and territorial conti-
nuity also form a trope of legitimacy frequently invoked internally
and internationally by the modern Chinese authorities. Bells were
important in ancient Chinese state rituals and in the Gao Feng
video production the visual mapping of shots of ancient ritual bells
onto the sound of bells invokes centralized court ceremonies and
the illusion of a 'timeless' national authority;44 the use of bells also
has a more contemporary significance. The bell chimes that open
the song and the music video ring out that internationally recog-
nizable tune, 'The East Is Red'. 'The East is Red' is not the Chinese
national anthem, but is nevertheless probably China's best known
tune and song eulogizing that national and revolutionary hero, the
late Chairman Mao; the first lines of the song are 'The East is
redrrhe sun has risen/China has produced a Mao Zedong'. The
tune, recorded on recently discovered and restored ancient bells
similar to those we see in the video clip, was broadcast incessantly
by China's first satellite in orbit around the globe.
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'The East is Red' has the same place in the national imaginary
and produces the same patriotic sentimentality as Elgar's 'Land of
Hope and Glory' in the English imaginary. The song itself has
numerous historical connotations, but the chimes version alone is
laden with significance. Every Chinese knows that the chimes
sound on the hour at the clock tower of Beijing's main railway
station, and thus the chimes also occupy a place in the national
imaginary, akin to that of the centralized and nationalizing chimes
of Big Ben in London.
In a production intended not simply for domestic consumption
but also for propagation amongst the overseas Chinese communi-
ties, the Chinese diaspora, the musical cliche of 'The East is Red'
also clearly identifies this particular nationalist patriotic narrative
with the Communist PRC version of nationalism, indeed the ambi-
tion is to make that version of nationalism seem natural and to
have all Chinese everywhere accept it.
The chimes evoke and represent at once, revolutionary history,
and the unity of China assured by and at the centre. The chimes
represent also both the beginning of the long narrative of the
Chinese nation, and mapped onto that the historical narrative of
the People's Republic of China. This is foregrounded visually by the
first shot of ancient Chinese bells in the sunrise; evoking both the
birth of the nation and the words of the song 'The East is Red'.
That shot is succeeded by a group of children (always represented
as the hope of any nation and, of course, always also the excuse .for
adult suffering while awaiting the nation's utopian destiny) who
walk determinedly forwards, towards the camera, and thus into the
future of the nation. This opening shot also constitutes a mimicry
of a well-known scene from the photographic record of Mao's life.
The children release doves into the air as a sign of desire for peace-
ful progress, and hold up lit candles in the dark in a quasi-religious
gesture. As the garishly coloured head of a lion dancer twirls across
the screen, the soundtrack switches from 'The East is Red' into Gao
Feng's melody.
The lion dancer represents tradition and Chineseness and visu-
ally masks the segue into a Western-style popular music mode.
Similarly the Chinese women dancers in white robes enacting
Buddhist, and thus traditional, beliefs, facilitate the shift into a
seemingly less Chinese musical practice; this allusion to Buddhism
may also be read as emblematic of the national subject's, China's,
historical capacity to absorb, naturalize and nationalize external
cultures and thought.
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There are several shots of Peking Opera characters in the first
few seconds of the video. Their function is to supply national
colour, and the aura of tradition, but their use probably also is
linked to the recent successful exploitation of traditional opera in
sophisticated made-for-export Chinese Fifth Generation cinema.
The Peking Opera woman character (who appears to enact the lead
role of a famous patriotic, militaristic Chinese opera Women
Generals of the Yang Family) twirls away from the camera in front
of Tiananmen and the famous picture of Chairman Mao fixed onto
the grand podium that overlooks Tiananmen Square; the viewer at
no moment actually sees memory-laden Tiananmen Square itself,
although the camera is shooting from that position.
In the opera scenes there is again a disjuncture between sound and
image, since while the visual exoticism of Peking Opera is deployed,
there is little or no attempt at a musical representation of the very
different, very Other, music of Peking Opera. Indeed, there is noth-
ing in fact to fix these actors as representative of specifically Peking
Opera rather than any other Chinese opera of which there are many
regional variants. Peking Opera is one of many local operas, but has
the distinction that it was elevated over the centuries into the court,
and thus the centralized, national sung drama form. Musically, then,
traditional Chinese opera music is indicated only by its absence. But
given that each region has its own opera sung in its own dialect,
only the visual can represent a sort of mute national image. Aurally,
then there is only a lack of specific musical references, so that while
the rapid visual changes overlap with the musical continuity in this
production, the visual allusions to traditional music culture never-
theless digress from, and even oppose, the music that would
normally be commensurate with the images.
Cutting to the next frame of the video, four or five middle aged
couples are shown running into each other's embrace against the
backdrop of the red PRC flag which fills the screen entirely. The
camera pans out to reveal those embracing as members of various
ethnic minorities, known in China as 'minority nationalities'. The
first shot of singer-performer Gao Feng shows him in classic Mao
pose, overcoat flapping, one hand held high in emulation of the
well-known Chairman's greeting. Pictures of Mao had previously
been used by ordinary citizens (bus and taxi drivers stuck up por-
traits of Mao on their vehicle windows in the early 1990s) as a
form of protest against the political order, and a reminder to the
authorities of the revolutionary idealism on which the state was
founded; it is a clever detournement of an iconography to which
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the authorities could hardly object. But here we see Gao Feng strik-
ing poses redolent of those of Chairman Mao, and long etched into
the popular imaginary, not to critique contemporary authority, but
rather to affirm and celebrate it. We had seen during the Cultural
Revolution Mao as pop idol, now we see pop idol as Mao.
As in many standard pop-rock videos there is an alternance
between the street, (the real world where the artist is in touch with
the people) and the studio or concert hall (the space where elec-
tronic wizardry, fanciful lighting and electrical equipment can
boast their modernity). In Da Zhongguo, against a dark back-
ground the spotlight sweeps across Mao/Gao Feng to reveal him
now on a studio concert stage. The audience includes children, and
again national minority members who in this video are always rep-
resented as smiling and seemingly contented women dressed in
attractive colourful costumes which mark them as 'feminized',
innocent and harmless. Such indicators of their difference accord
with the official ideology's construction and representation of non-
Han minorities, and incidentally supply supplemental, peripheral
colour. But here, not just the minorities and children smile, all the
studio audience smile, all sway in time with the music, hands in the
air in a gesture of responsive salutation, and almost religious exal-
tation as they sing along with Gao Feng's patriotic celebratory
song. One great China, one big happy family.
Space, history and multitudes have been repeatedly employed in
Communist China to reinforce national pride and to establish
national authority, and also to invigorate the nostalgic dream of a
national return to a Chinese golden age of political and military
supremacy. As the Chinese saying, which finds its place in the pop-
ular discursive negotiation of everyday life, has it: lishi chang,
difang da, ren duo ('history is long, the place is big, and people are
numerous'). Each of these three elements of common-sense ideol-
ogy is alluded to here both visually and musically. The chorus and
crowds of children and concert spectators imply multitude, while
the bells imply both length of history and provide a sense of aural
space. The very occasional shots showing space outside Beijing,
also allude to the notion of vastness.
Ultimately, this music video production constitutes a successful
attempt to recuperate national iconography, to reinscribe and re-
affirm the associations of party with nation, of an integrated
people inclusive of yet beyond minorities, in which the image of a
dominant Han majority at the centre represents metonymically the
entirety of Chinese society.
75
RE-TAKING TIGER MOUNTAIN BY TELEVISION
'They must be represented' wrote Marx, and yet in this produc-
tion where are the workers, the peasants, where indeed is the rest
of China? Where are those who are Other to China's consumer and
industrialized capitalist cities? Where in this video of celebration
are those relegated to the lower echelons of the socio-economic
hierarchy, where is the representation of the reality of beggars and
prostitution, and what of the so-called floating population of 100
million plus unemployed (twice the population of France or ten
times the population of Portugal), those constantly dependent on
the arbitrary regulation of the economy by the global market, state
planners and local functionaries?
Gao Feng's song and its televisual presentation constitute a
response to a fear of national fragmentation. The yawning inequal-
ities that daily fragment and threaten the integrity of the Chinese
nation-state, the daily peasant uprisings happening somewhere and
everywhere in rural China, even more than local or ethnic differ-
ence, are well concealed beneath the mask of national centralized
well-being this video constructs.
While the video attempts to nuance, nationalize and make specific
an increasingly global popular culture, the local· social fragment-
ation and increasing economic inequality it hides is not of an order
than can be negotiated or contained within national boundaries. As
Etienne Balibar recently noted:
the territorial distinction between the developed regions and the
under-developed regions is less stable, the polarisation of eco-
nomic statuses translates less directly into territorial structures,
the interference or the overdetermination of class differences and
ethnic discriminations are produced equally in the North and the
South, so that everywhere internal exclusion replaces external
exclusion. An 'underclass' which is not at all a neo-proletariat,
seems to be being constructed on a world scale, while at the other
extreme a transnational privileged class is striving to establish
common interests and a common language for itself.45
Earlier in this chapter, I noted how the lyrics and images of this
production serve to elide the realities of China's ethnic diversity.
Such members of Chinese society can be constructed as the Other
to the nationalized, and increasingly transnationalized, new urban
middle class, but at a stage in world history when populations are
'at one and the same time completely atomized and yet irreversibly
mixed', the language of alterity becomes increasingly inadequate.46
Not only are minorities and women reinscribed in their traditional
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roles in this video, but the economically disadvantaged are again
forgotten. Thus it is not a critique focussed merely on the exclusion
and marginalization of the ethnic Other that will suffice to counter
discursive strategies such as we see and hear deployed by Gao Feng.
Rather what is required is a response framed by the real univers-
ality which marks this historical stage in which 'for the first time,
humanity is not simply an ideal, a utopian notion, but has become
the condition of existence of human beings themselves ... a condi-
tion that coincides with the generalisation of conflicts and of
exclusions. '47
Gao Feng's production eulogises not simply a nationalist ideol-
ogy, but also a new economic order whose beneficiaries however
can only ever be a minority of the people existing within China's
border. But this economic expansion 'abolishes neither political
domination nor economic inequalities', and on the contrary is part
of an unprecedented stage of 'polarisation of wealth and misery, of
power and powerlessness'.48 While Gao Feng's product may have
served to bolster the new economic and ideological positions of the
relatively wealthy and powerful, a little satisfaction may be drawn
from the fact that the miserable and powerless, deprived of con-
sumer durables, did not have to endure it.
***
Debray has written that 'liberal capitalism apparently has nothing
to fear. .. from economic self-regulation [/'auto-contr6Ie eco.n-
omique].'49 Yet, over the past five years or so, it has been notice-
able in 'liberal capitalist' societies that the state has increasingly
encroached on this 'self-regulation'. Perhaps this is merely a mani-
festation of the convergence of the two forms of spectacular power,
the diffuse and the concentrated. Of course, in reality, televisual
distribution and consumption has never been totally 'free'; in
capitalist societies, 'nothing is forbidden but not everything is
sellable, and if the citizen has the right to see and hear everything,
distribution has its constraints.'so
If there is to be optimism for the future in China or elsewhere in
the capitalist and unified world, if there is to be 'resistance', it will
not come from satellite TV (Chinese or non-Chinese), nor from
Chinese-produced soap, nor MTV.
However, I would not want to deny the usefulness of the medium
of televisual representation in terms of its critical potential. Over
the last decade alternative video-makers in Latin America and
Nigeria have been exploiting the potential of the VCR to evade the
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centralized mass media system and produce independent material
for the home video market.51 Even traditional television may still
provide the opportunity for critical intervention as the work of the
BBC North-East's social investigative journalist, David Morrison
has recently shown.52 There can be radical makers of video and
television documentary just as there are radical writers of books
and newspapers; television and video is not the new culture, merely
a new cultural medium. Optimism should be tempered, however,
by the reality that while the techniques may have changed, the
manipulators of power relations and the ideology they seek to
enforce, and reinforce, have not.
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4PADDY'S CHINATOWN, OR
THE HARLEQUIN'S COAT
A Short (Hi)story of a Liverpool
Hybridity
[I]ndividual experience of separate daily life remains without
language, without concept, without critical access to its own past
which has been recorded nowhere. It is not communicated. It is
not understood and is forgotten to the profit of the false spectac-
ular memory of the unmemorable.
Guy Debord!
Contemporary ethnic autobiographies partake of the mood of
metadiscourse, of drawing attention to their own linguistic and
fictive nature, of using the narrator as an inscribed figure within
the text whose manipulation calls attention to authority struc-
tures, of encouraging the reader to self-consciously participate in
the production of meaning.
Michael Fischer2
Leave. Exit. Let yourself be seduced one day. Become multiple
people, brave the outside, split off elsewhere. There you have the
three first unfamiliarities, the three kinds of alterity, the three
first ways of exposing yourself. For there is no apprenticeship
without exposition, often dangerous, to the other. I shall never
again know who I am, where I am, whence I come, where
I am going, which way to go. I expose myself to others, to
unfamiliarities.
Michel Serres3
[I]ncomprehension is present everywhere in everyday encounters.
Something must be specified, made clear, but there's not enough
time and you are not sure of having been understood. Before you
have done or said what was necessary, you've already gone.
Across the street. Overseas. There will never be another chance.
Guy Debord4
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It is, naturally, not a question of this absolute secret that each
carries to their grave, sometimes even in ignorance that they do
so, but rather of that moving of the border between the said and
the unsaid which involves several levels: the individual, the
family, the village or the neighbourhood, a basic group, a 'gang',
a 'society' and so on. Perhaps we can talk of a 'history of indis-
cretion', not in the primary sense of this word (inability to
discern) but in its ordinary and accepted sense (to communicate
to the uninitiated information thus far retained within the
spheres of individual, family, or friends).
Histoire de fa vie privies
Toute biographie est un roman qui n'ose pas dire son nom.
Roland Barthes6
After my grandfather died, my English grandmother burned joss
sticks and lit red and black candles for months. I shall never forget
that odour of incense pervading the gloomy, crumbling Victorian
Liverpool house we all lived in. My grandmother was not just
remembering the dead but trying to 'make contact' with the dead,
and my own involvement in Chinese studies for the past twenty-
five years in a sense has been an attempt to make contact with that
same deadman, to know the things he did not tell me, to find
answers to the questions I did not know to ask.
My particular ambition when I started thinking about what
became this chapter was to write 'academically' about the British
Chinese diaspora. But memories of my own relationship with a
particular moment and locus of that diasporic experience and,
more insistently, memories of the dead and the dead's memories
kept interrupting my determined narrative and pushed me onto
irresistible side roads. However, neither did I wish to write a 'his-
tory'; I had already theorized and written on the history of anti-
Chinese racism.7 And yet History and histories kept intervening.
Untold and half-told stories of others, like spectres, keep demand-
ing that we return to these nebulous narratives, force ourselves to
recall and narrate the interstices of the ghost stories of the previ-
ously ignored, insignificant, marginalized, of those who are now
dead but still within living memory.
One particular result of thinking about this task has been real-
ization of how the marginalized's, the hybrid's, and the migrant's
remembering is constructed as 'inauthentic' and thus how such
subjects must defy linear and narrative strategies of constructing
histories of communities whose duration has been necessarily fixed
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by their production by, and dependence on, modern European
colonialism. For while the mapping of postmodern critiques onto a
wilfully persistent modernist project in China continues to be
resisted by the economic realities of uneven development, the com-
pass of postmodernity and postcolonialism may account for our
incapacity to narrate, if not otherwise to represent, the histories of
those beyond history, the 'hybrid,' 'non-historic' peoples' of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Others have problematized the
question of hybridity and foregrounded the way in which propo-
nents of 'postmodern hybridity ... typically obliterate significant
portions of the reality of a colonized culture'.8 But my principal
concern here is to discuss particular representatives and instantia-
tions of a hybrid community which, like many such communities
before, has never had the historical opportunity to become the site
of postmodern fantasizing.
In the era of postmodernism then, the notion of hybridity is con-
tentious and questionable. But I am not ready to surrender the
concept of hybridity as unusable. It is a concept essential to the
understanding of many modern communities, and the hybridity I
discuss here is materially and historically real.
It was not my intention to write an autobiographical 'testimony,'
and yet I have come to accept that this will be an autobiography of
sorts, but in a real sense it is only incidentally so. This essay started
as an attempt to tell a community's story and the story of a repre-
sentative of that community whose story for most of my adult ljfe
I have sought to know and explain, the story of a man whom, dur-
ing the formative years of my childhood, I followed and observed
as closely as a shadow. I belonged to a single parent family, and my
single parent worked all day until late in the evenings. But in a
sense for much of my childhood I belonged to a three-parent
family. At home I was looked after by my English grandmother and
my Chinese grandfather. I had a great deal of affection for my
grandmother. I witnessed her sadness at the way her life had
evolved, but also the great exuberant joy and infectious humour of
which she was capable. She belonged to a legion of modern women
whose gender and social position kept them from realizing their
dreams. My mother always told me I had never known my grand-
mother at her best, and regrettably, I am sure that is so. But as for
my grandfather it seems that no-one ever knew him at all.
I had long wanted to write my biographicalJautobiographical
version of the old man's story and that is what I started to do as an
undertaking separate from my work on Liverpool's Chinatown.
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But it soon became clear to me that the demarcation line between
the project of reconstructing the history of the Chinese diasporic
community of Liverpool and the narration of my attempt to know
my grandfather by telling, not his story but, stories about him was
a porous boundary. In the author's mind the two narratives flowed
in and out of each other uncontrollably. Portions of this chapter,
marked off in italicized print, represent remnants of the attempted
biographical narrative. But in assembling this chapter, I was
compelled to write further passages in a similar autobiographical
mode. I deploy both here to illustrate the difficulty of maintaining
the distinctions between the mode of narrativization that I first
attempted and my project to write about a particular diasporic
community.
Early in my research I realized that while the stories of the
people of the historical Liverpool Chinatown were imaginable,
they nevertheless remained unknowable. The efforts that have
been made to produce local minority histories of Chinatown rely
like mine on newspaper accounts and official reports and amateur
ethnologists' often racist philippics which enable us to reconstruct
and deconstruct the discursive means by which the historically
dominant forces situated the immigrant and hybrid Chinese pop-
ulations. Such efforts have also drawn on personal testimonies of
second generation hybrid Chinatown subjects. That sort of work
is extremely valuable in reconstructing the anguish and victimiza-
tion suffered by these subjects, but can only tangentially unmask
stories of the first generation.9 Moreover, the new, more recent
Chinese immigration to Britain mainly from post-1949 Hong
Kong has established new 'all-Chinese' communities replete with
grandparents and grandchildren. The particular hybrid China-
town of which I write is no more. Like many diasporic communi-
ties in the past, the hybrid community I had wanted to write about
had existed for a very short historical moment. To write about this
history then I would have to narrativize my own memories of that
moment. I perhaps would have wanted to continue to hide behind
the shibboleth of academic 'objectivity', of critical distance. But
over the past few years I have been moving away from that posi-
tion, moving away from the displacement of my own concerns
onto those of a conveniently academically reified object of
research. I had a conversation with an African American student
at the University of Chicago several years ago in which she made
me realize that I was 'passing'; when a person of colour looks
white enough to pass as a white person. I had thought of 'passing'
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as a practice wilfully engaged in by others. But was this student
right. I have what could be a Chinese name, I teach Chinese
studies, but on the first day of a new academic year, I always feel
that I disappoint the eager European students as they see a white
man walk into the room. When teaching in Hong Kong I sensed a
similar sort of surprise when walking into a classroom of Hong
Kong Chinese students for the first time. A colleague of mine told
me that he had heard that amongst my department's students at
Hong Kong University there were two schools of thought: that
either I was a gwailo (or 'ghost' as foreigners are called in Hong
Kong) with an assumed Chinese name and faking Chinese ances-
try, or that I was somehow Cantonese and that I was pretending
that I was foreign-born and foreign-educated. There was no trend
of thought corresponding to the reality.
No, I had never consciously thought that I was passing; although
I did experience some of what people who think of themselves as
passing experience, most notably being included in white racist
conversation about Asians and Blacks. Like other 'miscegenated'
people who 'pass' as white I hear directly the discourse of white
racism which is now unspeakable in the presence of the non-white.
I suppose that such is the particular privilege of the hybrid who
'passes'.
I have never suffered for my 'hybridity', for my part-Chineseness.
I think the only times I have felt emotionally offended have been in
China and Chinatowns. When I lived in China, passing operated ~o
my disadvantage much of the time. Of course, being white allowed
me without question to enter hotels and shops reserved for for-
eigners whilst a British friend of mine who looked more Chinese
always had to carry her passport. I, however, was always a for-
eigner. However well I spoke Chinese, however long I lived in
China, I remained a foreigner. Every time I opened my mouth I
needed to re-establish my linguistic and cultural qualifications. It
could happen dozens of times a day. Each time I could prove I was
not a foreigner like all the others, not a tourist, not a businessman,
that I knew Beijing, that I was Zhongguo tong (knew the ins and
outs of Chinese society), but I was always a foreigner to begin with.
To my intellectual friends their knowledge of my Chineseness
worked to my advantage, made me more acceptable, made me
liable to a greater degree of confidence but also gave them license
to indulge in a greater degree of abuse, and ultimately in the final
stages of sometimes ferocious arguments, my foreignness was
always used against me: 'You do not understand, because you are
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not Chinese.' Living in China was very instructive in the politics of
race and ethnicity. I sometimes thought it unfair, but it was histor-
ically and intellectually understandable. Perhaps what I experi-
enced in China was institutional racism, but the whole narrative of
the last two centuries of history, of the way the West has treated
China and Chinese people, renders such complaints pathetic. If I
knew and understood the nature of hierarchical prejudice, I knew
it in England. I knew class prejudice and I knew the prejudice
known to all identifiable inhabitants of Liverpool; and
Liverpudlians are inevitably and inimitably identifiable as soon as
they open their mouths. 'Liverpool is the only city in Britain (apart
from London) upon which other Britons have definite opinions and
it is seen as a city of problems where the people themselves are
reckoned to be part of the problem.'lO Imagine then, not just the
double bind, but the triple bind of the Chinese Liverpudlian:
Chinese, working class, and from Liverpool, and the quadruple
bind of the Chinese Liverpudlian woman. I was fortunate. I did not
look Chinese, I could lose my accent, and I could even pretend not
to be from Liverpool (although that I have never done).
len Ang has broached this problem of writing about identity
from her own specifically liminal position as a non Chinese-
speaking Chinese and considers autobiography 'as a more or less
deliberate, rhetorical construction of a 'self' for public, not private
purposes'.ll My own attempt at writing about diaspora differs
from hers in that I aimed naively to write about not myself but oth-
ers, about the Liverpool Chinese, but then had to admit that the
figure of my own grandfather is centrally important to the con-
struction of that community for me, and that my storytelling would
incidentally but necessarily tell my story. In the process of
recollecting, recollections would refuse to simply centre on my
grandfather, they rushed forward to later childhood years after his
death when I lived in another Liverpool, a non-Chinatown last-
gasp Liverpool of working-class bravado and Merseybeat myths of
the 'swinging sixties', that itself was a special and hybrid space.
'Liverpool's people became accustomed to thinking of themselves
as belonging to a city with a place in the world. Horizons were
seldom lower than that. Never down to the region and unthinkably
not to the Southwest corner of Lancashire'. 12
But it was not just in the process of reminiscing that I recalled
other moments of my youth that took place over the physical traces
of my childhood-Chinese grandfather in Liverpool, it was also
during the very academic process of researching this particular
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diasporic community that such recollections pushed aside the
'object' of my research. Whether at a microfilm machine, or walk-
ing in and out of the library where the archives were held, disparate
narratives of my own Liverpool history persistently flowed over
one another. So that like len Ang, I concluded that I could not
exclude the autobiographical from the biographical, the personal
from the academic. Indeed, I refused to do so, not because the
imposable 'lines' between all these were no longer clear to me, but
because they appeared as barriers that I wanted to dismantle. Born
in Indonesia, len Ang has throughout her life been 'implicitly or
explicitly categorized, willy-nilly, as a 'Chinese'. I look Chinese.
Why then don't I speak Chinese?' I have had a somewhat contrary
experience. My Chineseness was totally invisible; on that count
some might even deny my capacity to claim a Chineseness at all.
Many of my mother's half-Chinese generation had spent much of
their mid twentieth-century lives desiring such invisibility.
Although a few phrases of Cantonese stuck in my head from my
sorties into Chinatown with my grandfather, like len Ang I did not
know the Chinese language, but then I did not need to. Unlike len
Ang no-one expected me to. I decided to learn Chinese anyway. I
remember when I was an undergraduate doing Chinese studies, I
did a class presentation on Macao, and 'revealed' that my grand-
father had spent much of his childhood there, and that he was
indeed Chinese. My fellow students refused to believe me, and if
and when they did could see no point in advertising such 'in~u­
thenticity'. In the 1970s students of Chinese were either interested
in Taoism or Maoism, not Chinatowns. There seemed no point in
going around advertising my imperceptible Chineseness. I under-
stand that in Britain today even quite famous literary theorists in
places like Oxford University are now 'rediscovering' their
Irishness, or Welshness, anything rather than be just plain English.
But a quarter of a century ago ethnicity was not so socially or polit-
ically acceptable. The plain fact is I did not look Chinese, I did
not suffer racism for being Chinese, but I had been, still am, an
observer of my own family's suffering, of their being treated
differently.
My mother, for instance, has always attracted the curious gaze of
others. People stare at her and cannot quite identify her. She asks,
'I don't look that foreign do I?' But the fact is she does look some-
how different. All her life she has been treated differently from, and
by, her fellow Liverpudlians. Once as she descended from a bus she
was helped across the road by someone who imagined she had just
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arrived in England; regrettably, she told me later, she did not even
want to cross that road. Quite recently she was hailed by a young
woman on a bicycle cycling down one of those magnificent
Edwardian streets in central Liverpool. The young woman was
proselytising for Jesus; I didn't believe anyone but Mormons still
did that, and then only in Asia, but perhaps Liverpool is perceived
as in need of civilizing. The young woman stopped her bicycle and
thrust a tract into my mother's hands:
'Do you speak English?' she asked. She was 'well-spoken' my
mother said, that is she did not speak with a Liverpool accent.
'Not very well,' my mother replied disingenuously.
'Do you think you could manage to read this?' the young woman
continued. By this time the tract was starting to crumple as they
both continued to clutch at it while the negotiation proceeded.
'Not really,' replied my mother.
'Oh,' said the young woman rapidly recuperating her tract and
cycling off. Presumably my mother was abandoned as a irre-
deemable alien pagan. Perhaps there is a special space in limbo
reserved for the 'half-caste' people who seem not to speak English
very well. But, in fact, what my mother experienced is what any
'Oriental-looking' person experiences in Britain regardless of being
British-born, and that is being treated like a recent arrival, as if they
had 'just got off the banana boat', as they used to say in Liverpool.
While being 'half-caste' may confer dubious benefits in the
colonies, it confers none in the colonial metropolis. In the 1950s
my mother had been offered a job through an employment agency
with the Liverpool office of an American tobacco company. The
first morning she reported for work she was immediately asked to
leave. She would understand, wouldn't she? During World War
Two however she had been deemed white enough to be conscripted
to work in a munitions factory. Like many others she found the
alternative of being in the services less monotonous, so when the
recruiters visited the factory she signed up. She was a Petty Officer
in the navy, working as an accountant. She passed the examina-
tions to become a Chief Petty Officer, but could not afford the
paraphernalia essential to British officer status, even in a suppos-
edly democratized war time military. But for most of her life she
has experienced discrimination for her 'foreign looks.'
Narratives and testimonies of diversity and difference, of racist
injustice, of patriarchal oppression are now legion. Yet we still need
to keep reading and writing such stories. The hybrid who 'passes'
perhaps has a particular responsibility to tell such stories, to point
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to such injustice. But is this quality of human hybridity only pre-
sent in the 'racially,' ethnically or culturally miscegenated? Michel
Serres has written of the attribute of metissage (the preferred
French word for our notion of 'hybridity') as a phenomenon of
human existence that ideologies and discourses of race and ethnic-
ity fail to take into account. Thus, he would say, we all possess the
attribute of hybridity and all have the potential to increase the
degree and nature of such hybridity:
Strange and original, already a mixture of genes of its father and
its mother, a third between them, every child evolves by new
interbreeding alone, all pedagogy remakes the engendering and
birth of a child: born left-handed, they learn to use the right
hand, remaining left-handed, are reborn right-handed, at the con-
fluence of two directions; born Gascon, they remain Gascon and
become French, in fact mixed; French, they make themselves
Spanish, Italian, English, or German, if they marry and learn
their spouses culture and language while keeping their own, then
already you have a fourth, soul and body mixed. Their mind
resembles the Harlequin's coat.13
Serres points to the ease with which multiple social identities accu-
mulate in the society in which he grew up and lives. All the other
identities he uses to illustrate his argument are also, however,
national and sub-national identities. Beyond the national identity
of France Serres describes only other national identities, the identi-
ties of those modern nation states which border France; intruding
even into Serre's eloquent plea for the recognition of difference and
coexisting identities, the dominant spectre of Jacobin centralizing
ideology. Occulted behind Serres' discourse the fact that legally and
institutionally it is through marriage that one acquires Spanish
nationality, and that one acquires Spanishness only by accepting
the state's national(ist) ideology. Physically, geographically, and
materially, however, while the French state may share an adminis-
trative border with the Spanish state, it is the Basque language,
community and identity that straddle the northern section of that
border; the Catalan, that is mapped over the southern section of
that political frontier. Serres is right, however, to point to subject's
making ideological, links at national levels. Does Serres see such
hybrid subjects as somehow ideal, or is he merely describing a
manifestation of European capitalist modernity? In the 'globalized'
modern world desired non-national connections between sub-
national and anti-national communities are still obstructed by the
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more dominant national authorities which dispose of almost total
linguistic and economic power. More serious perhaps than the
neglect of local communities in Serres' narrative is the lack of a
space for the non-white, the non-European European, the black
French, the Arab French, the 'Indochinese' French. It is as though
French colonial history has been erased, when it has never been so
problematic. Beyond the two dimensional borders of France's
hexagon are the hybrid communities that France constructed in
Asia and Africa, communities now in France and as French an
identity as is Gascon. And yet these communities are surrounded
by internal borders, excluded within and from the Frenchness that
once desired nothing more than to render them totally French, to
Gallicize them, to efface their indigenous cultures. Having only
half-succeeded, having created subjects with new and vibrant iden-
tities, French yet not French, laying claim to whatever they choose
to take from Frenchness, just as the French colonizers took what
they wanted from their conquered subjects, the forces of white
racist French wish to eradicate the 'impure,' the 'inauthentic' from
metropolitan France. The evident metissage of these once colonial,
once French, still (culturally and pyschologically) colonized, sub-
jects is too painful a reminder of white France's own inauthenticity,
or rather of the impossibility of authenticity. They are those who
the colonial would like to forget.
This desire for forgetfulness can be traced to an 'amnesia' whose
construction lain Chambers has located in the Baroque century,
'witness to the violent and extensive elaboration of a eurocentrism
that seeks to model and mould the rest of the world in its image
and imaginary.' While 'non-European bodies and histories' could
be contained and repressed as a forgotten and 'invisible presence'
on the 'colonial periphery' the racially hybrid, the 'half-caste', the
metis, like the colonial migrant drawn through economic necessity
to the colonial metropolis, is irritatingly present in the colonial
body and less easily forgotten. 14 In order to forget you need to find
'final solutions', to eliminate, to erase. And erasing is precisely
what colonial powers have long sought to do. Sometimes eradica-
tion has taken the form of elaborate national policies that have
sought to destroy the ethnic memories of Native American lands
and reinscribe them with the face of the white man (sometimes
literally - Mount Rushmore). Sometimes such elimination operates
at levels of the local and the everyday; for instance, through the
media's manipulation of racist fears and the deployment of munic-
ipal housing ordinances to 'erase' Chinatowns.
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Today the majority of ethnically Chinese people in Britain are
confined to the takeaway catering trade, but before World War
Two they worked, as did many Chinese in America, in the laundry
business, 'for many whites the epitome of all that was foreign' .15
The lowliness of the occupation was not lost on the modern
Chinese poet Wen Yiduo who as a, relatively, privileged student in
the United States wrote these lines in 1928:
The Laundry Song
Laundering is the most common occupation of the Chinese in the
United States, so often many students from China are asked: 'Is
your father a laundryman?'
(One, two, three)
Washing clothes that must be washed clean,
(Four, five, six)
Ironing clothes that must be ironed smooth.
I can wash out kerchiefs wet with grief,
I can wash white guilt-black shirts,
Greed's grease and lust's ashes...
All your home's dirty washing,
Give it to me to wash.
Metal that smells and blood that stinks,
Sullied things must be washed until clean,
Things washed will again be sullied
You say a laundryman's trade is too menial,
The Chinese alone will stoop so low,
Soapsuds can produce nothing imposing,
Washing linen pales against building of destroyers.
I agree it can't bring renown -
Bathing in bloody sweat, to wash the sweat of others
Would you stoop to it, would you?16
The fear of the foreign as Theweleit and Taguieff in particular have
demonstrated is imbricated in the fear of contamination'!? The
foreign, the unclear is filth. That the foreigner should be relegated
to purify the white man's filth is then perhaps fitting: how can the
contaminated be further contaminated? But it is also paradoxical:
how can the contaminated not fail to contaminate anew in the very
act of purifying the white man's sullied clothes?
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In the space of one afternoon in 1911, during a seaman's strike in
Cardiff, Wales, every Chinese laundry in the city was ransacked; it
was the same year my grandfather, who had left China two years
earlier, arrived in Liverpool. Ten years later, in June of 1919, as the
dismal reality of post-war unemployment and social misery
embraced World War One's returning servicemen, Britain saw its
worst 'race riots' yet; and 'race' would continue to be exploited by
British labour leaders, even those with seemingly impeccable 'social-
ist' credentials. The Jewish socialist Emmanuel (Manny) Shinwell,
who when I was a child I recall was always appearing on television
represented as the grand old hero of the left, in 1919 in his capacity
as secretary of the Seafarer's Union, was one of the most vociferous
campaigners against the employment of Black seamen, and 'master-
minded the colour bar on ships sailing from Glasgow harbour.'18
The unions' exploitation of race was not new, however. As men-
tioned in an earlier chapter, in 1906, a general election year, the
deployment of Chinese labour in British South Africa, rather than
white labourers from England, had been a major political issue.
James Sexton, Liverpool Irish labour organizer and politician, led
the anti-Chinese campaign in Liverpool, writing in his Weekly
Courier column, December 15, 1906:
My strictures on Chinatown have been responsible for a consid-
erable increase in my correspondence. The bulk of the letters
have been in support of my attitude though for reasons to which
I do not subscribe. I have endeavoured to make it clear from the
outset that it is not on narrow racial grounds or out of prejudice
to the presence of foreigners in our midst that I base my objec-
tion, but upon the grounds of experience and the knowledge of
what is meant by the congregation of low caste Chinamen in
other countries, their tendency to lower the standard of morality.
The same type of Chinaman is here in Liverpool, with the same
standard of morals. I have been to some trouble to investigate the
matter, not in the broad open light of day, like the Medical
Officer of Health and other public officers, when all is calm and
bright and the Chinamen away at their ships, but in the witching
hours of night, when the Chinese dens are packed, and where
immoral practices are in full swing. We have no law to stop
INDULGENCE IN OPIUM
Neither had New York or San Francisco or the colonies when the
yellow men first crept upon them. Eventually, however, laws had
to be adopted in all these places making indulgence in opium
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illegal, and it is so to-day. In China itself the edict has gone forth
that ten years from now opium smoking will be treated as an
offence. The pernicious effect of the habit is admitted. And if
there be no law to prevent it at present, then the agitation will at
least do some good by calling attention to a necessity for a change
in the law.
We cannot now know whether Sexton was writing out of ignorance
or was consciously revising history when he represented the history
of opium as a Chinese-originated problem. But here, as I demon-
strated in Chapter Two, historical reality is turned on its head. It
was Britain's regnant authority in the nineteenth-century that
through the two Opium Wars had intentionally transformed China
into a nation of 'junkies' in order to pay for England's own addic-
tion to tea. Eventually, not only was the opium exported to China
grown and produced in India but tea was grown there also, thus
depriving China of any effective revenue from the trade, assisting
in the ruination of China's economy, and forcing thousands of
desperate southern Chinese to chance their hand abroad. For the
twentieth-century British and American newspaper reader, middle-
brow-fiction fan, and cinema-goer, opium would be uniquely
understood as an inherently Chinese 'evil'. 'Indulgence in opium',
pace Sexton, was illegal in China and yet opium throughout was
imported into China by the great British hongs such as Jardine
Matheson whose fortune is now secreted in that lingering British
colony of Bermuda.
Sexton claims to be founding his anti-Chinese arguments on 'no
narrow racial grounds' and yet he deploys the language typical of
racist and in particular Orientalist rhetoric when he represents the
Chinese as cunning and stealthy in the manner in which 'yellow
men first crept upon' New York and San Francisco. Sexton
continues:
There is a still graver danger, viz., the attraction - I could use a
stronger term - of girls of 14 and 15 years of age. That this is
going on I am convinced. I have seen the girls going into the
Chinese places at night. I have seen girls coming out in the com-
pany of Chinamen who took them to shops to buy finery. It is dif-
ficult to give a concrete case, but the facts I have stated speak in
favour of a close investigation. I should be pleased indeed to learn
that my impressions are not well-founded.
Let us leave the unsavoury subject for the time being until we
see what the local authorities will do to grapple with it, and turn
to our own industrial affairs. The Autumn session of the Imperial
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Parliament is drawing to a close. And again, as in the previous
session, from a Labour point of view the result is magnificent...
What exactly is at issue here is not simply sexual permissiveness, or
the corruption of minors per se, but the allegation that such prac-
tices are pursued by Chinese men. That Sexton represents such
'crimes' as being committed solely by Chinese men as though non-
Chinese sailors and other men did not exploit the poverty-stricken
circumstances in which the women of Liverpool's proletariat lived
is unsurprising, what is of greater interest is Sexton's foreground-
ing anxiety over contamination of the white body by a non-white,
extraneous, foreign body.
Many of the young white women who eventually made their
homes in Chinatown were penniless Irish immigrants with no other
recourse. 19 My grandfather would arrange for many of them to
marry Chinese seamen. While Sexton assures the reader that he is
'convinced' of the occurrence of such crimes, he nevertheless finds
it 'difficult to give a concrete case', and yet concludes that the
'facts' he has provided warrant a 'close investigation'. Sexton was
successful in his demand. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Liverpool
City Council decided to investigate the claims made in the city's
newspapers against the Chinese in Liverpool, and appointed a
Committee of Inquiry. One of the members of this committee was
Councillor Sexton himself.
Except during World War Two when Chinese seamen manned
the allied merchant marine, Liverpool's Chinese population did not
exceed three figures. At the time Sexton was writing it was no more
than a few hundred. The numerical strength of the non-white
Other has always been a malleable instrument in racist discourse.
A few hundred Chinese can be made to represent the vanguard of
a horde of invaders or be made to seem so minuscule and insignif-
icant a number that they should be disregarded altogether.2o
The Liverpool City Council's Committee found that there were
few grounds for concern. Sexton and the majority of his fellow
'concerned' Liverpool dignitaries' fears over the penetration of the
local white body by the alien Chinese were unfounded. The inquiry
had been based entirely on the racist dread of contamination and
on the desire to rid Liverpool of this Chinese minority. The coun-
cillors were not interested in the maintenance of petit bourgeois
morality as such, nor were they preoccupied by the treatment of the
city's women and children in general; Sexton and his colleagues
betrayed no anxiety over moral behaviour within other Liverpool
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communities, nor did they seem perturbed by the generalized prac-
tice of wife-battering endemic in Liverpool's white communities.
A dozen years later, in the 1919 riots, British union activists
again incited racist sentiment when promoting action against non-
white seamen. However, the unionists were in something of a
quandary when playing the patriotic card, and hesitated over
stressing the foreignness and non-whiteness of their targets; many
foreign seamen were Scandinavians and thus very white, while
many of the British seamen were from the British West Indian
colonies. The opportunity to exploit racial differences was not lost
however. In Hull the Britishness of Black sailors was upheld against
the foreignness of the Chinese when 'coloured seamen cleared the
shipping office of Chinese sailors so that only British - Black and
White - would be employed.'21
My grandfather walked down Duke Street with his copious over-
coat (lapping around and behind him. One of the items in the
newspaper the previous day was headed: 'Chinese Man and English
Wife Evicted By Angry Mob' and told of a house in
Northumberland Street which had been rented by a Chinese man
and his white wife, since they had allegedly offered more money
than a returned soldier. The mob had invaded the house, abused
the couple, thrown the furniture into the street and set it alight. In
that morning's newspaper he read that a London mob had attacked
a Chinese laundry. 'So,' thought Chan looking up from the news-
paper 'the economy is not so good, the bosses blame the Chin~se
seamen, the union men blame the Chinese. But they need Chinese
seamen. They're cheap. But now it's getting like America where we
Chinese are banned by law, and there they don't let Chinese marry
white women. Here I've got a wife, children. How long before the
English copy the Americans? Maybe soon I should take the family
back to China.'
I saw my grandfather read the English newspapers everyday. I
know he was involved in local Chinese matters. He represented
Chinese people in trouble with the law (runaway seamen, over-
stayers, illegal immigrants) in the local courts. I saw him walking
down the old slum street in Liverpool many a time, and in partic-
ular one grey winter's afternoon with a half dozen eggs in a white
paper bag that he had just bought at the corner shop. On the side
of the bag was printed an advert for Typhoo tea, a tea he never
drank. It was a week before he died. I stood in the street in front of
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the house and watched him come towards me with his baggy yet
elegant charcoal grey overcoat flapping around him; a coat like the
one worn by Mao Zedong in a well-known portrait of the Great
Helmsman that I would come to know only a decade later. He
chided me, I think, for being outside in the cold; it was sometime
between Christmas and New Year. On New Year's Day he boiled
himself a small duck.
He never did take his family back to China. He had planned it.
He acquired all the documents, had the children pose for Chinese
passport photographs. But the grand return did not happen. Why
after so much planning and dreaming did he not go? The Japanese
war in China in the 1930s? The fact that two of his friends were
reputed to have got off the ship only to be met by 'agents' and
were never seen again? Or was it simply that he suddenly did not
have the financial means? Did he lose at the gambling table, did he
fail to win as planned? No-one knows, or none of his descendants
can remember. After so many years of trying to be invisible, to be
forgotten, perhaps you just forget.
There are, however, some moments of my grandfather's life
that are celebrated in family lore, because my mother and her
younger brother (who in his fifties decided he wanted to remem-
ber) were there. Then there are other moments that are unmen-
tioned or simply confused. None of these memories can be dated
with any accuracy. None can be put for sure into the sequence of
family or world history, but occasionally while sifting through
newspaper archives, obscure monographs, and social science
dissertations on the Chinese community, I stumble upon the inter-
stices of his story and official documented history. Or sometimes
a past memory suddenly makes historical sense. The trigger is
often revisiting a place that I first knew in childhood. I remember
once my grandfather took me to New Brighton, a working class
day-trippers' seaside town across the River Mersey from
Liverpool. It was a treat. First we had gone by underground train
to a hospital of some sort, where he sat and chatted to a Chinese
man in hospital-issue pyjamas. It must have been spring or sum-
mer. We sat outside under candy-striped parasols, but I recall
there was no sun. They talked, the man gave my grandfather
some papers. I never knew where we had been until many years
after my grandfather's death. A high school friend of mine, a
team-mate on the hockey team was taken ill with what turned out
to be leukaemia and stomach cancer. No-one ever told him. I
went with some of the other hockey players to see him. It was the
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same place I'd been to as a small boy. It was a hospital for the
terminally ill. My friend lived only six months. The Chinese man
must have been dying also.
My family was engaged eventually in all those occupations
Chinese were allowed to pursue. In the late 1930s, they were in the
laundry business, not in Liverpool but in Rhyl, in North Wales,
forty miles or so from Liverpool's Chinatown. All of the stories
about those times seem to relate to events that took place during
World War Two, like the one about my grandmother and mother
escaping the blazing cinema which had just been hit by a German
bomb. It seemed like my grandmother had spent much of the war
not in Rhyl but in Hollywood. Who could blame her? Apart from
Hollywood there was only the Chinese laundry. My grandfather
would work in the back of the laundry and occasionally go down
to Liverpool Chinatown to chance his hand with the takings. He
had not bought the business. He was in partnership with a friend
who had a big win on the gambling tables and bought a laundry.
But the accounts were bogus. There was no way that the laundry
could make enough money to keep the family let alone generate
enough to pay the fifty per cent of the estimated profits to my
grandfather's partner. There was also a house that was constantly
remortgaged and eventually repossessed, and that precipitated the
move back to Liverpool, to what had been the seamen's cafe he ran
during the late 1940s and in which gambling took place; many
Chinese seamen had been stranded in Liverpool during the Second
World War and the Chinese population had been in the ten's of
thousands.
The major family folkloric anecdote relating to the laundry -
apart from the routine accidents with irons, scalding water and
bleach - is centred on the day my grandfather acted with what I
perceive as unbounded dignity and irreverence. Some people might
have thought my grandfather an arrogant man, and it is true, he
was occasionally an ill-tempered, and domineering figure within
the family. He ought not to be over-sentimentalized. But as a
Chinese immigrant living in a hostile and racist environment I
credit him with much courage. With a history and life already
behind him by the time he arrived in England at the age of thirty,
who knows what sadnesses his silence concealed. It seems more
than probable that there were still those he cared for alive in
China; his mother had abandoned his father, his father had later
died in a typhoon, but there was talk of a brother, and perhaps
there had been a first, Chinese, wife. Once, when I was already at
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primary school he won seven hundred pounds on the football
pools. A great deal of money. At that time my mother earned only
a few pounds a week. My grandfather sent his entire winnings
back to China.
The laundry story went like this: A man, a white man naturally,
came in to collect his meticulously cleaned, ironed and starched
shirts. My mother and her younger brother were minding the
counter. The man complained about the cost of the laundering. My
uncle called his father.
'I'm not paying all this just for cleaning a few shirts,' said the
man defiantly.
'Don't want to pay?' replied my grandfather tartly.
'No, I don't,' said the man.
'All right,' said my grandfather as he took back the packet of
shirts. He dispassionately thrust the whole package into a bucket
of water meant for cooling the hot irons, and thwacked the man
across the face with the soggy bundle. Blathering and swearing, the
astonished and admonished man left the shop.
I like that story. Despite its pathos, its smallness, it remains for
me one of the most poignant and heartening narratives of anti-
colonial resistance I have heard.
Eventually, the laundry went bankrupt. I don't suppose it was
because my grandfather frequently exacted such retribution on
recalcitrant customers, but simply because in the 1950s with the
advent of coin-operated launderettes, the bottom fell out of the
market. When I first went to America in the 1980s and saw
Chinese and Korean people still working in laundries I was aston-
ished. They had long-since disappeared from the do-it-yourself
automated consumerizing England in which I grew up.
The other story, which much more directly affected a whole com-
munity of people, dealt with the razing of Chinatown. In Europe as
in America, the territorial space occupied by the ethnic Chinese
communities has frequently been perceived as particularly invasive
and infectious, a space where the contagion of 'Yellow Peril' was
cultured. Even though Chinese communities were limited and con-
tained by the sometimes physical boundaries of Chinatown, and
even when these peripheral sites were forced upon their inhabitants
institutionally or legally, or 'chosen' by the Chinese people by
economic necessity, they have still been perceived as menacing
spaces, and metaphorically constructed as such. In California, the
San Jose Chinatown was consumed by fire as local white inhabi-
'tants stood by and local authorities offered no assistance; it was
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replaced by a walled village, paid for by a local white philan-
thropist. The population was segregated from the surrounding
whites, until its tiny community deprived of new members by the
USA's Chinese exclusion laws, simply faded away, and the town
could finally be literally razed and erased.22 In the case of
Liverpool's Chinatown, the local white authorities, especially the
local press, seemed to relish the moment when erasure could be
effected, and constantly invented rationales and strategies for the
disappearance of the 'alien' Chinese presence. While less than thirty
years previously a far fewer number of Chinese inhabitants had
been inflated into a 'Yellow Peril' menace of huge proportions, now
in 1934 the alleged diminution and diffusion of Liverpool's Chinese
population is represented in the Liverpool media as a rationale for
razing Chinatown:
POST AND MERCURY, Apri119, 1934
"Chinatown"
I am told that many residents in Pitt-street and Frederick-street
are becoming increasingly resentful of that particular area being
dubbed 'Chinatown'.
My informant, a Liverpool alderman, says that there has been
a considerable reduction in recent years in the number of Chinese
nationals resident in and around Pitt-street, which he attributes
to the depressed state of shipping. And the fact that the
Corporation has been responsible for some attractive housing
developments in Pitt-street has accentuated still further the inap-
titude of the term 'Chinatown' as locally applied.
POST AND MERCURY, April 25, 1934
"Chinatown"
There can be no doubt that Liverpool to-day, as a Liverpool alder-
man suggests, has no longer a Chinatown. The nickname will
continue to stick, I dare say, to the region of Pitt-street and
Frederick-street, but nowadays there is nothing discreditable in it ...
At the end of the war over 6,000 Chinese lived in Liverpool;
but shipping depression has changed all that. The University sur-
vey three years ago showed that Liverpool had only about 500
adult Chinese males and there had been considerable inter-mar-
riage with white women. Many out of work have been deported,
and the present small Chinese community is sprinkled all over the
city, chiefly as laundry keepers.
POST AND MERCURY, November 19, 1934
Chinatown Doomed
Plans have been provisionally approved for the rebuilding of
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Chinatown, and indeed of the whole area on each side of Pitt-
street and Upper Pitt-street.
A block of flats erected in Pitt-street some years ago and the two
churches of St. Michael and St. Vincent de Paul - the latter
designed by the famous Pug - will remain; but otherwise the
entire district will be demolished, replanted and rebuilt in har-
mony with the new block of flats fronting St. James-street.
Upper Frederick-street will disappear and Pitt-street will be
widened to sixty feet, while both Cleveland-square and Kent-
square, dating from the time of Queen Anne, are doomed. The
much dwindled Chinese colony will have to find a new home.
During the Second World War, when the Allies were dependent on
Chinese labour to keep maritime communications open, the respon-
sibility for razing Chinatown would be displaced onto the German
Luftwaffe's blitzkrieg.
After the war, the desire to see superfluous Chinatowns erased
re-emerged. In the 1950s, London's Chinatown was the target for
elimination, a project which attracted the following statement from
the Lettrist International (later to become the Situationist
International):
LETTRIST INTERVENTION
Letter to The Times re Chinatown
Sir,
The Times has just announced the projected demolition of the
Chinese quarter in London. We protest against such moral ideas
in town-planning, ideas which must obviously make England
more boring that it has in recent years already become.
The only pageants left are a coronation from time to time, an
occasional royal marriage which seldom bears fruit; nothing
else...
We hold that so called modern town-planning which you recom-
mend is fatuously idealistic and reactionary. The sole end of
architecture is to serve the passions of people.
Anyway, it is inconvenient that this Chinese quarter of London
should be destroyed before we have the opportunity to visit it and
carry out certain psycho-geographical experiments we are at
present undertaking.
Finally, if modernisation appears to you, as it does to us, to be
historically necessary, we would counsel you to carry your enthu-
98
PADDY'S CHINATOWN, OR THE HARLEQUIN'S COAT
siasm into areas more urgently in need of it, that is to say, to your
political and moral institutions.
Yours faithfully,
Michele Bernstein, G.-E. Debord, Gil]. Wolman
13 October 1955, POTLATCH
At the end of the millenium, Chinatowns were suddenly re-
invented and refurbished with garish-coloured dragon-headed
lamp-posts, red plastic pagoda-topped phone boxes, and imposing
arches imported from China. Chinatown restoration societies
advertise themselves on the internet, along side Chinatown
business associations. This may seem like a reprieve for
Chinatowns, but is more probably the final knell following the
funeral we all missed.
Back in 1934, Liverpool City Council had already proceeded
with its plans to raze Chinatown, condemned Chinatown houses
and businesses, and the inhabitants thus evicted without compen-
sation. For my grandfather there followed a sequence of events that
led perhaps to the preparatory steps he took towards returning
with his family to China, and more immediately to his leaving
Liverpool for the unviable laundry in Wales. Everything he owned,
and everything to which he was attached was to be found in
Chinatown. Not only did it represent his and others' livelihoods, it
was their home, their social life, their community. My grandfather
refused to vacate his premises. He fought the city in court. He
defended himself. How could he have thought he would win? 'Was
it merely an act of defiance for himself, for his family, for his
community?
Not only did he lose the case, and thus lose Chinatown, he was
ordered to pay the court costs. Again he refused. It was not that he
could not pay - he could always have borrowed the money from
Chinatown acquaintances - he would not pay. He was sent to gaol
for a month. My grandmother took him food, went everyday to see
him, the lone Chinaman in the white man's gaol.
I like this story also. It gives the lie to the myth of the cowering,
submissive Chinaman. He challenged local government power, and
he defied the judicial authority of the state.
In a work which undoubtedly changed the course of thinking
about culture, society and history, Daily Life in the Modern World,
Henri Lefebvre opens the presentation of his research and thinking
on daily life with some remarks about a quest to discover the
significance of a particular day in early twentieth-century history, a
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day chosen completely at random. He concludes that the newspa-
per archive as a record of history not only hides infinitely more
than it reveals about the real trends of world history, but also that
it fails to tells us anything of the day to day lives of 'unimportant'
people:
Now you want to know what happened on this day seemingly
like any other, during a relatively peaceful and prosperous year,
at least in our beloved West and in our dear old country. So you
will go to the National Library. You will consult the newspapers.
You will find items of news, accidents, the statements of the
important people of the day, a dusty mass of news and varied
events, dubious revelations of current wars and revolutions. You
will find practically nothing that will help you foresee ... what
was going to happen, what was brewing hidden by the depths of
time. You will find little either about how people of no impor-
tance lived that day: their business, their concerns, their work,
their amusements. Only the adverts (as yet undeveloped), items
of news, the minor marginal news reports will inform you about
what happened at the centre of daily life during those hours.
Bent over the newspapers and the magazines of this not too
distant era ... you can now dream. On that day, didn't something
essential happen that doesn't appear in the record ...23
Lefebvre, like Bachelard, authorizes us, appeals to us, to dream, to
account for the sub-surface of the newspaper's seamless inscrip-
tions of authorized history quantifiable on any particular day by a
fixed number of pages: eight, or sixteen, or thirty-two. But never
any more or less. No more, no less of official life is permitted to
happen. Official daily life takes on a plateau-like equivalence. In
advocating and authorizing our dreaming, Lefebvre is reflecting on
the unnarrativized day as either a day when a seemingly minor
event (on a date now unknowable) significantly shifted forward
our common history, or a day which constituted a more or less sig-
nificant moment in a process, a longer moment of intellectual
development such as Einstein's work on relativity, to cite Lefebvre's
own example. But he is also concerned that there is no record 'how
people of no importance lived that day,' and without a sense of that
day there can be no sense of all the days constitutive of the life of
the 'people of no importance.' In her prefatory comments to the
revised edition of the second volume of L'invention du quotidien,
Luce Giard, likens the 'transgressive' quality of Michel de
Certeau's, Pierre Mayol's and her work on the everyday when it
appeared in 1980 to the transgressivity of May 1968, 'believing in
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the imagination, and the interior liberty of the "man without qual-
ities" .'24 De Certeau and his colleagues' work surely in a large
measure addressed Lefebvre's concern over the lack of space
afforded to the everyday and the common people in the official
record. To the extent that the titles of the American university
presses have recently been peppered with the word 'everyday'
Giard is no doubt entitled to a certain satisfaction with having pop-
ularized a certain style of inquiry. But as the authors' afterthoughts,
in particular Mayol's, on the impact of French youth unemploy-
ment, themselves reveal, there is always the danger of seeing in the
social and economic conditions that dictate the everyday life of a
comparatively affluent society, such as was the case in the France
of the 1970s, a greater emancipatory potential than really exists.
For there are also moments when the everyday existence in the
modern world of the 'people of no importance' is challenged by
official ideological and economic changes, and by the narratives of
modernity and progress. While economic and technical 'progress'
may transform everyday life practices such as shopping for
groceries and the time allotted to cooking, more catastrophic
events such as a prolonged strike, an economic slump, a civil war,
racially-inspired forced migrations, will shatter the norms and rou-
tines of material everyday life. And while, as Lefebvre intimates,
the official national impact of such events may be recounted in the
newspapers, the effect on the 'people of no importance' is
concealed beneath the official pages of record. It was just such an
official movement against 'people of no importance' that 'took
place with the dispossession of Liverpool Chinatown's inhabitants,
and which the Post and Mercury reported so glibly.
In my own search of the newspaper archives, I was not seeking an
'accurate' record of the everyday life of the poor white women,
Chinese merchants and sailors and their 'half-caste' children of
Liverpool Chinatown. All I hoped to do was to match stories of offi-
cial provincial life with the necessarily imprecise narratives of
unofficial history. 'Bent over the newspapers and the magazines of
this not too distant era ... you can now dream,' wrote Lefebvre, and
so on the day I found the newspaper reports of the threats to erase
Chinatown, I dreamed of something essential happening that did
not appear in the record.
'1 will go back to China.' Sitting in the white ceramic tiled cell in
Walton gaol, Chan decided he had had enough. The English had
forced their way into his homeland, had made the people into
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opium addicts, had taken Hong Kong for themselves, could come
and go as they pleased, but here in England they would not even
concede the smallest space to Chinese people. They didn't want
Chinatown. They didn't want Chinese in Liverpool. 'They don't
want us here. They call us barbarians and flaunt their "civiliza-
tion" and their justice and their churches, and then they just take
away our livelihood, take away our home. We can only go back to
China.'
'Dearie,' he said to my grandmother, using their preferred term
of endearment, when she came to visit, 'We must go back to
China.'
'Yes, Lee,' she replied. 'We shall go.'
After all what incentive was there to remain? Every act of central
and local authority must have seemed rooted in the desire to
expunge the contaminating presence of the Chinaman. British citi-
zenship legislation had even taken away my grandmother's British
nationality for marrying an alien. She had been excised from the
British national body.
Had my grandparents and my mother and her brothers returned
to China they would have encountered numerous difficulties, espe-
cially through the years of Chinese political turmoil, in the 1950s
and 1960s when to have foreign connections could be tantamount
to treason. And what of the practical difficulties, the language,
everyday existence? What kind of loyalty, what kind of bond did it
require for this woman, my grandmother, to consider taking such a
step, to consent to accompany her husband to, what was for her, a
very foreign land.
Theirs had not been a forced marriage as such, more a marriage
of circumstance perhaps, or of necessity. Both my grandmother and
her mother were products of the British suffragette era, my great-
grandmother was known as a 'woman of character'. She was a
fairly well-educated woman, a liberated woman for her time. She
decided one day that she no longer wished to tolerate her husband's
behaviour, the routine of daily life and taking her four children she
quit the little Cotswold village where they lived. She liked to travel.
She liked to move house frequently. She was a born migrant. She
met a Greek ship's carpenter; my great grandmother and grand-
mother accompanied him on a long circuitous voyage around the
Mediterranean. My grandmother fell in love with Palestine. She ate
fresh figs and became enamoured of a Palestinian boy. She was
seventeen. Later when she retold her adventure, it always sounded
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like Paradise. I remember my mother and I would buy her dried figs
as a treat, they were not the same, but they were a token of past
pleasures. They brought her the pleasure of reminiscence. All her
life, she dwelled on that moment of autonomy, of passionate life
untrammelled by the boredom of habit and routine. It was her sus-
taining dream, the glimmer of an alternative life she might have
known.
Returned from the sea, the ship's carpenter deceased, my grand-
mother and her elder sister worked in a Liverpool tobacconist's
near Frederick Street. My grandfather bought his cigarettes there
everyday.
My grandparents would eventually have five children. My
mother's younger sister died in infancy. One blustery, cold day, my
grandfather, euphoric after a win on the gambling tables, swept off
his baby daughter to the corner sweet shop. She wasn't well
wrapped up, she was fragile, and was dead within the week. My
grandmother never really recovered from that trauma. She spent
the rest of her life in a sort of unspoken mourning for her lost
daughter, and for her lost Palestine.
It must have been difficult also to bear the weight of white dis-
approbation of her marriage to a Chinese. In the first half of this
century, for a white woman to associate with a Chinese man, a
representative of the Yellow Peril, was considered tantamount to
prostitution, not to mention infidelity to the nation.
The newspapers did not neglect this aberrant phenomenon.
Under the headlines 'A Yellow Peril', 'Questions of Morality; and
'Public Indignation Increasing,' the local newspaper published an
editorial that foregrounded the problem of Chinese men 'tainting
the race' by marrying white women, even if most of the white
women, my grandmother being an exception, were Irish and thus
belonged to another habitually undesirable 'racial' minority. The
rhetoric of the racist discourse of the time always constructed inter-
marriage between 'races' as though a boundary between species
had been transgressed. Physical union was seen as a bestial act.
Women who associated with, or married, Chinese men were thus
described as having 'mated' with them:
It is not only degraded women who mate with these men.
Frequently one comes across a decent-looking, apparently happy
and contented woman with three or four half white, half yellow
children at her feet. It is with a shock that one sees such names as
Mary Chung and Norman Sing. It is at once sorrowful and
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sickening to observe such apparently decent British women suc-
cumbing to the attractions of the yellow man; but it is to be seen
not alone in Chinatown, but wherever Chinese laundries are
established, that is to say, all over Liverpool. Young women are
fascinated by these dark-eyed Celestials.25
My grandmother cared for her children, stood by her husband. She
survived him by five or six years. In her later years she was blind
and ill with diabetes, but most of all, it seemed to me, saddened by
the mundanity of her life. She loved to play the piano, but needed
to read music, which in her later years she could not do. On occa-
sion she would bang the keys in frustration. She loved colour, but
could not see. She told me humorous anecdotes of train journeys in
the Ottoman Empire. It was a wondrous world far from the drab
and poor circumstances in which she found herself. She was an
adventurous women, an extravagant woman, she had the air of an
actress about her. She had been one of the first women in Liverpool
to drive. The car was a white Packard. It must have been one of the
moments when my grandfather was comparatively affluent. He
drove the car into a ditch one day and, disgusted but unconcerned,
walked off and left it there for good.
For my grandmother, there had been moments of happiness, but
it must have been difficult living with such a strong-willed, seem-
ingly rash man, who lived and earned his living in a Chinatown
world she could not share. I saw more of that world than she or her
children did. My grandfather was not just a gambler after all. He
was a literate man. He knew some law. He defended Chinese sea-
men, runaways, illegals, in the courts. We would hide out illegal
immigrants in the attic. If they could go six months without being
caught they got a residence permit; I suppose that's what used to be
known as British fair play. He acted as a sort of ombudsman in dis-
putes in Chinatown, negotiated with the police. Years after he died
ageing cm police sergeants would stop my mother and ask her if
she were Chan's daughter. He was the unofficial leader of
Chinatown. Once a small official-looking man, dressed in what we
now call a Mao suit, came from Paris to see my grandfather. My
mother who was a young girl remembers that day well. The man
told her she had the map of China stamped on her face and that
one day she would be very proud of that. I suppose it was meant
as a compliment, but also as an assertion of resistance, hope and
patriotic fervour. After all this was a moment in history when the
anti-colonialist struggle inevitably equated with nationalist
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struggle. But my mother did not have a national face, but an ethnic
face, not the face of China, but a Chinese face which led people to
refuse her employment, ask her if she needed help finding her way
around the city she had grown up in, or whether she understood
English. Apart from his intervention in the matter of my mother's
physiognomy this Chinese man's provenance from France reminds
me of my grandfather's own acquaintance with the French lan-
guage. My grandfather read the French newspapers, perhaps then
as now there was more news about China to be found in the French
press. But when and where did he learn French? His childhood was
spent in Canton and, after his father's death, in Macao. Apart from
Macao and Hong Kong that southern region of China fell under
the French colonial sphere of influence, but surely the level of
French necessary to read a newspaper would require more than just
chance encounters with the colonial French presence. As a young
man he had studied in Nanking, and since he had been orphaned
at an early age it seems probable he was already making his living
from his gambling skills. Perhaps he learnt French in Nanking. It is
said he expected a consulate to open in Liverpool after World War
Two, and he looked forward to being named the honorary consul.
Perhaps it was his childhood ambition to be a scholar-official just
like thousands of others who went to Nanking to prepare for the
civil service examinations before they were abolished in 1905. But
a consulate never did open in Liverpool.
Whenever my grandfather was about to go off to Chinatown, I
would run the two or three blocks to the main intersection where
there was a cab rank and bring back a taxi; no-one in our street had
a telephone and radio cabs in any case were not yet invented.
Sometimes I would go with him, and spend what seemed like eter-
nities sitting in the drab front room of the Chinese Freemasons'
house. He would disappear for a few minutes and return with a
hambao, which much later I discovered was properly called a
charsiu bao. I would sit there clutching it while he disappeared
again to conduct his business. Sometimes the journeys were longer,
like the trip to the cancer hospital. I remember once we went out to
a Chinese restaurant some miles out of town. Two chefs had been
fighting with choppers. One had ended up dead on the big wooden
chopping table. I cannot remember now whether the body was still
on the table. I think it was there or maybe it had been removed and
it was just mentioned; but since I couldn't follow the conversation,
how would I have known that? It must have been there.
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With regularity he would take me to the corner candy store. I
called it Paddy's. No-one else called it that. My grandfather spoke
good English but with a not altogether perfect pronunciation.
The English 'r' escaped him. My middle name, the name by which
I was called as a boy, was Barry. When the shopkeeper asked my
name my grandfather would tell him, and the shopkeeper heard
it as 'Paddy'. Whenever we went into the shop the shopkeeper
would say 'Paddy'. It took my mother and I a long while to work
out why the shop was called Paddy's, and we didn't work it out
until my grandfather had died. Occasionally he would take me to
women's houses. He knew a number of women. One or two were
Chinese and lived nearby. Several of the women were white
and had 'half-caste' children about my age. Who were these
women? The wives of Chinese seamen whose marriages he had
arranged?
Apart from the scenes I personally observed or participated in,
much of what I have narrated here happened before I can even
claim to remember, either before I was born or before I could
understand, so I must invent it, reconstruct it. However, the racist
discourse is a documented historical reality, the official acts took
place, and the family's reactions to their treatment, which survive
as undated anecdotes, happened some time. However much
research I might do as a descendant of an immigrant, of a diaspora
dweller with a whole undisclosed life locked in her/his head, ulti-
mately I can do no more than, indeed am compelled to, re-imagine.
Imagination is the stuff of fiction, but it is also the reality of half-
known, half-sensed, half-spoken, half-gone-with-the-dead diaspora
stories. If the stories are to be known they have to be written imag-
inatively, inventively. In a sense then this chapter is an attempt to
make sense of my own personal diaspora, but it is also an approach
to comprehending the impossibility of such an attempt.
To talk of this inheritance, to refer to history, as to refer to trans-
lation or memory, is always to speak of the incomplete, the never
fully decipherable. It is to betray any hope of transparency. For
to translate is always to transform. It always involves a necessary
travesty of any metaphysics of authenticity or origins. We find
ourselves employing a language that is always shadowed by loss,
an elsewhere, a ghost: the unconscious, an 'other' text, an 'other'
voice, an 'other' world ...
lain Chambers26
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The everyday is what grips us intimately from inside. It is a half-
way history of ourselves, almost in retreat, sometimes veiled; we
must not forget this 'monde memoire', as Peguy put it. A similar
world grips our mind, olfactory memory, memory of places of
childhood, memory of the body, of childhood gestures, of plea-
sures. Perhaps it is not superfluous to underline the importance
of the domain of this 'irrational' history, or of this 'non-
history ...
Paul Leuilliot27
Bent over the newspapers and magazines in the Liverpool City
Library, I looked up and wondered whether on that day in reading
in the newspapers of the Hull riots, Chan Lee did not take some
essential decision. He always read the papers - English, Chinese,
sometimes French too my mother tells me. I ordered some photo-
copies of dusty newspaper court reports of proceedings against
Chinese seamen and laundry workers arrested for opium smoking
or gambling, and left the public library. I walked back across the
gardens at the back of Saint George's Hall, gardens I'd walked
across so many times before. I was a teenager studying in the public
library for university entrance examinations, reading up on barely
known Latin American novelists who thirty years later are heroes,
politicians or ghosts. But I wasn't thinking about that moment of
my life. I was thinking about the summer I went to my first
summer camp, the summer we moved house from the old Victorian
'slum' to the high rise council flat, the summer I moved up to the
central Liverpool high school. It was a glorious summer. England
won soccer's World Cup, although I had supported Pele and Brazil,
until the finals, and even bought a yellow pennant with Pe!e's face
printed on one side and a blue globe on the other. My mother gave
me the money to buy some World Cup mementoes and in addition
to the pennant I bought an England key ring that had a plastic
replica of the England mascot, 'World Cup Willie' who looked
something like a cross between a lion and a teddy bear and sported
a union jack tee-shirt. The two-year old Labour government was
re-elected, no doubt in no small part thanks to England's soccer
victory. But that wasn't the first election I remembered. The first
was the 1964 election. In the yard of the school in a posh part of
Liverpool, which I reached each day only after taking two public
buses, I was the only boy or girl to support Labour, all the others
were Conservatives, except for one senior boy whose father was
destined to be a Liberal leader in the town one day. I must have
been eight or nine years old, and I recalled Labour posters posted
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over the old Co-op shop window in Myrtle Street; a shopping street
which was already closing down shop by shop because of slum
clearance, declining trade and the gradual incursion of the super-
market in Liverpool. But that was 1964. The most memorable day
in what seemed now like the endless and sunny summer of 1966
was when I went 'down town' with my mother to welcome the
Everton and Liverpool soccer teams arriving on top ofan open-top
double decker bus for the Lord Mayor's banquet in their honour;
(in Liverpool although not in other parts of Britain people say
'downtown', a seafaring town's linguistic import from America
may be, or just the fact that the centre of town is a dell, I was once
admonished in an undergraduate translation class at London
University for using the expression). Both teams were Liverpool
teams. I wore Everton and Liverpool ribbons and an Everton plas-
tic boater. Liverpool and Everton had between them achieved a
double by winning the Football Association cup and the League
title. Bill Shankly, the gruff and avuncular Scot, Liverpool's man-
ager, was King, so that parts of Liverpool's Irish population then
worshipped two King Billies. I no longer remembered who the
Everton manager was. Like the election of the Labour govern-
ments, the day had become confused in my mind. The memory had
become fused with that of the day I went to see the Beatles on the
balcony of the Empire Theatre and stood on the steps of the
impressively neo-classic St. George's Hall to get a better view.
Maybe I hadn't seen them. Maybe they hadn't come out. Maybe I
had it confused with a Pathe news clip that showed them coming
out, that I saw later. I couldn't recall. 'One thing's for sure', I mut-
tered to myself, 'they built that bloody hall back to front.' And they
had. Or so it was said. The builders read the plans upside down.
The magnificent St. George's Hall was meant to give onto the
splendour of its gardens, look out towards the river, towards the
Ocean, the New World. But they built it backwards. It looked onto
the grimy old building that was Lime Street station, towards
Manchester, towards the industrial mill towns of northern
England. Somehow, I thought, that was the beginning of the end
for Liverpool. They say the architect committed suicide when he
received the news by telegram while aboard ship in the
Mediterranean. It was raining again. I counted my change and
caught a taxi. Since Thatcher had deregulated the city's bus author-
ity a plethora of busses with liveries of different colours had sprung
up, besides their route numbers had all changed since I was a boy,
and I no longer knew which bus to catch home.
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In the narration of my leaving the library that day, I omitted a
mundane memory from my catalogue of random thoughts. I had
actually worked in that library. I mean I had not just consulted the
collection, I had actually trained as a librarian there. Between high
school and university I worked as a library assistant. I was dis-
patched to the branch library in the undesirable area of Toxteth; the
area in which I had grown up. I worked in a humdrum unexciting
job in a library building built for the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie
and now barely frequented except by the poor and unemployed in
search of warmth. I wanted to be gone from Liverpool. The time I
worked there would have been about five or six years before the
riots which gave that area notoriety. Twelve years before I had used
that library on my way home from primary school. I had been
issued with tickets and borrowed a book on space exploration; I
remember it recounting stories of monkeys and cosmonauts. I think
I must have decided it was too rough an area to chance my luck in
with regularity because I used libraries in other places after that. A
hundred yards up Parliament Street from the fine old neo-classical
public library building was the Rialto Cinema where my grand-
father took me on several occasions. We did not go often. We
usually went to the Tatler news and cartoon cinemas down town.
Grandfather would watch the Pathe news and I got to see Tweetie
Pie and Tom and Jerry. But just occasionally we went to the Rialto.
We saw the Disney cartoon The Sword in the Stone, and ~ film
about the 301 Spartans, which impressed me a good deal. It was a
great story, later taught to me at school with much less panache and
colour. The Athenians wore purple tunics and the Spartans red, I
recall. Just sometimes, my grandmother took me to the cinema.
I remember we went when I was about five or six to see Summer
Holiday at the Majestic. It was a sort of pre-MTV pop musical star-
ring the Shadows and Cliff Richard, England's recording industry's
tame answer to Elvis Presley. I was reminded of that trip to the
cinema just recently when watching British television Channel Four's
Bhaji on the Beach, a wonderful film telling the story of Indian
women of various generations, and their day-to-day harassment at
the hands of husbands, families, and ordinary English racists. The
local Indian women's group organises a day out to Blackpool, and
the music chosen to accompany the journey sequence is a Hindi
cover version of the theme tune from Summer Holiday.
When I went to see Cliff Richards that day, the status of the
Majestic cinema as a daily landmark in my life was another five
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years away, for the unremarkable cinema building was only a
stone's throwaway from the high school I attended throughout my
teenage years. As for the Rialto, an unusual and memorable build-
ing by reason of its tiled whiteness which foregrounded it against
the neighbouring redbrick Edwardian terraces, it was destined, like
many other cinemas and churches in the 1960s, to become a furni-
ture warehouse. And yet its final hour would be much more heroic
as it ultimately became a centrepiece of the 1981 Toxteth riots and
was to be consumed dramatically by flames. I didn't witness it. I
was then at Peking University pursuing a quest determined by boy-
hood affection and fascination for an old Chinaman I still strove to
understand.
As a child I saw the residues of aging lives. I 'knew' an old
Chinese, a 'Chinaman' as white people called him then, the scholar-
official manque, a would-be returnee to China, ultimately just an
old gambler whose luck had run out, or who had no further need
of luck. I remember arguments over money. One in particular sticks
in my mind. My grandfather wanted a sum of money for his own
purposes, perhaps to go and gamble with. My mother wanted to
use it to pay the electricity bill. That argument must have happened
when I was already about seven years old, since for much of my
early childhood we had only gaslight; I used to play with the little
replacement gas mantles. One day there was no more gas. It had
been disconnected. The bill had not been paid. It seems now that
we had neither gas nor electricity for a very long period of time.
Eventually my mother found the money to have one floor of the old
house wired. I don't know who won the argument over the
electricty bill that day, but I do not recall the electricity being dis-
connected. However I do remember that my grandfather
pronounced the word electricity 'Electric City.' I imagined giant
electricity generating plants brightly illuminated and working
through the night, and for a long time wondered about the exact
location of Electric City.
My grandmother loathed routine and habit. She knew the value
of the passionate life she had been denied. She abhorred the dismal
greyness of everyday decaying city life. My grandmother once so
effervescent became during the time I knew her a sad, old woman
whose worst fears came to pass. Her name was Gwenllian. She and
her mother had spent many years in Wales; when I was a boy my
grandmother would take me to see my great aunt, the one with
whom she had worked in the tobacconist's. My great aunt lived in
Wales. I was enchanted by the countryside and the nation. I
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wandered alone over the hills imagining adventures, inventing
stories about having caught trout by tickling their bellies, and play-
ing with the local Welsh-speaking boys who made me feel like a
foreigner (I was) and gave me my first glimpse of the realities of
English colonialism. My great grandmother like my grandmother
adored that country. She named my grandmother after a Welsh
Princess who had been locked up at the top of a tower and left to
there die. When Liverpool City Council eventually rehoused my
family out of the old slum Victorian building that had housed the
seaman's cafe, it was to the top floor of a high-rise block of flats.
My grandmother blind and unable to walk more than a few steps
at a time felt she was re-living the legend of Princess Gwenllian,
and the council flat was indeed her prison tower.
If you asked my uncles about my grandfather, you would hear
very different stories, or perhaps no story at all. I asked my
mother's eldest brother once to talk about his father. He had man-
aged to graduate from medical school thanks to remittances from
the laundry, but could not survive the race and class ideologies of
the 1950s British medical profession. He settled in Canada, where
he was a surgeon. He had been the closest to my grandfather, he
worked in the laundry himself. He knew the Chinese characters for
'collar' and 'shirt'. It's almost like a rags to riches fairy tale. But he
had nothing to say, no tale to tell. He too is now dead, along with
his own untold history.
The funeral cortege drove into Nelson Street. Two or three Chinese
men were standing on the steps of the small terraced house that
served as the headquarters of the Chinese Freemasons, the tong
house; it was the house where I'd sat clutching a charsiubao many
a time as I waited for my grandfather to return from his errands. I
had been sitting in the small sepia and maroon coloured front room
only a few days before the funeral, but I have never set foot in that
house since. The house is now painted white and has a red door
and plastic sign proclaiming it be the Headquarters of the UK
Chinese Freemasons. I have never seen anyone go in or out.
The Chinese men who were dawdling on the pavement were
smoking. They quickly dropped their lit cigarettes and ran into the
house. It was a mid-winter's day, but I remember clearly that the
sun was shining brightly, I wanted to take the family Brownie cam-
era to the cemetery. The black cars drove slowly down the street.
There were a number of people standing on the pavement to watch
Chan Lee's funeral procession go by. The hearse drove around the
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block and passed in front of the freemasons' house again. By now
the men were struggling to hoist up a flag on the pole that still
stands in front of the first floor window. The procession was
repeated and this time the flag was up but from the gesticulating in
the street beneath the flagpole it seemed something was wrong. It
was the wrong flag. The hearse went around the block again and
the next time the funeral procession drove by the flag seemed to
everyone's satisfaction.
Were my grandfather to return today to that Freemason's House
where the flags were run up, to that haven of stranded old Chinese,
he would find towering before it a brilliant, garishly coloured red-
lacquered Chinese archway, imported from the People's Republic
of China and erected by workers from China, the Chinese transla-
tion of 'Chinatown', 'Zhongguocheng' (there used not to be such a
word in Chinese), emblazoned across the upper part of the monu-
ment. It would be sentimentally appealing to interpret the arch as
a memorial for he who never did go back to China. But no, his
story, my story cannot be resolved so glibly. Rather, I see that arch
as an anachronistic structure, out of time and out of place, closing
off the Chinatown I once knew, casting its shadow over that front
room of the tong house where I patiently awaited the return of my
grandfather, wondering where he had been and what he had done,
and wonder I still do.
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